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INTRODUC'riON 
In the fall 976 a st (R. Rommetveit), a 1 
guist (E. ), a philosopher (D. F¢llesdal), and a mathe-
rna tical ,J" Eo Penstad} decided to give a nar togeth~ 
er on as seen from thei1· va perspect:ives. This was 
an interdiscipl venture, the 'copic turned out to be fashion~ 
able, and \ve had an overflow audience c- at least. until the Hl.a·the-
Montague's "~J:t.er that etn.· audience was reduced to a more 
comfortable size. But enough interest had been generated for the 
seminar to con:t 1\nd has served as a useful meeting place. 
The "hard been a group of linguists and logi-
c bnt from to we have also had the active part. 
pation of rs, psychologists, and computer sci ts. 
After the grand opening we settled down to understanding the 
impact of the Montague paradigm on theoretical linguistics, and it 
was natural for us to focus on the semantics of natural languages 
and the rrelat betv1een syntax and semantics. A result 
of this learning vJas the lecture i•iodels for natural lan-
guages [1] ch I gave to the 4th Scandinavian Logic Symposium. 
It represents a logician's reaction to Montague's PTQ. As a logi-
cian I could make ici t t.he use r"iontague had made of the notion 
of generalized quantifi~. (In addition to "surface" uses it was 
also pointed out that an unspecified generalized quantifier seems 
to lurk belo',v the surface in passive constructions,. If we assert 
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that Mary is liked, we leave open whether by one, several, many, 
most.. . . Perhaps this explains why politicians love the passive 
voice.) I also pointed out. how the Montague analysis could be 
given a more 
red interpreta 
bent. 
as a rel 
'Love' as a bivalent verb has a natu-
on bet'ween two individuals. This is 
t.he lexial "fact". If th,;: cornpositionality requirements of your 
favorite synt:actic analysis requires something different, you can 
always lift in type using the technique of t..~abstraction. Fur-
ther an analysis o£ pass was given that was attuned to this 
lexical point of and vlhich seems to be similar in spirit to 
some current lexical treatments of passive. 
The lecture concluded noting several shortcomings of the 
Mon>cague paradigm. The model frame Ot = <A, F I> carries too 
little structure and needs to be enriched by further computational 
and/or geometric content. And I also emphasized that in a 
speaker/listener si it is misguided to try to force all of 
the pragmatics into the index set I of th,e structure at, We 
have to deal with partial interpretations, conflicting interpreta-
tions, the building up of an interpersonal interpretation; and 
interpretations may be modified or determined by functionals which 
carry along the presuppositions introduced. 
Except for a few specific points such as the remarks on gen-
eralized quantifiers much of what was said in the lecture was 
either expository or of a general and programmatic character. 
Later in our seminar v1e returned to and discussed fur'cher the 
connection betv;een part:ial i t.y and presuppositions. I introduced 
in'co the Hontague framework a partial functional R(a ~ ~) where a 
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is of arbitrary type and ~ is of type t, R(a~~) is then of the 
Sc@e type as a~ n1e semantics is as follows: 
IIR(cq~)ll =lied! if li ~II = 1 , II R (a ; ~ ) II is undefined o-therwise. 
(Note tha·t e, g. II~ II - means that II~ II is defined and is equal 
to 1; with t:here are "weak" and "strong" notions, this 
we do not enter into here.) The R-functional was applied by c. 
Fabricius-Hansen ein wieder? Zur Semantik von wieder 
[ 2]. It is vlell~known that v1ieder (again) has both an external 
(repetitive) and an internal (restitutive) reading. In her paper 
c. Fabrici.us~Hansen 9ave a m1ified analysis within a ~~Iontague PTQ 
framework extending the partial R-functional to account for the 
associated presuppositions. (To indicate, very briefly, part of 
the repetitive wiede~:· may be captured in the translation 
wieder' = A.p.R(p:!:_p), v;here P is the past tense operator. The 
full story, much on Dowty's account in Word Meaning and 
Honta9ue Grammar> can be found in [ 2] . ) 
An important event in the history of the seminar was the 
"Horkshop qn~els for l~atural Languages which ,,,e arranged in Oslo 
in the fall of l 980 and vlhich helped us to establish broader 
international contacts. At that time some candidate theses were 
being written as an offshot of the activities in the seminar (a 
few each in lingustics, computer science, and mathematics). In 
this Report we have reproduced revised versions of the parts of 
t.hree candida-te theses l·vhich were submitted to the Department of 
Mathematics in 1982/83. 
Helle Frisak Sem g in the first part of her thesis, Quantifier 
Scope and Coreferenti;:J.lity a modified treatment of the quantifier 
- I.4 -
storage mechanism developed by R. Cooper in Quan·tification and 
Syntactic Theor_y, In cular, she eliminates the use of multi-
valued functions the semantic interpretation. Cooper's storage 
mechanism is successful in treating many questions of quantifier 
scope na·tural uages but there are defin limitations. 
1"1any of these can be overcome by using Hans Kamp' s theory of 
Discou~se Representation Systems, and in the second part of her 
thesis Helle Sem ext:ends Kamp' s analysis to cover ·the Cooper 
system and is thus a.ble to obtain a satisfactory treatment of some 
of the examples that could not be handled by the storage method. 
In the final she studies the connection bet\l<?een Dis-
course Representation st.ems and the theory of Situat.ion Seman-
tics as developed by J-. Barv1ise and J. Perry. 
Tore Langholm develops in his thesis, Some Tentative Systems Re-
of the He studies first a propositional 
system L(S) based on a model structure <Q,w,[ ]>, where Q is 
a non-empty set of sit.uations, wEQ is the actual "world" and [ ] 
is a valuation on the prositional variables, [p] = <[p]+,[p]->, 
where [pJ+,[p]- ~ Q and [p]+ is the set of situations which 
supports 'che truth of p. [ p] ~ is the set of situations that 
definitely refutes the truth of p. We assume that wE[p]+U[p]-
and that wf[p]+n[p]-, but in general neither [p]+u[p]- = Q, nor 
[p]+n[p]-*¢, thus situations may both be partial and contradic-
tory. 
Langholm gives a complete axiomatization of L(S) and also 
proves similar resul t:s for a first-order theory L ( SQ). In the 
final part he uses his systems to study naked infinitive percep-
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t.ual reports. thesis is a first and useful step toward a more 
comprehensive mathematical study of situation semantics. 
Jan Tore L¢nniES_ develops in his thesis, Mass Terms and Quantifi-
,cation, a novel o£ the semantics of mass ·terms o The basic 
semantic entity an atomless Boolean algebra and both mass noun 
phrases and the homogen,eously referring verb phrases denotes ele-
ments algebra. "rhis "simple" idea seems to get right the 
va s t.roublesome features of previous accoun·ts" To give some 
precision to his treatment L¢nning constructs a fragment of 
English, a su 
ment, and the 
gation is carried out 
ical formalism to correspond to this £rag-
ate !rtodel theory. A mathem.atical investi-
dun:'!s). And looking at the formalism in different \'ll'ays (i.e. 
us the appropriat«:1 representation theorems) he explains how it 
is poss consistent} to either viev! mass terms as "indi-
viduals" (s ar tenns) or to view them as "properties" (general 
tenns). Thus some of the earlier philosophica.l discussion do not 
seem too profitable. In the final sections of his thesis L¢nning 
extends the fragment to include count nouns and amount terms. 
An underlying premiss for our activities in ·the seminar has 
been our belief in the fruitfulness of the interaction between 
logic and linguistics. I hope that the work reported on in this 
Report gives substance to this belief. \1/e plan to continue the 
Oslo Seminar and hope, in par·ticular, to strengthen our competence 
. , , , ~in the computational aspects of natural language modeling. 
Jens Erik Fenstad 
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[1j Fenstad, J.E., Models for Natural Languages, in: Hintikka 
et al. (eds.), Essays on Mathematical and Philosophical 
Logic, pp. 315-340. 
D. Reidell Publ. Comp. Dordrecht 1978. 
(2) Fabricius-Hansen, C., Wieder ein wieder? Zur Semantik von 
wieder, in: Bauerle et al. (eds.), Meaning, Use, and Inter-
pretation of Language, pp. 97-120. 
w. de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1983. 
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SOME TENTATIVE SYSTEMS RELATING TO SITUATION SEMANTICS l 
Tore Langholm 
The motivation for considering the systems of this article is to 
be found in the field of Situation Semantics, which is currently 
being developed by Jon Barwise and John Perry. Our systems are 
not meant to catch the full complexity of the richer theory. 
Rather, they are intended as tools with which to study some of the 
more elementary properties of situations, and to provide the 
opportuni for a sort of reconnaissance trip into areas which 
eventually will have to be conquered by a more comprehensive 
formal theory. 
1 • TBE PROPOSITIONAL SYSTEM L ( S) • 
In every-day life, the truth-value of a proposition depends upon 
the situation at hand. In the first part we shall try to make 
this idea precise by studying a simple propositional language 
based on a semantics of situations. 
1.1. Definition of L(S). 
Symbols: propositional variables 
connectives 
auxiliary symbols 
Formation rules: 
; , V, A, => 
(,) 
(l) All propositional variables are formulae. 
(2) If A and B are formulae, so are ,A, (AvB}, (AAB) and 
(A=>B) . 
By (A=>B) we want to express that B is true in every situation 
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in which A is ·true. Vile have to discuss what logical principles 
ought to be valid. In [Barwise 1979] the following two rules are 
proposed: 
(1) (AAB) is true on the basis of s just in case both A and 
B are true on the basis of s. 
(2) (AvB) is true on the basis of s just in case A or B or 
both are true on the basis of s. 
This can also be inferred from the rules on pages 137 and 138 of 
[Barwise and Perry 1983]. If these rules are accepted, the 
following formulae and.rules of inference become valid: 
(A;,B) => (BAA) (AAB) => A 
(AvB) => (Bv A) A => (AvB) 
A => B A => c 
A => c B => c 
------
A => (BAC) (AvB) => c 
As for negation, it appears obvious that A is true on the basis 
of s just in case ,A is false on the basis of s, and that ~A 
is true on the basis of s just in case A is false on the 
basis of s. This gives us the following principles: 
A => -,,A 
Also it seems reasonable ·to accept de Morgans laws in the present 
context: 
-,(AAB) => (-,Av,B) 
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1 .1. 1. The Formulae (AA-,A) => B and A => (BV""~B) in Situation 
Semantics, 
If no formula can be both true and false on the basis of the same 
situation, then ~> B is a valid principle for any A and 
Motivated by a. sh to s'cart. out with the broadest possible frame, 
we vJill, ho,,veve:r ,. admit inconsistent situations, hence not accept 
the unrestrici:ed of (AA,A) => B. As we shall later see, 
inconsistent tuations can be eliminated from our models by 
adding (Afl.-d\) => B as an extra axiom scheme. 
The principle ~ ~> (Bv,B) will be rejected on the grounds that a 
proposi i:ion may be total foreign to a situation, and thus 
neither be true nor false on the basis of it. 
From the above remarks, vte construct the following truth tables 
for v and 1\, where 'c, nt, f and nf abbreviate true, not 
true, false and not false respectivelyo 
-:t: (P,VB) A B (AAB) t t t t 
(1) t ( 2 ) t nt nt t 1 nt 
I 
nt t t. nt t nt 
nt nt nt nt nt nt 
By de Morgans laws and the rules 
( 3 ) A true iff ,A false 
A false iff ,A true 
~ II .4 ~ 
we 
A B AV B) A B (AAB) 
nf nf nf nf nf nf 
( 4) nf f f (5 ) nf f f 
f nf -t-'"' ""' L nf f 
f f f f f f 
for S it.ua1: 
He see that ·there four possible t:n;;th~'<mlues for propositions 
with 
true and not false 
true ax1c1 fa_lse 
fa.l e t:1r-1cl 
From the above t:e>J:):L ete:ri ve t:..he fol (uniquely deter-
mined) truth tables 
r. 
"' 
? 
~ 
0 0 
? 
? 0 
(6 '? 
? 0 
~~~~ ~ 
0 
0 
0 
0 !J, ill 0 o/' 
G 0 0 
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From rule;c; ( 3) t1'lt:' :ruth t:able for negation constructed: 
A 
'? 
0 
Observe that these, trut.h ta 1)1es are closed re to the se'c 
lues they also agree with. ordinary two~ 
aure that a situation de a.n ordinary two 
f~lerne11t therefore only have ·to require that each 
.2. The Semantics 
In our seraar1tics etation of a proposition 11 be the 
its truth. More precise , we assume 
of situations, An inte£Eretation is 
det:ermined a func:tic:on frorn propositional variables to sets of 
propositional variable p there will be two 
IDI+ 
. ..t: ~ t' 
+ Q, where I pI is the set of situations 
p and I pI·- the set of si t.uations "''hich ren-
Cter Accord.i tJ:J our discussion under 1 • l , 1 IPI+ n 
(existence of "inconsistent" si tua·tions) and 
U !PI- may be a proper subset of Q. l!'Je denote by the 
c:srdered pair I ~~ I p 1 > , thus an int is a map 
from proposi on.'"-' ,,,ar:lab:Les to the set :P (Q) (Q 
shall further as ume that~ Q contains a particular element w 
S;Lt.11ation" ~ which we single out as the key to ·tru'ch 
ancl. falsi A proposition will be considered true or false just 
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in case it is true or false on the basis of w. To ensure that 
all propositions are true or false and not both, we impose the 
requirements "that 
and 
for all propositional variables p. 
With these preliminary explanations we come to the formal defini-
tion: 
A model or structoure L(S) is a triple ~~ = <Q, w, I >, 
where 
( 1 ) Q is a non-errtpty set of situations. 
( 2) w is a di uished element of Q. 
( 3) is a function from the set of propositional variables of 
L(S) into 
We write jpj 
( 4) + wE IPI U 
= <lpl+, 
I Pi~· 
IPI-> and require that 
\illf I P I + n I P I -and 
for all propositional variables p of L(S). 
The function gives an interpretation for the propositional 
variables. This will be extended to all formulae by the following 
definition~ 
1.2 .. 2. Defini·tion of the Interpretation IIAIIot = + -<IIAIIcJt~d. 
( i) ProEosi·tional variables: II pliO[.,= jpj 
(ii) Negati~~ + II -,AII~rt - II All ()t, Vv 
II ,Jl.llo-c + = II AIICll-
..!. ...... IIBII~ ( i ) Disjunction~ II AVBIIOC = IIAIIOLU 
II Av B llu"t = II Allot n II Bllo-t. 
( i v) Conj_unction: + II Alldl n IIBII~ II AABII = or~ 
II AABI!ot. = II All!)t U II BIIUl 
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'I'he reader will see hovJ' these clauses correspond to the truth-
tables above. 1-Jhen no confusion is likely to occur, we drop the 
index !){,_ and write more simply IIAII for II Allot.. 
(v) Strong I~plicatio~~ From our previous explanations it 
( ) . I+ follows that we want A=>B to be true, 1..e. wEIIA=>BI , 
just in case IIAH+ c HBH+. In other situations there seems 
to be no preferred 1"'1ay to define the truth-value of (A=>B) 
from II All and II Bll , Considerations of simplicity have led us 
to the fol choice: 
< Q , ¢ > " if il Ali + c II B II + 
IIA=>BII = 
¢,Q>, otherwise 
l .2.3. Definition o~~, 
A formula A of L(S) is true in the model QL, in symbols 
+ 
wE HAll 
true in all models 
is true or valid, in symbols fA, if 
of L { S) . 
A is 
Let as usual A :::J B abbreviate -,Av B. It follows from 1 • 2. 2 that 
the following formulae are valid: 
(A=> B) :::J ( c~~ {1-\=>B)) 
-,(A= B) :::J (C=>-,(A=>B)) 
(A=> B) :::J (-:(ll.=>B)=>C) 
,(A=>B) :::J ((A=>B)=>C) 
It should be pointed out that these formulae are very marginal to 
the theory. He could just as well have made them not well formed. 
Our chief concern lies formulae of which no subformula is 
within the scope of more than one occurrence of =>. 
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l .2.4. A Remark on Complete Sets of Connectives for L(S). 
We close this section with some remarks on the truth-functional 
connectives v, r\ and .,. They do not comprise a functionally 
complete se·t of connectives with respect to the four truth values 
0, +, iJ,. and 1 • This should be no cause for concern, since the 
contrary vmuld be positively undesireable. If we had formulae 
corresponding to truth functions which are not closed with respect 
to the set {0,1}, w could not be made to define a two element 
valuation. However, it could be of interest to find a set of 
connectives complete respect to the set of functions which 
preserve two-,val>.Jed logic. Such a set is obtained by adding the 
connectives T a.nd ~ with the following truth tables: 
An absolutely complete set is obtained by adding (to 
{A, v, ,, T, -}) a constant u denoting ? (or <¢,¢> in the 
semantics of L(S).) 
It is, however, difficult to find intuitive counterparts to these 
connectives (with the possible exceptions of T), and since the 
systems in this article are constructed with analysis of natural 
languages in mind, I cannot see any reason to include them. He 
could have been forced to introduce them in order to achieve a 
complete axiomatizat.ion. But this turned out not to be the case; 
hence they can safely be disregarded. 
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1 .3. Valuation Structures. 
Although the relationship between situations and propositions is 
defined as a membership relation, it will sometimes be useful to 
think of situations as valuations on propositions. Given a model 
ot of L(S) and a situation sEQ we define: 
IIAII = 0-teS if 
if 
if 
•o= lL 
+ 
sEll Allot 
+ 
sE II Allot 
' + Sf II Allq 
s~IIAII~ 
and 
and 
and 
and 
sf II Allot 
sE II Allen_ 
s~ II Allot 
sEll Allot. 
From the correspondence bebreen truth tables ( 6) and ( 7) and defi-
nition 1 .2 .2 we see U,at for any ()t, and s,. II will be a 
01,.' s 
valuation conforming to (6) and (7). Moreover, II II will be 
~,w 
an ordinary two-valued valuation. 
l.3.J. Definition of §imple Formulae. 
A simple formula is a formula of L(S) without occurrences of the 
connective =>. 
1 .3.2. Definition of Valuation Structure. 
A structure or_, = <Q, w, I I> is called a valuation structure if Q 
is a set of valuations on the simple formulae of L(S) according 
to the truth tables (6} and (7), and for which 
v(p) = II pll 
- ()[_,, v 
for all vEQ and all propositional variables p of L ( S) . 
In other words, the situations of a valuation structure are valu-
ations, and their valuations of propositional variables correspond 
to their memberships in the positive and negative extensions of 
the propositional variables. Any set of valuations (containing a 
two element valuation), together with a distinguished element in 
the set (being a t>,vo element valuation), uniquely determines a 
valuation structure. From the remarks above it follows that in a 
valuation structure Qt, v(A) = II All !'I-f for all simple formulae 
vv,V 
A. 
l • 3 • 3. Lemma. 
Every L (S) struct:ure is elementarily equivalent to a valuation 
structure. 
The proof straightforward. 
1 . 3 . 4. Theorem. 
A=>B, vJ'ith A and B simple, is valid if and only if the joint 
truth table of A and B has or ~ in the column for B in 
any line in which A is assigned the value or the value ~· 
Proof~ It is immaterial to the truth of a formula of the type 
A=>B which two element valuation (if there are more) is the 
designated one. We also see that for any pair et,1 , 0(,2 of valu-
ation structures and pair A,B of simple formulae, if Ql ~ Q2 
OL1 fA=>B follows. Now let ~ be a valu-
ation structure built up from all possible valuations on the simple 
formulae. By the remark above, if 1i ~A=>B, A=>B is valid in any 
valuation structure, and hencein any structure. 
From this line of reasoning a stringent proof can easily be con-
structed. 
- II. 11 -
1 o4. Axiomatization 
The following axiomatization is an adaption of the axiomatization 
of the System E fde of Anderson and Belnap. The connection to 
Efde will be explored in the next chapter. 
Axiom schemes. 
(Al) (AAB) => A 
(A2) (MB) => B 
(A3) -,A ;;:::> -,(AAB) 
(A4) ..,B => ,(AAB) 
(AS) A => (AvB) 
(A6) B => (Av B) 
(A7) -dAvB) => -,A 
(AB) .,(AVB) => -,B 
(A9) A => -y-,A 
(A1 0) ;;A => A 
(A 11 } -,(AAB) => (,Av,B) 
(Al 2) ( -,AA -,B) => -,(AvB) 
(A1 3) .. (AA (BVC)) => ( (AAB)vc) 
(AI 4) (A=> B) :::J ((A=>C) :::J (A=> ( B/\ C) ) ) 
(Al 5) (A=>C) :::J ((B=>C) :::J ( (AvB)=>C)) 
(Al 6) (A=> B) :::J ( (B=>C) :::J (A=>C)) 
(Al 7) (A=> B) :::J (A :::J B) 
(A1 8) (A=>B) :::J (C=> (A=>B)) 
(Al 9) -,{A=>B) :::J (C=>-; (A=> B)) 
(A20) (A=> B) :::J (-;(A=>B)=>C) 
(A2 1 ) -:(A=>B) :::J ( (A=>B)=>C) 
Rules of inference: 
Hodus Ponens: From A and A :::J B we may infer B. 
- II. 1 2 -
1 .4.1. Theorem 
Every theorem is valid in every structure. 
Proof~ Validity of (AJ )-(A13) is verifiable by 1 .3.4. (A14)-(A16) 
are simple set-theoretic principles involving the interpretation 
rules for v and A. . (Al 7) follows from the fact that wHl. The 
validity of (A18)-(A21) is a consequence of our particular choice 
for the interpretation of -(A=>B). Finally, Modus Ponens clearly 
preserves validity. 
l .4.2. Remark. 
Since the axioms are given by axiom schemes (and M.P. is the only 
rule of inference), every substitution instance of a theorem will 
be a theorem. Hence we should expect the same for validity; the 
following reasoning shows this to be the case: 
Since no restrictions are posed as to how the truth values of 
propositional variables are to be defined in various situations 
(except completeness and consistency for w), the interpretations 
of formulae in general cannot vary more freely than those of the 
propositional variables. This means that given a distribution of 
interpretations to some set of formulae, the same distribution can 
be attained by a corresponding set of propositional variables, and 
from this it is seen how a counter-example for some substitution 
instance A' of a formula A may be converted into a counter-
example for A. 
Note that this is not as trivial as it might perhaps seem. If, 
for instance, we had required that each propositional variable has 
a situation supporting its truth, substitution would not preserve 
validity. 
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1 .5. Comparis~n to _the System E of Entailment. 
The semantics described in 1 .2.1 and 1 .2.2 gives L(S) some 
important features which makes it natural to compare it to the 
system E of entailment, which was constructed in order to catch 
the intuitive notions of entailment and relevancy. 
1 • 5. l • An Equivalent Decision Procedure. 
The decision procedure of 1 .3.4 is equivalent to a slightly diffe-
rent one. He may define the partial ordering < on the set of 
truth values by let·ting 'F 1. .... $ and £ are identical, or if 
£ is above $ in the figure below: 
Naw accept A=>B as valid if 
v(A),v(B) for all valuations v. 
The test may seem stricter than the first 8 since vJe do not allow 
<? , 0 > , <? > and < 1 >. However, because of the symmetry be-
tween ? and ~ in the truth tables; if there exists a v for 
which v(A) = '? and v(B) = 0, there is a v' for which 
v' (A) = ~ and v' {B) = 0. Similar remarks hold for <?.~>I <'tt, ?> 
and < 1 , 1- > I < 1 , ? > • 
1 • 5 • 2 • L ( s) and E "'d • ----~--'---'------Ie 
In the system E, a first degree entailment forrnula is a formula 
A=>B with A and B containing only truth-functional connec-
tives. The system Efde (first degree entailment fragment of the 
calculus E) is characterized by the decision procedure above 
(cfr. [Anderson & Belnap 1975] ). In other words, the set of valid 
L(S)-formulae within the set {A=>BjA,B simple} coincides vli th 
E • fde 
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In proving the completeness of L(S), it would be a waste of ef-
fort to start from scratch rather than finding some way to benefit 
from the works of Anderson and Belnap. In "Entailment" they prove 
the following to be a complete axiomatization of Efde" 
Axiom schemes 
(AAB) => A 
(AAB) => B 
A =;i> (AVB) 
B => (Av B) 
(AA(BVC)} :0:::) ( (AAB)VC) 
Pt => ,,A 
-,-,A => P.. 
Rules of inference: 
A => B A => B A = >C 
B => c A ~""--? c B => c A => B 
A => (~ A => (BAC) (AVB) => c -,.B => -TA 
1 .5.3. The System L(S)fde· 
We want to prove that the set of theorems of Efde is cointained 
in the set of ·theorems of L(S). In order to do this, we define 
the systems L(S)fde in the following way: 
Axiom schemes: (AI ) - (A1 3) • 
Rules of inference: 
A => B A => B A => C 
B => C A => C B => C 
A => C (AvB) => C 
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] . 5 . 4. Lemma. 
A formula of the type A=>B with A and B simple is valid in 
L(S) iff it is valid in Efde" 
Proof: Since Efde is c~haracterized by the decision procedure of 
] e5.1, this follows from the result of that section. 
1 • 5. 5. Lemma. 
Every valid formula of Efde is a theorem of Efde" 
Proof: Cfr. [Anderson & Belnap 1975]. 
1 • 5 • 6 • Lemma. 
Every theorem of is a theorem of L(S)fde" 
Proof: All axioms of Efde are axioms of L(S)fde" In order to 
prove that any theorem of Efde is a theorem of L(S)fde' we need 
only to show that if A=>B is a theorem of L(S)fde' so is ,B=>,A. 
The proof os this (by induction on the derivation of theorems) is 
straightforv.rard but lengthy, and we omit it here. Cfr. pp. 29-34 
of my cand.scient. thesis. 
1 . 5 . 7. Lerruna. 
Every theorem of L(S)fde is also a theorem of L(S). 
Proof: All axioms of L(S)fde are axioms of L(S). The rules of 
inferense of L(S)fde are derivable in L(S) by Hodus Ponens and 
(Al4)-(A16). 
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1 . 5 . 8. Theorem. 
Every valid formula A=>B of L(S) with A and B simple is a 
theorem of L(S). 
Proof: This follows immediately from lemmas 1 .5.4 to l .5.7. 
1 .6. L(S) and Ordinary Two-valued Propositional Calculus. 
1 • 6. 1 • Lemma. 
Let A be a simple formula which is also a tautology of ordinary 
two-valued propositional calculus. If are the propo-
sitional variables of A, then 
is a theorem of L(S). 
Proof: Validity of ((,p1vp 1 )A ... A(,pnvpn))=>A is verified by 
l .3.4. The rest then follows by 1.5.8, Al7 and M.P .. 
1 .6.2. Theorem. 
If A is a tautology of ordinary two-valued propositional calcu-
lus, then A is a theorem of L(S). 
Proof: This follows from 1 .6.1 by M.P. and iterated use of the 
fact that (,p,vp.) and A~ (B ~ (AAB)) are theorems of L(S). 
l l 
1 .6.2.1. Remark. 
As the proof is carried out, it applies oply to simple formulae. 
But any tautologous formula A is a substitution instance of a 
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simple, tautologous formula A'. A proof of A' is easily con-
verted into a proof of A by substituting throughout. 
1 .6.3. Definition. 
A 1 , ••• ,An 1-- B means that B is a theorem of the system obtained 
by adding A1 , ••• , A n to the axioms of 
1 .6.4. Theorem (DeductioncTheorem). 
L ( S). 
If A1 , ••• , An 1- B, then A1 , .•• , An-l !-An => B. 
Proof: This property belongs to any system with M.P. as the only 
rule of inference, which contains all formulae of the types 
(A => ( B => C ) ) => ( (A => B) => (A => C ) ) and A => ( B => A) 
as theorems. 
Normal E'orm. 
The reduction theorem of SS states that every formula is equiva-
lent to a formula in which no modal operator occurs within the 
scope of another modal operator. The similarity in structure 
between L(S) and S5, as opposed to T or 84, i.e. the fact that 
+ IIA=>BII is either Q or ¢, leads us to expect something similar 
for L (S) . 
1. 7.1. Definition. 
A formula is in normal form if every subformula of the type 
A=>B has the following property: A is either simple or it is 
the formula p 1 =>p.1 • B is either simple, or it is the formula 
-,(p1=>p1 ). (p1 is the first propositional variable.) 
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1 • 7.2. Theorem. 
Let as usual A=B abbreviate (A~ B) A (B ~A). Given a formula 
A of L(S), we can effectively find a formula A' of normal 
form such that A=A' is a theorem of L(S). 
The proof of this, ,,.,hich is by induction on the construction of 
formulae and makes essential use of axiom schemes (A18)-(A21 ), is 
straightforward but very tedious, and we omit it here. Cfr. pp. 
48-61 of my cand~scient. thesis. 
1 .8. Theorem (Decision Procedure). 
There is an effective procedure to check whether a formula of 
L(S) is valid. 
1 .8.1. Restriction to a Subset of Formulae. 
In view of 1 .7.2, we need only prove decidability for formulae of 
p 1 normal form. 
But we may simplify further. Relying on results of the ordinary 
propositional calculus, we know that there is an effective way to 
check whether an arbitrary formula F in p 1 normal form is a 
tautology ((A=>B) is considered atomary). If F is a tautolo-
gy, it is valid. If it is not, there is an effective way to find 
a formula F' in conjunctive normal form which is tautologically 
equivalent to F. (And hence true in an L(S) structure iff F is 
true.) Checking whether F' is valid in all structures, is equi-
valent to checking whether each of its conjuncts is valid in all 
structures. 
Each conjunct looks like this (cfr. 1 .8.1 .1 - E and all indexed 
capital letters represents simple formulae.): 
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E 
v (\1. __. ( G . = H, ) ) 
l"' l l 
v(V .. , p "">p )=>D.)) 
l"-n ~] -J l 
v 
.=>B.)) 
1. l 
m,n,r,s,k,l;;>O 
·ro check the valid of this is equivalent to checking the fol-
lowing (The special case r p should be read as F .r, i.e. 
F·,(I\A)): 
AEf 
rp 
(2) v(Vi~k(( =>p1 )=>ci)} 
v( x(K:L'"'>.,(pl=>pl))) 
where r is the se·t 
{ ,E 1r iJ {G.=> \ Ll { (p =>p )=>D } 
l J i.;; m 1 J i i.;; n 
U {L.=>-dp1=>p1 )}. 1. J..( r 
1 • 8. 1 • 1 • Remark. 
In (1) of J .8. 1 we assume that the conjunct does not contain 
-:((p =>p )=>-,(p =>p )). 
1 1 1 1 
Hnen this fails, vte have one of the following cases: 
( i) ·rhe conjunct contains ., ( ( p 1 => p 1 ) =>., ( p 1 => p 1 ) ) 
as a disjunct, and is hence valid. 
(ii) The conjunct is the formula (p =>p )=>.,(p =>p ), ] 1 1 l 
and lid. 
(iii) The conjunct properly contains (p =>p )=>,(p =>p ) ] ] ] ] 
as a disjunct, and is equivalent to the formula obtained 
by deletin<;~ this disjunct. 
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1.8.2. Set-u:e for the Decision Procedure. 
In the joint truth table of E and all G. , H. I D. I L. I A.' B. I ~ ~ 1 1 1 1 
c. and K.' delete all lines with one of the following properties: 1 l 
( i) For some i,;;; m, G. has 
l 
one of the values or 'j,-, and 
H. has not. 
l 
{ii) For some i,;; n, D. has a value distinct from and ~. 
l 
(iii) For some i" r, L. has a value distinct from 0 and ? • 
l 
1.8.3. Decision. 
The validity relation (2) holds if one of the following is true: 
( i) None of the lines in the reduced truth table defines a 
two element valuation. 
(ii) None of the lines in the reduced truth table does at the 
same time define a two element valuation, and assign ,E 
(iii) 
(iv) 
( v) 
the value l . 
For some i(s, all lines which assign A. 
1 
the value 
or t, also assign B. 
1 
one of these values. 
For some i,;;k, it is the case that all lines assign 
or ~. 
For some i,;;Jl., it is the case that all lines assign 
0 or ? . 
c. 
1 
K. 
1 
The procedure covers all possible special cases. If there is no 
formula E, the possibility of validity by (ii) vanishes. If r 
is empty or the second, third or fourth line in (1) does not 
exist, the reduction of the truth table is correspondingly less 
extensive. If the fifth, sixth or seventh line in (1) does not 
exist, the possibility of truth by (iii), (iv) or (v) vanishes. 
All lines in (1} cannot vanish at the same time, since then we 
would not have a formula in the first place. 
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l .8.4. Proposition. 
If (2) holds, then the procedure concludes that (2) holds. 
Proof: Suppose the procedure concludes that the validity relation 
does not hold, He then know that the reduced truth table contains 
a two element valuation. In case there is a formula E, there is 
a two element valua'cion supporting the truth of -,E. For each 
formula A.=>B. there is ~a line which assigns A.' but not B., l l l 1. 
or 1-. For each c. there is a line assigning c. 0 or ? • 
l l 
For each T there is a 1 • assigning T or t-. LJ • ..t.lne .u . 
1. 1. 
These lines each defines a valuation, and from this set of valu-
ations vve construct a valuation structure, letting a two element 
valuation (which supports the truth of -,E if there is such a 
formula) be the distinguished element. It is immediate that this 
constitutes a counterexample to (2). 
1 .8.5. Proposition. 
If the procedure concludes that (2) holds, then (2) holds. 
Proof: Suppose (2) does not hold. There is then a counter-exam-
ple ot, \l!hich by l . 3. 3 is elementary equivalent to a valuation 
struc·ture OV. All valuations in 01,' correspond to lines in 
the reduced truth table. For if a valuation is present in the 
counter-example (which must validate r), it has defied all reduc-
tions on the previous page. For each of the formulae A.=>B., 
l l 
(p1 =>p 1 )=>Ci and Ki=>,(p1=>p 1 ), there are situations in ~· 
which prevent them from being true; and hence lines in the reduced 
truth table which prevent the decision procedure from according 
(2) truth. 
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l .8.6. Corollar~. 
From the formulation of the decision procedure, it immediately 
follows that a validity relation of the kind indicated in (2) 
hol,ds just in case 
i: ..,r 
or for some i, 
rj:: A.=>B. 
J_ 1. 
or r~ (pl=>pl)=>Ci 
or r I= K i = > , ( p 1 = > p 1 ) 
This result will be useful when we prove completeness in the next 
section. 
1 .9. Theorem (Completeness). 
Every valid formula of L(S) is a theorem of L(S). 
1 .9.1. Proposition. 
Completeness follows if we are able to show the following impli-
cations ( ~ ,r should be read as 1- , ( 1\ A) ) : 
AEf 
( 1 ) r ~ A=>B ~ r f- A=> B 
( 2 ) F .,r 
-
f- ..,r 
( 3 ) r 1= (p =>p )=>c 
-
r ~ (p =>p )=>c ] 1 1 1 
( 4) fF K=>.,(p1=>P 1)- r 1- K=>., (p 1 =>p1 ) 
when r is the set (m~O, and E, D, L do not necessarily exist): 
(All capital letters represent simple formulae). 
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Proof: By] .7.2 and 1 .6.2 we only need to show that validity 
entails provabilit.y for formulae of type ( l ) of 1 . 8. l . (1.8.1.1 
applies to provability as well as validity.) By J .6.4, this is 
equivalent to showing that (2) implies the corresponding provabi-
lity relation. By 1 .8.6 this is equivalent to proving (1 )-(4) 
above for r of the type specified in l .8.1. 
The assumption that r contains at most one formula of the type 
(p =>p )=>D is justified by the fact that 1 ] 
is a theorem of L(S) Similarly for L=>,(p1=>p1 ). 
1 .9.2. Proposition. 
Implication (1) of] .9.1 is true of L(S). 
Proof: By adopting a technique used in the completeness proof of 
"de Morgan Implication" (which is the same as Efde) in [ Hakinson 
] 973 J, it can be shown that if r¥ A=>B, then there must exist a 
valuation v which satisfies v(D)E{l,~}, v(L)f{ 1,~} and 
v(G")E{l,~}----r v(H")E{l,'t,}, but not v(A)E{l,~}- v(B)E{l,'l-}. 
l l 
Also, if r ~ A=>B, then r must be consistent. Hence, also 
{EADA;L} U {G. ~ H.}" is consistent. Since L(S) contains the 
1 1 1.;;n 
ordinary propositional calculus, this implies the existence of a 
two element valuation v• such that w(EADA-,L) = 1 and 
w(G.) = ]-----;. w(H.) =]. It is easily checked that the valuation 
1 l 
structure based on {v,w} with w as the distinguished element 
constitutes a counterexample to fF A=>B. 
T' I 
.I 1-, 
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1 .9.3. Proposition. 
Implication (2) of J .9.1 is true of L(S). 
Proof: If ~ f, then f~ (p1v-.p 1 )=>(p1/\,p] ). f~ (p1v,p1 )=>(p1/\-,pl) 
now follows by 1 .9.2. Since ,((p1v,p1 )=>(p1/\-;p 1 )) is a theorem, 
we must then have f- -If. 
1 . 9. 4. Lemma. 
Let II be a subset of {E} U {L=>,(p1 =>p, )} U {G.=>H.} ._. (i.e. 
J 1. 1. 1."" n 
II does not contain (p1 =>p1 )=>D). If II has a model, then 
II~(p 1 =>p 1 )=>C for any simple c. 
Proof: Suppose OVI= II for a valuation structure 01.,. A new 
valuation structure 01J is derived from ot.,. by adding to the 
situation domain of Ol the constant valuation assigning all 
simple formulae the value ?. E, L=>-,(p1=>p1 ) and all G.=>H. 1. 1. 
remain unchangedg but (Jt,' ~ (p =>p )=>C. r J 1 
1 .9.5. Proposition. 
Implication (3) of 1.9.1 is true of L(S). 
Proof: Suppose fF (p1=>p 1 )=>C. There are two possible cases, 
corresponding to whether r has a model or not. If r has no 
model, 1- -,r follows by l • 9. 3, and hence r f-- (p1 =>p1 )=> C since 
L(S) contains the propositional calculus. If r has a model, 
((p1 =>p1 )=>D) E r for some D by the lemma. Since 
( (p1 =>p1 )=>D) :::J ( ( (p1 =>p1 )=>c):: (D=>C)) is a theorem, the rest now 
follows by l .9.2. 
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1 .9.6. Propositio~. 
Implication (4) of 1 .9.1 is true of L(S). 
The proof is similar to the proof of 1 .9.5, and uses a lemma 
similar to 1 .9.4. 
1 .10. Closed Strctures. 
A set E of valuations is closed if it has the following property 
(we suppose all propositional variables occur in the sequence 
<p. > '~JN) : 
-1 1~ 
For any valuation u if for all n there is a valuation vEE 
n 
such that v (p.) = u(p.} for all i~n, then uEE. 
n 1 1 
A structure is closed if its situation domain corresponds to a 
closed set of valuations. 
1 .10.1. Topological Compactness. 
The expression "closed set of valuations" is topologically moti-
vated. He define the metric d on the set of valuations in the 
following way~ 
A set of valuations will then be closed in the sense above if and 
only if it is closed with respect to the topology defined by d. 
This topology is also a product topology of a very trivial, com-
pact topology. Hence it is itself compact. This means that it 
has the following important property: 
If the intersec-tion of every finite subfamily of a family of 
closed sets is non~empty, the intersection of the family itelf is 
non-empty. 
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As will become apparent fron the proof of the next theorem, the 
notion of topological compactness is closely related to the notion 
of logical compactness. 
1 .10.2. Theorem (Logical Compactness). 
A set of formulae has a model if and only if each finite subset 
has a model. 
Proof: This follows if we can show that every consistent set of 
formulae has a model. 
1 • J 0. 2. 1 • Contruction of the Hodel Qtl:l. 
Suppose the set IT is consistent. We extend TI to a maximal 
consistent set l:l. Let V be the set of all valuations on the 
simple formulae. For each simple formula A, we define FA to be 
the set { vE V I v (A) E { 1 , t1, } } • Hence FA is both open and closed. 
He now define QL'I as follows: 
QL'I = n (FA. u FB.) n (n F ) n (~FD. ) 
i i c. 2 l l l l 
{A.=>B.}. is the set of all formulae 
l l l 
A=>B in L'l (A, B simple) . 
{c.}. is the set of simple formulae C 
l l 
for which ( (p1 =>p 1 )=>C)EL'I. 
{ni}i is the set of simple formulae D for which (D=>,(p1=>p 1 ))Ell. 
The simple formulae contained in L'l define a two elemen~ valu-
ation w. It is easily checked that wEQ 6 . We now want to show 
that the valuation structure Ot,6 based on 0. 6 with w as the 
distinguished element, is a model for l:l. 
l .10.2.2. Proposition. 
For all simple A, AEL'I iff A is true in Qt6 • 
Proof: A is true in 
iff AE6. 
1 .10.2.3. Proposition. 
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iff + wE II AIIO(t,, 
If (A=>B)E6, then A=>B is true in ()t6 . 
i.e. iff w(A) = 1 , 
Proof: This follows immediately from the construction of Q 6 . 
1 .10.2.4. Proposition. 
If A=>B is true in then (A=>B)E6. 
Proof: Suppose A=>B is true in ot6 . This means that 
~ 
i.e. 
Q6 n FA n FB = ¢. By topological compactness, it now follows that 
~ Qt, n FAn FB = ¢ for some finite subset 60 of 6. Clearly 
0 
under these conditions the set 6 0 U {,(A=>B)} can have no model. 
This is because Ol6 is in a sense a maximal model of ~ 0 , and 
0 
if a model of ~O contains a counterexample to A=>B, this coun-
terexample must be present in OL~ . By completeness 
0 
60 U {-,(A=>B)} must then be inconsistent, i.e. ~O f-A=>B. 
Accordingly ~ J- A=>B, and by maximal consistency (A=>B)E£1.. 
1 .10.2.5. Propositio~. 
For every formula A of L(S), AE~ iff ot~j:::A. 
Proof: By 1 .7.2, we only need to show this for formulae of ~he 
types A, (A=>B), (p1=>p1 )=>A, A=>,(p1=p1 ) with A and B simple. 
He have already showed it for the two former types. The proofs 
for the two latter types are similar to 1 .10.2.3 and l .10.2.4. 
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1 .10.3. Theorem. 
Every structure is elementarily equivalent to a closed valuation 
structure. 
Proof: The proof of 1 .10.2 applies. 
1.11. Sideview to Hodal Logic. 
1.11 .1. The Systems L(CS) and L(CS)+. 
Consider the following structural constraint: 
(1) for all p. 
This corresponds to a ban on inconsistent situations, and a 
narrowing of attention to (strong) three element valuations. 
VJhen L ( S) is used to describe such structures, we call it 
L ( CS) . (Language of Consistent Situations.) 
A complete axiomatization of L(CS) is obtained by adding to 
(Al )-(A21) the axiom scheme 
(A22) (AA,A)=>B. 
An interesting group of L(CS) structures are those which satisfy 
the following: 
( 2) Given a situation s and a finite set {q1 , ... ,qn} of 
propositional variables such that llq.ll =!=? for all 
l. s 
i~ n. 
For any propositional variable p there is then a situ-
ation t for which llpllt:f? and llq.ll =llq.llt for all i~n. 
l. s l. 
Hhen L(CS) is used to describe such structures, we call it 
L(CS)+. A complete axiomatization of L(CS)+ is obtained by 
adding to (Al )-(A22) the axiom scheme: 
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(A23) ( ( ( AA B ) =>;A) A ( ( AA ., B ) = > -:A ) ) ::) (A=> 1A ) 
These completeness results are easily derived from the complete-
ness theorem for L(S). The proofs by themselves do not reveal 
any interesting properties, and we omit them here. Cfr. pp. 94-96 
of ffi'.J cand.scient. thesis. 
1 • 1 1 • 2 . Lemma. 
Every L(CS)+ structure is elementary equivalent to a closed 
L(CS)+ structure. 
Proof: Let Ot be and L(CS)+ structure. ot is also an L(S) 
structure, and hence elementarily equivalent to a closed L(S)-
structure OL'. All A22 and A23 axioms are true in at, and 
therefore in CV~. Since every L(S) structure satisfying all the 
A22 axioms is an L(CS) structure, and every L(CS) structure 
satisfying all A23 axioms is an L(CS)+ structure, Ot' must be an 
L(CS)+ structure. 
1 . 11.3. Definition. 
s is a subsitua·tion of t if 
+ + 
sEIPI --+ tEIPI and 
sEiPI,--- tEIPI 
for all propositional variables p. 
1.11.4. Definition. 
A situation is a possible 1,vorld if it defines a two element valu-
ation. 
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1 . 1 1 . 5 . Lemma . 
A closed L(CS) structure is an L(CS)+ structure iff every situ-
ation in the structure is a subsituation of a possible world in 
the structure. 
Proof: Obviously, an L{CS) structure in which every situation 
is a subsituation of a possible world, is an L(CS)+ structure. 
Let s be an arbitrary situation in a closed structure for 
L(CS)+. Let q 1 ' ' " • ' qn ' · · · be an enumeration of those propositio-
nal variables q for which I qJ =I=?. Since ()'0 is an L(CS)+ 
s 
n 
structure, for any n there is a sequence <t > of situations 
r r 
in Q which all agree with s for q 1 , ••• ,qn' and which conver-
ges towards a possible world. This possible world must then be a 
member of Q. Hence we have shown that 
where A 
n 
Q. 
1. = ;qi 
Since PW 
there is a 
FA n Q n PW * 0 for all n 
n 
is Ql/\ • • .AQn (Q. = q. if l l 
if JqiJs = 0) and Ph' is 
JqiJ s 
the set 
is closed, (n F 
An 
) n Q n PW=I=¢ by 
n 
possible world in Q which agrees 
= 1 ' 
of possible 
compactness, 
with s for 
q.' i.e. in relation to which s is a subsituation. This 
1. 
pletes the proof. 
1.11.6. Definition. 
worlds. 
and 
all 
com-
OA is an abbreviation of •A=>;(A=>A). An M-formula is a formu-
la which is built up using the connectives 0, v, 1\ and , 
only. 0 A is true iff A is false in no situation. \ve want to 
compare this operator to the necessity operator of S5. 
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1 • 1 1 • 7. Lemma. 
If theM-formula A is valid in L(S), then it is valid in S5. 
Proof: From a set of two element valuations on simple formulae, 
and a distinguished member of the set, both an 85 structure and an 
L(S) structure can be built. The rules for interpretation of 
formulae in the connectives 0, v, A and , are seen to coin-
cide, hence a formula in these connectives is true 1n both the S5 
structure and the L(S) structure, or false in both. 
Since all S5 structures are of this kind, any H-formula which is 
valid in L(S), is also valid in 85. The converse does not hold, 
ho'll.rever, since the formula O(A ::J B) ::J ( 0 A =OB) is valid in S5 
but not in L(S). On the other hand, it is valid in L(CS)+. 
This will follow from a theorem below. 
1 .11 .8. Lemma. 
If the M-formula A is valid in S5, then it is valid in all 
closed L(CS)+ structures. 
Proof: Let Ot be an arbitrary, closed L(CS)+ structure, and 
let ot['PH be the structure obtained by removing from ()L all 
situations which are not possible worlds. He must show that G'(, 
and O'C~PH are elementarily equivalent with respect to the set of 
M-formula. 
By J. 11 • 5 there is a function f:Q + Q~PH such that s is a 
subsituation of f(s) for all s. Since we must have f(w) = w, 
and II All :f? for all A, the lemma will follow from the 
ot,,w 
proposition below: 
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1.11. 8.1. Proposition. 
For all situations s, if II All r"'4 :f? 
V\,.Jf S 
and A is an M-formula, 
then II All(}(.,, 8 = II AI!Jt f' PvJ, f ( s) • 
Proof: We show this by induction on the construction of M-formulae. 
Basis: For propositional variables, this is immediate from the 
definition of subsituations. 
The induction steps for the truth-functional connectives are 
straightforward. 
Consider OA. If there is a counterexample in ot, i.e. an s 
such that IIAII(}(,,s = 0, IIAII()t,~PW,f(s) = 0 by the induction hypo-
thesis, and so there is also a counter-example in OCt PW. Suppose 
there is a counter-example in otl' PW, i.e. an u such that 
II Allot ~ PW, u = 0 . 
tio ad absurdum) 
Since uE PVJ, IIAI!ru E{O,l}. 
VI.Jt U 
Suppose (for reduc-
that II All I1..A 
v ~_,, u 
= 1 • Then IIAIIQ-li'PW,f(u) = by 
the induction hypothesis. But f( u) = u (since uE PW), so this 
gives a contradiction. Hence we must have II All/l./ = 0, and so 
Vt_.,tU 
there is a counter~example in &e. 
He have now seen that OA is true in OC iff it is true in O(lPW. 
Accordingly, since IIOAII = <Q,¢> or IIOAII = <¢,Q> in all 
structures, D A is either true in all situations in both ~ and 
CCI' PH, or it is false in all situation in both. This completes 
the induction step for 0, and hence the proof by induction. 
1.11 .9. Theorem. 
If A is a M-formula, then A is valid in L(CS)+ iff it is 
valid in s5. 
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Proof: This follows from 1.11.7, 1.11.8 and 1.11.2. 
1 . 1 1 . 1 0. Remark. 
The theorem states that SS is in a sence a subsystem of L(CS)+. 
The converse, however, does not hold. It is not possible to de-
fine => from the connectives D, v, t\ and ., . In the proof 
above, it v1as shown that a tvi- formula cannot distinguish between 
(}L and 0()' PW when ot is a closed structure for L ( CS )+. If 
=> were defineable using these connectives only, no formula of 
L (S) could distinguish between ()(, and Ol~ PW. But this is 
clearly not so. If (}C. contains a situation s for which 
IPI = ?, -d(p=>p)=>(pv-w)) is true in (}(., but not in O()'PW. 
s 
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2. EXTENDING L ( S) ..12_. QUAJ\TTIFICATIONAL LOGIC - THE SYSTEH L ( SQ) . 
He will now consider a quantificational extension of L(S). More 
or less sophisticated modes of quantification (e.g. generalized 
quantifiers) could be used, but for the sake of simplicity we have 
chosen the ordinary first order quentifiers. 
However, the question of how to define such quantifiers turns out 
to have no obvious answer. If we associate with each situation a 
set of individuals - those present in the situation, we have the 
following alternatives: Is VxA true in the situation s when 
A is true in s for all individuals of s, or should it be all 
individuals whatsoever? L(SQ) contains two distinct universal 
quantifiers, each corresponding to one of the alternatives above. 
2 • ] • Definition of L ( SQ). 
Symbols: 
A countably infinite set 
of individual variables 
For each n and m such 
that m~n, a countably 
infinite set of n,m-ary 
relation symbols R1 , R2 , 
Logical symbols 1, A, v, =>, V, a 
Auxiliary symbols (,) 
By an n-ary relation symbol we will understand a relation symbol 
which is n,m-ary for some m. The difference between n,m-ary 
and n,k-ary relation symbols will only become apparent through 
the semantics. Syntactically they are interchangeable, though it 
will be possible to decide from the appearance of a relation sym-
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bol whether it is n,m-a.ry or n,k-ary (by indices or otherwise). 
Formation rules: 
If x1 , ... ,xn are variables and R is an n-ary relation sym-
bol, then R(x 1 , ••• ,x) n a formula. 
If A1 and A2 are formulae, so are (A 1AA 2 }, (A1vA2 ), ,A1 and 
{A.1=>A2 ). 
If A is a formula and x a variable, VxA and axA are 
formulae. 
2.2. The Semantics for L(SQ). 
2.2.1. Definition of L{SQ) Hodel. 
A Model or Structure for L(SQ) is a quintuple <Q ,w,D,dom, I I> 
( 1 ) Q is the set of situa·tions 
( 2) w is a distinguished element of Q 
( 3 ) D is the set of individuals 
(4) dom is a func·tion from Q into p (D). 
The function dom assigns to each situation its domain of indivi-
duals, which is a subset of D. 
( 5 ) 
( 6) 
dom(w) = D 
is a function from the set of relation symbols into 
U (~(QxDn)~(QxDn)) such that if R is n-ary, then 
nEN 
I R I E~ ( Q x D n ) ~ ( Q x D n) . 
IRI+ is to be interpreted as the set of those n+l-tuples 
such that a 1. , ••• , a n bear the R-relation to each 
other in the situation s. 
I R 1- is ~to be intf'o as the set of those n+l~tuples 
<s a g 1 SL1C1n that explicitly don"t bear the R-
relation 'co each other in the i t.uation s" 
( '7 ) 
' I 
n 
xD 11 "'" ¢ and 
c u 
This carr to requirement 4 of 
{8) If R 
r1.ember of 
In an n m-ary relat 
reserved for agents vlhich 
sity of an 
A variable ass for:-
Defirlit_ 
For a 
assignment g, tne 
is a 
I PI ! ·~"- i then 
the first m argument places are 
t.CJ present for the truth or fal-
i '" r·elat.io:v1 t.c be determined on the basis 
Ide define to be a func-
the set of individuals in 0{,. 
:Lon funct 
g 
and a variable 
liN 
vv• g 
is defined by 
indu the fol ng way 
Basis 
+ 
g ,,.,g(x )>EIRI-} n 
Induc"cion step: Fc;r 1\ v, , and ""'>, ·the induction step is 
defined as 
is the set of t~ose sEQ + sE II All~ , for every 
vv,g 
g" ·the value at x. 
IL3 
t'h(J23 19 sEQ such that sE II + for AIIOGg' some 
,, J is t II s g 
g ' from g in the value at x. 
+ 
e sEQ such t.hat sE II P.~llr'<d ~· ! for every 
Ul.• ':::1 
·i~ 
il axA l C· t<h~:: q ~-~ 
g ' f~r-orn 9 -t:~h~£-? value at x, and 
for s 
+ 
sEQ such that sE II Allo~ , for some leg 
~ .. 
ts tJ:-g::· g 
Z:rc)lTi g ~trte value at x, and 
for ::d 0 
exl.J, def1ned 
A la. "tii t11 r to g if 
A forrnula is t:r:ue s It is easily verified 
true or false, and not. both. 
\tal t.J::ue stucture with respect to 
"' c:. § ,, z.::.~ 
--~~------~~~~~z•~=~ 
The fo1lmving basit1 for t1le set of valid 
formula.e of 
cnns A ll s u ·~, s t ·~~~ lid L(S) formulae are 
Since t1t fm." L(S), it is 
effectively deci a formula is an ax of this kind. 
Also, all formul the follovling schemes are 
axioms~ of (P..=>B) (B"">Jl,). A(y/x) is 
the formula obtai substituting for every free 
occurrence of 
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(Axl ) Vx(A=>B} :=1 (3 xA=>B) 
(Ax2) Vx(B=>A} :::::> (B=>VxA) 
X is not free in B 
(Ax3) \ix ( Bv p,) => (Bv\ixA) 
(Ax4) ( (3 xA)AB) => 3 x(A/\B) 
(Ax5} \ixl\_ => A( x) J in A, X does not occur v>Ti thin the (Ax6) J1. { x) => 3xA scope of any quantifier binding y 
(Ax7) ,vxA => 3 x-rA 
(Ax8) ax ( Bv l\} => ( Bv axA) } is in X not free B (Ax9) ( ( exA) .1\B) ='l- ex(AAB) 
(AxlO) ( ( axA) '" C ) => A( x) l In A, X does not 
J occur within the c~x11) (A(y/x)AC => exA scope of any quantifier binding y 
In AxlO and Axll, C is the formula R(z 1 , •• "'zn) or the formula 
, R ( z 1 , ••• , z n) , with R n, m-ary and with y among z 1 , ••• , zm. 
(Ax12) 
Rules of inference: 
Hodus Ponens j- A and f-A :::::> B yield f- B. 
Generalization f-A yields 
a-introduction ~A:::::. ( (BAP(x) )=>C) yields !-A:::::> (B=>axC) 
when A, B and c do not contain the unary relation symbol P, 
and X is not free in A or B. 
e~introduction j-A:::::. ( (CAP(x)=>B) yields t-A:::> (exC=>B) 
\vhen A, B and c do not contain the unary relation symbol P, 
and X is not free in A or B. 
a-int.roduction and e-introduction are not rules of inference in 
the sence that the consequent is true in 0C if the premiss is. 
They merely state tha·t if the premiss is true in all structures, 
then so is the consequent. 
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2.3.1. Theorem. 
Every theorem of L(SQ) is valid in L(SQ). 
Proof: The axioms are clearly valid, and the first two rules of 
ference are easily seen to preserve validity. He show this to 
be the case also for a-introduction. The proof for e-introduction 
is similar. 
Suppose A~ (B=>axC) is false in crt,g. Then (B=>axC) is 
false, and is + sf n axCII~ . so there an sE II BIIO(, such that By 
,g ,g 
the interpretation rule for a, + sf II CliO( , for 
,g a g' differing 
with g at most at x, and for which g ' ( x) E dom ( s) • Let (}(,' be 
a structure identical to G{,, except that P denotes a "presence 
predicate", i.e. lpl + = { I < )} - < s, a> aE dom s . Hence + sE II P ( x ) HN , , • 
vv ,g 
Since neither of A, B or C contains P, a shift from ot to 
o~· does not alter the interpretation of any of these formulae. 
Also, A and B do not contain x, so a shift from g to g' 
does not alter the interpre·tation of these formulae. Hence 
sEIIBII~, ,g' , sEIIP(x)ll~.: ,g' and s111cll~, ,g' . This means that 
(BAP(x})=>C is false in OL',g'. Furthermore, A is true, so 
~',g' constitutes a counter-example to A~ ((BAP(x)=>C). 
2.3.2. Derived Rules of Inference. 
2.3.2.1. L(S) Entailment. 
If A;, ... ,A~ and B' are substitution instances (by the same 
substitutions) of the L(S) formulae A1 , ... ,An and B, and 
.A. 1 , ... ,A f- B, then 
n L(S) 
Al , ... , A' t-- B' 
n L (SQ) 
Proof: This follows immediately from the deduction theorem of 
L(S), the fact that every substitution instance of a valid L(S) 
formula is an axiom, and the rule of Modus Ponens. 
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2. 3. 2. 2. S~mplified a- and e-Introduction. 
The rules we obtain by deleting the "A" in the rules of a- and 
e-introduction, are easily seen to follow from these rules. We 
will sometimes refer to these simpler rules also as a- and e-
introduction. 
2.4. Definition. 
r is consistent if -.(A1 r\ •• • /\An) is a theorem for no finite 
subset {P~ 1 , ••• ,An} of r. 
2.5. Theorem (Completeness). 
Every consistent set of formulae in L(SQ) has a model. 
The central ideas of the proof below are borrowed from the com-
pleteness proof of Modal LPC in [Hughes & Cresswell 1972]. Cen-
-tral to the proof is the notion of E-formulae ~ 
2 .5. 1 • Definit.ion of E- formulae. 
Formulae of the following kinds are called E-formulae: (P is 
1 ,1~ary and there are no occurrence of P or free occurrences of 
y other han those displayed. He also assume that y does not 
originally occur in C.} 
( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
( v) 
3xl'" ::J A(y/x) 
{((AAVxC)=>B A(A=>{BvC(y/x)))) ::J (A=>B) 
(({C(y/x);\A)=>B)A(A=>((3xC)vB))) =:1 (A=>B) 
(((AAaxC =>B)I\((AI\P(y))=>(BvC(y/x)))) =:1 (A=>B) 
( ( (C(y/x),AJ\;\P(y) )=>B),\ (A=> ( ( exC)vB))) =:1 (A=> B) 
They are said to be E-formulae with respect to the variable which 
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is here represented by y, and (for categories iv and v) the 1,1-
ary relation symbol \¥hich is here represented by P. 
Two E-formulae which are identical, except that they are E-forrnu-
lae with respect to different variables or relation symbols, are 
said to be of the same E~form. 
2.5.2. Lemma. 
If IT is a consistent set of formulae, then so is IT U {E} for 
any E-formula E with respect to a variable and (for categories 
iv and v) a 1 ,!-ary relation symbol which do not occur in any 
formula of IT, 
Proof: Suppose (for reductio ad adsurdum) that IT U { E} is 
inconsistent, This means that H :::::> -,E is a theorem, where H is 
the conjunction of some formulae in IT. Furhter suppose E is of 
type iv, i.e. E is the formula 
( ( (AAaxC)=>B)J\ ( (AAP(y} )=> (BvC(y/x)))) :::::> (A=>B) 
Since rH :::J ·~1E, we must have 
f-H :::::> -;(A=>B), 
r-H :::::> ( (AAi'lXC) =>B) 
and ~H :::::> ( ( AA P ( y ) ) = > ( Bv C ( y / x ) ) ) 
'\rJe want to show that the last entails 
f-H::; (A=>(BvaxC}) 
This is proved in the following manner: 
( ] ) 
( 2 ) 
H::; ((AAP(y))=>(BvC(y/x))) 
H::; (A=>ay(BvC(y/x))) 
theorem by the assumption 
1 , a- introd. 
( 3) 
( 4) 
(5) 
(6) 
From 
and 
and 
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H ::J (A=>(BvayC(y/x))) 
~< ) 
"'" 
P(v))=>C 
-- .ct. "' 
aye( x)=>axc 
H ::J (A=>(BvaxC)) 
j- H ::J -,(/I"=>B) 
j- H ::J ( (AAaxC)=>B) 
j-H ::J (A=>(BvaxC)), 
2, Ax8, L(S) ent. 
Axl 0 
4, a-intra. 
3, 5, L(S) ent. 
1- ,H follows by the rule of L(S} entailment. 
Hence I1 is inconsistent, contrary to the assumption. This means 
'chat n U {E} must be consistent when E is of type iv. The 
proofs for E-formulae of types i-iii and v are similar. 
2. 5. 3. Lemma. 
Every consistent set of formulae (in an L(SQ} language ~) can 
be extended to a maximal consistent set (in an L(SQ} language !.;• 
which extends which contains at least one E-formula of each E-
form ( in 1./ ) . 
Proof~ Let there be given a consistent set r of formulae. We 
extend the language by an infinite list of 1 ,1-ary relation sym-
bols, and an infinite list of variables. Since the original lan-
guage did contain infinitely many of both these sorts of symbols, 
r is consistent also in this language. We now want to extend r 
to a consistent set which contains at least one formula from each 
E- form of the ne\v language. There are just countably many E-
forms, hence they can be given an enumeration. 
He now define a corresponding sequence <A > of E-formulae in 
n n 
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the fol 
Infinitely ~' do not occur in r, and only finitely 
rnar.t:.z CJcc:u I"' in 1 1 rn~ lar remarks hold for J , J -ary rela-
tion s. Hence there is a variable y and a 1,1-ary rela-
p r Let 
be the E- formula of fc,nn n+ l i th respect to y (and, in cases 
iv and t.o P 1.nc>2 r 1~s cons it no~."r follows by 
that r u is consistent 
for· a1i 11 ~ Hence r U also consistent. 
In order to obtain the se escribed the lernma, v:re nov1 only 
need to extend r u 1:o a mcnu.mal consistent set. For 
used for consistent sets of first 
or de::::: ic lS a licable. 
2.5.4. Def 
An formula of the R(x1 , ••• , ) . 
A. formuLa :Ls either a proper atomary formula, or it 
is of one of th·r:: V xA or axA. 
Hence all fo:rrr,ulae are built up from quasi-atomary formulae using 
truth-functional connectives 
Lemma,, 
Every maxima corH:;istent:. set 6. which contains at least one formu-
la for each E- form, has a rFJ.odel. 
2.5.5.1. Construc"tion of the Model o-1_,. 
Let:. V be >che set. c£ tour elernent valuations which treat quasi-
atomary formulae as We only demand of elements in V 
V' 
if 
star}t: \ra 
As an exam~ 
the relationship between 
ogy t.he same 
{ vE V I v (l, ) E { 1 , ~ } } 
closed. The subset V' of V is 
li 
of closed sets, hence t is closed itself. 
property: 
la A and every variable ~= 
l 
f 
c 
.-I 
<_ \ 
l 
' 
' ! 
ere 
tJ-Jere 
' 
a.nd 
is 3 y for 
is a y for 
is a '\! and 
-' 
\:fi~t i ch 
vlftic~h 
a ? } 
v(A( 
v(P.. ( 
~axy p 
x})E{l 
x))H 1 .~} 
for 
and v(A ( y/x) ) ,_ { 1 
"1 ~ary P for 
and v(A y x) ~{l .~} 
n 
" 
the two con~ 
re 
follows: 
iff AE 6. ) • 
he distlnguished element. 
(2 The domain of sit Q u is the Q above.) 
( 3) 'I'11e clorr;_[:±ir1 .i. ivlduals is the set of variables in the 
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(4) dom(v) = {x I there is a n,m-ary relation symbol R and a 
m-tuple , , , , , z > which contains x, such that 
m 
v(R(z1 ,, •• ,z y 1 , ••• ,y )) is in {0,1 ,1,} for some m n-m 
( 5) 
x >lv(R(x 1 , ••• ,x ))E{0,1t}}. n n · 
Clearly, ~~ satisfies all requirements of 2.2.1. The assignment 
g is defined as ~he ity map on the set of variables. 
2.5.5.2. Propo~~tion. 
If vEQ, (G=>H)Ell and v(G)E{1,1t}, then v(H)E{1,1-}. This 
follovJs immediate from the construction of Q. 
2.5.5.3. Proposition. 
If (-,(G=>H) )EL1, ·then. there is a vEV' such that v(G)E { 1 .~} and 
v(H)~{l,~}. 
Proof: Suppose there is no vEV' such that v(G)E{l,~} and 
v(ff)f { 1 ,'1,-}. By the definition of V', this means that 
FG n ~H n ( n (~ U F)) = ¢. 
- -- (A=>B)E6 A B 
By topological compactness, there is a finite subset 
of 6 such that 
But then 
FG n FH n ( n (~ , . A 
i<n i 
( 1\ {A.=>B. )) :::l (G=>H) 
i< n 1 1 
= ¢. 
{A.=>B.} ./ 
1 1 1"' n 
is a substitution instance of a valid L(S) formula, and by con-
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2.5.5.4. Proposition. 
If (.,(G0 =>H0 ))E:LI, then there is a vEQ such that v(G0 )E{l,'t-} 
and v(H0 )~{1 .~}. 
Proof: Suppose (,(G 0 =>H0 ))ELI. The set of formulae of the types 
3xA, exA, ~xA and axA can be enumerated. Suppose the first is 
exA. From the construction of Ll, we know there is a variable y 
and a 1 ,1-ary relation symbol P such that 
is contained in Ll. By maximal consistency of Ll, 
( 1 ((A(y/x)AG0AP(y))=>H0 ))El.\ 
or (-,(G 0 =>((exA)vH0 )))ELI. 
He choose one, and call it -, (G =>H ) . 1 1 Since (-,(G 1=>H 1 ))ELl, we 
~ 
V'=i=¢ have FG n FH n by 2.5.5.3. \i?e 
1 ] 
also see that 
~ 
(FG n ) (FG ) . FH c n FH 
1 1 0 0 
The procedures for ~' 3, and a are similar. Also for these, 
suitable E-formulae are present in f.\. This process is repeated 
by induction. At step n+J we form 
from -,(G =>H ) 
n n 
and the n+1 'th formula in the (3xA, exA, ~xA, axA)-sequence in 
the same way as 
and the first element in the (3xA, exA, ~xA, axA)-sequence. 
For all n we will have 
and 
By compactness 
(n (F G 
n n 
follows. 
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n FH ) ) n V't¢ 
n 
It follows from the construction of {~(G =>H )} that 
n n n 
( n ( f' G 
n n 
n 'FH ) } n v• c 
n 
Together, these results yield 
-Clearly, no element of Qo" Q is contained in FG n FH • Hence also 
follows. 
( n < E' G 
n n 
n n 
Thus FG n FH n D.t¢, and there is a vEQ for which v(G0 )E{1,~} 
0 0 
and v(H0 )~{1,'J;}. 
2.5.5.5. Proposition. 
FA fl Q c FB n Qt¢ if and only if (A=>B)Ell. 
This follows from 2.5.5.2 and 2.5.5.4. 
2.5.5.6. Proposition. 
wEQ. 
Proof: Suppose wfV'. Then there are formulae A and B such 
~ 
that wE FA n FB and (A=>B)Et:.. But (A=>B) =:J (A =:J B) is a theo-
rem, and by maximal consistence (A =:J B)Et:., i.e. w(A =:J B) = 1, 
-contradicting wEFA n FB. Hence wEV'. 
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In order to show that this w is also in Q 0 , suppose 
w(3xA) = 1. There is an y such that ((3xA) ~ A(y/x))E6, and 
hence w(A(y/x)} = 1. exA ~ 3xA is easily seen to be a theorem 
of L(SQ). Hence also w(exA) = 1-- w(A(y/x)) = 1. For w the 
two other requirements for elements of QO are reducible to the 
two just considered, since w is a two element valuation. Hence 
we have shown wEQ 0 . Since w(p)E{O,l} for all p, wEQ immedia-
tely follows. 
2.5.5.7. Proposition. 
flAil~ = v(A) 
vv•g,v for all vEQ. 
The proof is ~' induction on the construction of formulae. 
Basis: For atomary formulae this follows immediately from the 
definition of I . 
Induction step: For truth-functional connectives, the induction 
step follows from the correspondence between the valuations and 
the inductive definition of II II • 
=>: We first show that v(A=>B)E{0,1} for all vEQ. There must 
be some formula C for which v(C)E{l .~} (v is not the 
constant valuation on ?. Hence v(C')E{J,~,O} for some 
C', and so v(C'v.,c')E{l,~}). Since C=>((A=>B)v 1 (A=>B)) is 
a theorem, v(A=>B)E{l,~,o} by 2.5.5.5. There is also some 
formula D for which v(D)E{O,?}. ((A=>B)A,(A=>B))=>D is a 
theorem, so v(A=>B)E{l,?,O}. Combining these results, we 
obtain v(A=>B)E{O,J}. Also, (A=>B) ~ (C=>(A=>B)) and 
(,(A=>B)) ~ (C=>,(A=>B)) are theorems, so v(A=>B) = w(A=>B). 
Hence we only need to show that + wE II A=>BII iff (A=>B)E6. 
Now wE II A:::o:>BII + iff II All+ c II Bll +. By the induction hypothe-
a. 
F~ n Q c n D) 
L-. }3 
~ II.49 ~ 
iff (FAn Q)::. (FB n Q). 
iff (A=>B)El'l. 
ste~q for is proved. 
But 
Suppose v axA f{l, } . Since vEQ, and hence satisfies the 
requ "cs of 2. 5. 5 , 1 , there is a y and a 1 , 1 -ary rela-
t P such tha·t v ( P ( y) ) E { l , 0,1-} and 
v the induction hypothesis, this means 
IIA y; } . Then { 1 /lr} for the 
(J ( 
_, ica1 to g e that g" (x) = y. Since 
c g' 
} . dom( v}, II a;.O\Ii 
New supposE· ·v(axf\, E[l,~'}. Further suppose yEdom(v), i.e. 
that E r' '1 o· 1 l J ' .' ' J where y is runong z 1 , ... ,zm 
and R lS m-ary Since ( (axA)AR(z1 " •• ,z ))=>A(y/x} n 
z ))=>A(y/x) are contained in ~. I1 . 
r • the induction hypothesis, 
IIA(~l x il This means that IIAII , E{1,"lt} (j(,,g ,v for 
all g tferi th g at most at x, and for \vhich 
9 ' ( x )E dom ( v) • in other words, II axAIII"l-l E { 1 , ~} • Hence 
v~_,,g,v 
v axA)E{1,'1r} iff llaxAii 1'+4 E{l,~}. 
V(n g, V 
vve have show'TI. 
s, :Lt follows that 
v(ex;B E! 1 iff ii r::•xBII E { ] '~} • 
,g,v And hence, by Ax12, 
{o:,v}. iff il axlU g, Together, these 
esuH:s yield 
II axAII 
- v ( axA). 
The induction step for 'II is similar. This concludes the proof 
of 2 • 5 ,, 5 • 7 • 
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0-c . .~ is a model for 6 , 
Proof~ 
iff AEb.. 
2.6. A Remark on a- and a-Introduction. 
Plain a- and e-Intrcduction. 
The rule I l-\ -~ B=>C) ( X is not 
':! ,, ~ (B""'-'axc) n 
free in A or 
+ 
wE II All ()t,g 
B 
vle call roduct.ion. The analogous simlification of e-
introduction we call plain e-introduction. They are simpler than 
a- and a-introduction and do also preserve validity. They are not 
would be too weak. There are cases 
for •,IJhicb A ::J ( ('E:.;,p x)) =>C) a teorem, but not A~ (B=>C), 
eve:n \All1eJ1 P ()Ccurs neither of A, B or C. This is so be-
cause of AxlO and Axll He •<Van-t to show that a- and e-introduc-
tion cannot be aced their "plain" counterparts, and define 
L0 to be the system in IAihich this replacement is made. 
Generalized Semantics. 
In the qeneralized s~nantics for L(SQ) dom is a function of two 
~"----~---=--...~-----~-~---~ 
entities. One coordina-te is a situation, the other an individual 
vcu·iable ~ For each variable x and situation s, dom(s,x) must 
satisfy all requirements of dom(s) in an ordinary structure. 
axA lS true in a situation s iff all aEdom(s,x) have the 
property of A. (For a formal definition, substitute dom(s,x) 
for dom(s) in the definitions of + II axAII"W o~,.,, g and 
+ 
II exAIIO(..g in 
~ II,,51 
It should be noted that dam is a function of the variable x 
Thus ax really binds the variable 
x, since dam s,x is independent of the in-terpretation of x. 
2.6.3. 
(axR(z) ·~~ a valid formula of L(SQ) with the 
g·ei1.eralizcd. r;;_rnantlCS ~ 
P :t-Ct()f ·: If for all aEdom(s,x), but <s,b>t jRj+ for 
a bt II axfd x il + ..l. t-
+ ( y) II , 
Lernrna, 
E-ver·v t.l1.ec)r2n~ ·.Jf •s valid in the generalized semantics for 
L ( SQ) ·~ 
Proof: are easily checked to be valid. 
Mod s Ponens nd eneralization clearly preserve validity. In 
t. 
wE II ,q_ sEPB 
st 
ain a-introduction preserves validity, 
fi 
is false in the structure ()1,, g. 
i i: ior1 .c O.L 
for a g 
+ 
II axCII.lt c ,g 
situation s in 
' + 
sp CIIO"Lg' for 
cliff ·Lh C1 at: fJ()St a 4C. X, '""' o lnce neither A nor B 
tains x, A ~ B=> false in ere, g •. 
Th<::· introduction is similar. 
2.6.5. 
is not a complete axiomatization of L(SQ). 
(axR(x ):o:: (a y is a valid formula of L(SQ). 
Then 
the 
a g' 
con-
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3 o }\PPLICi'-\'riOf\f Nl~J<:ED INF'lNJ:CfiVE PERCEPTION REPORTS 
3,] , Prelimi 
Huch of Barwise' on Situation Semantics emerged from 
his study of pe s, cfr. [Barwise 1979] [Barwise 
' ' 
.J_ ur3 tlC}rta_ " idea on perception out.lined there have 
·been tec1 of [ B se & Perry 1983]. 
Ide ill n.o>v ry t.o lat~e some of these notions within the 
so -far i:n s article, Due to the comparative 
s lici L S(} a rough approximation can be 
·8 
In ·the foL assume that the reader acquainted with 
[B. 3rnplEc on page 1 86, the follm¥ing rule for 
naked infin~ I.Vt::. l')e inferred. Barv1ise and Perry do not 
a rule, and express the need for 
ex entences are embedded. However, we try 
c).e, e' and a location 
overlapping that 
tuation such that. 
d~ !I ~~I ll 1 ~ 2 
,e'; yes 
article is insensitive towards 
connections and d1sco tuationso Also, there is nothing cor-
re to ocatior . This leads us to the following simplifi-
caticrn: 
an e' such that 
II cb II e' 
Ir:. e~ .seei ~'}" 
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Finally we drop the individual coordinate in the seeing relation. 
This can be interpreted as a restriction of our study to the per-
ceptions of one specific individual. This simplification is just a 
convenience and not really necessary. But it is also of little 
consequence and can eas1 be amended. If we also switch from 
"II ¢11 e" to "eE II ¢11 +,. v1e now obtain: 
eEIISEES ¢11+ 
iff there is an e'EH¢11+ 
such that In e: seeing,e';yes 
This is what we intend to represent within the setting of L(S). 
Now the scheme "In e: • 1 II seelng,e ;yes is one \vhich cannot possibly 
be defined in L(SI, since the situations of this system are pri-
mi ti ves and not sets. Hov1ever, we can get something very similar 
so to speak lifting the seeing relation out of the situations, 
and define a 
+ L: c n xn 
~:= 
such that <e,e'> E E corresponds to In e: seeing,e':yes 
The interpretation of ,SEES ¢ is something which Barwise and 
Perry say nothing about. The following I feel is a plausible 
suggestion: 
eE II SEES ¢II 
iff In e: seeing,e';no for every e' (possibly within some 
further specified set) such that 
e' E II¢ II+ 
Now 
In e: seeing e' ;no is something different from 
not (In e: seeing e' yes) 
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Hence we need one more relation such that <e,e'> E L 
corresponds to 
In e: seeing,e'~no 
3.2. Syntax and semantics of L(See*) 
Symbols 
propositional variables 
connectives 1 , v, A, =>, See 
auxiliary symbols (,) 
Formation rules 
(l) Every propositional variable is a formula. 
(2) If A and B are formulae, then so are (A=>B), 
(AvB), (AAB) and ,A. 
(3) If A is a formula without occurrences of See or =>, then 
See(A) is a formula. 
A structure for L(See*) is a quadruple <Q,w, I I ,L> 
(J) Q is the set of situations. These are primitives. 
(2) w is a distinguished element of Q 
(3) I I is a function from the set of propositional variables into 
j) ( Q} x.P ( Q) 
+ 
wE I PI u I PI ( 4) 
( 5) is an ordered pair + -<L , L > with both elements 
being sets of ordered pairs of situations. 
( 6) and 
+ 
c Z U L 
The last is just the requirement that for every t, <w,t> is a 
member of one, but not both, of z+ and L This corresponds to 
(4) and is necessary in order to ensure that See(A) is either 
true or false and not both. 
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For a given si:ructure (;'It, =<Q, w, I 1,2: >, the interpretation func-
tion II u00 is defined exactly as for Lo (S} on pages II. 6 and 
IL7, with the following addition: 
(vii) + + sEIISee(A)II iff there is a tEQ such that <s,t>EL: 
and tE II All +. 
(viii) sE II See (A) II iff <s,t>El: for all tEIIAII+ 
A is true in (}L if and only if + wE II AIIO'(.. 
3.3. Loerrrrna. 
Every well-formed substitution instance in L(See *) of a valid 
L(S) formula is valid in L(See * ). 
Proof: Remark l .4.2 is applicable. 
3.4. Axiomatization. 
A complete axiomatic characterization of the set of valid formulae 
of L(See *) is obtained by adding to the derivation rule and 
axiom schemes of L(S) the following axiom schemes: 
(Sl) (A=>B) ::J (See(A)=>See(B)) 
(S2) (A=>B) ::J (,see(B)=>•See(A)) 
(S3) See(AvB) ::J (See(A)vSee(B)) 
(S4) ,(see(A)vsee(B})=>,see(AvB) 
(SS) See(A)=>,(A=>,(A=>A)) 
(S6) (A=>,(A=>A))=>,See(A) 
3.5. Theorem (Validity). 
Every theorem is true in every structure. 
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Proof: By lermna 3 "3, all formulae indicated by the axiom schemes 
{A1 )-(A2l} are valid in L(See * ). Validity of Sl-86 follows 
immediately from the interpretation rules for the connectives. 
3. 6. Theorem (Complet~E0SS) . 
Every consistent set o:f formulae in L(See *) has a model. 
He prove this f:com the corresponding result for L(S): 
Construction of a model for a consistent set r. 
--------
Let r be a consistent set of formulae in L(See * ). We extend 
the language by a countably infinite set of new propositional 
variables, one for each simple formula of the original language. 
'rhe propositional variable corresponding to the simple formula A 
is denoted by pA. To ohtain the set r' , vve substitute pA for 
every occurrence of See(A) in formulae of r. 
IT is the set of all formulae of the types 
(A=>B) ::) (p =>p ) 
- 1\ B 
(A=>B) ::) 
P(AvB) => (pAvpB) 
-;(pAvpB) => IP(AvB) 
PA => ,(A=>,(A=>A)) 
{A~>,(A=>A)) => iPA 
Since r is consistent in L(See *), r• U IT must be consistent 
in L(S). r' U IT then has a model (}"G= <D.,w,ll> which is a 
closed valuation structure. In this structure we define an object 
z + = < Z , I ' 
·' suchthat CTt/=<fl,w,II,I> isan L(See*)model 
for T' : 
.,.,+ 
= { <s,t> It~ u /_, {II All +I sf II pAll+} 
" = {<s,t>ltE u '-" { li All+ I sEll pAll-} • 
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3. 6. 2. Proposi·tio~. 
1\.1 ' • ( • v~ ls an L See*) structure. 
Proof~ He mus~c check that ( 6) in 3. 2 holds. Since ()-(_, is an 
L(S) structure, II pAll+ iff ldE II pAll • Hence from the definition of 
2:, <vl,t>E2::+ iff <vi,t>t:>.:~, and this is just a reformulation of (6). 
3.6.3. Proposition. 
+ + IISee(A)II ~ llpAII 
Proof: Suppose I ) + sEIISee~A II • Then + <s,t>EI 
L + 
definition of I: ', this implies that sE II pAll . 
3.6.4. Proposition. 
+ ( + llpAII c IlSee A)ll • 
for a + tE II All By 
Proof: + Suppose sE II pAil and suppose (for reductio ad absurdum) 
that + ' + + stiiSee(A)II, i.e. <s,t.>p: for all tEIIAII By the 
definition of + I: ' this means that II All+::_ U {II Bll +I sf II p 8 11 +}. 
+ Since pA=>.,(A=>.,(A=>A)) is true, IIAII =F¢. By compactness, 
+ + + + IIAII c (II B1 11 U ... U II B II ) = II B.1v., .VB II for a finite subset 
. n n 
{B 1 , .•• ,Bn} of {BI sf1lp8 11 +}, By the truth of 
follov.rs. 
But by repeated use of the true scheme 
must lead to a contradiction, since s111PB.II+ for all i, l<i<n. 
]_ 
3.6.5. Proposotion. 
llpAII = I!See(A)II. 
P:coof fc:11 c ') ·~ 0 ._} Q ~· 3.6.4 and corresponding results 
for the negat.i 
is a. :T1odel 
Proof: fo1 from 3.6"5' 
es. 
L(See -r: JS :: ':>:ir · :::.oo .,;e:1k, since it allows the possibility of 
see fal e sit~ation 1.~. 
not necessa ly ~ue. The addition of this as an extra axiom 
tures: 
In such a 
1.1: 
,::; fol 
+ 
1- r. I p II 
LC! J':"J 
extra constrain·t on the struc-
wE I p! 
sees QJ t:hen ljl 
then b doesn't see ¢ 
of chap'cer 8 in l Ba.r':Jise .o;_:)d Perry 1983] become valid. 
'The cons·tra nt a.buV•2 can ~J.e strengthened to the following: 
( i) 
(ii) 
T '" T <s,t>E:>:: 
.L 
sE I pI , 
If + sEipj 
J. 
and tEipj' ( tE I PI then 
and tE I p j , then 
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This corresponds to 1:1-10 extra axiom scheMes 
The nc es 
E~ I f b E;.e12s ¢ and lj_J 
' 
then b sees ¢ and b sees c); 
F: I"" L }) se s rb c); 
' 
then b sees ¢ or b sees c); 
ee(¢)/\See(c);)) 
See ¢v0 ~ (See(¢ vsee(q;)) 
are bot:h Vcclid :Ln L(SeE,"' The first follmvs from Sl, the 
second from S3, 
3. 7. 3. Princip1et]_~or2:_cerning Identity and Quantification. 
Barwise and Perry also t fon;ard the following principles: 
c~ If }::> sees ~) ·the IT) then there is something1 such that 
b sees ¢(it. 1 ) 
G: If b sees ¢ (a 11 ) then there is a IT] such that b 
sees ¢(i ). 
None of these are expressible in L(See -x·). However the following 
very rough approximations: 
See(¢(x, ))A.:c ""· x 2.) ~See(¢ (x 2 )) J ] 
See( j 
arc':! both expre:ss.it;le o.nd txue in the language L(See Q) obtained by 
combining L(SQ) and L See*), and adding identity. (There are 
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several alternatives for the definition of II x = yll , buth that does 
not concern us here as long as + \vE II X = yllot, <] iff g (X) = g ( y) • ) 
The language L(See Q) vvas studied in my cand.scient. thesis, in 
particular, a complete axiomatization was given. This will be the 
topic of a further publication. 
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4. APPLICATION TO THE CONCEPT OF POSSIBILITY. 
The definition of the H-operator in section 1.11 enabled us to 
investigate the connections between the formal systems L(S) and 
SS. But there is more than this to be said about the notion of 
possibility in situation semantics, even within the narrow frar:te 
of the present systems. 
The concept of possibility represented in systems like S5, is the 
concept of philosophical possibility; "possibly A" r:teans "A 
could have been true" or "A does not describe an impossible 
constellation of facts''. However, in ordinary discourse another 
interpretation is intended at least as often. When our informa-
tion is incomplete, we of·ten use "possibly A" as a synonyme of 
"perhaps A is the case". In the terminology of situation seman-
tics, such a usage may correspond approximately to 
(1) "The present situation may be part of a situation in which A 
is the case." 
Could such a notion be represented within possible world seman-
tics? First note that ,A and Poss(A) could never be true at 
the same time. Then suppose Poss(A) is true in a possible world 
w. Since w defines a total valuation on the formulae, either A 
or ,A is true. It cannot be ,A, hence A follows. If we also 
accept the principle A=>Poss(A), the result is that we cannot 
distinguish betv.;een A and Poss (A), and we have a collapse to 
the propositional or predicate calculus. This argument cannot be 
used against L(S), since 
Po s s (A ) = > ( A v ,A ) 
need not be true. 
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Before we try to represent Poss(A) (as defined in (1 )) within 
L(S), we must decide ho'lr! to understand "may be part of". One 
interpretation is our technical term subsituation (cfr. 1.11 .3). 
"This situation may be part of t" should then be read as some-
thing like "Everything true 1.n this situation is also true in t, 
so on the basis of this situation we cannot exclude the possibili-
ty that t is factual. ". 
This could be a viable approximation, but I fear it may turn out 
to be a little confining, for instance in the presence of the 
concept of a situation's associated domain of individuals. In 
order to grant ourselves a little flexibility, we therefore leave 
open the possibility that there can be something inherent in a 
situation \vhich prevents some other situation from being a possi-
ble extension, independently of other facts in the two situations. 
Hence subsituation is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. 
Since we choose "possibly par-t of" to be a basic notion, we must 
add something to an ordinary L(S) structure in order to represent 
this notion. One candidate for this added feature is simply a 
relation + II on the set of situations. In order to represent 
also "cannot be part of" and a gap in between, we need one more 
relation II-. Poss(A) is then defined to be true in s iff s 
may be extended to a situation t in which A J.S true~ i.e. iff 
there is a tE II All+ such that . + <s,t>EII Correspondingly, Poss(A) 
is false in s iff s cannot be extended to any situation t in 
which A 1.s true; i.e. iff <s,t>E:II for all tEll All "'-
By what we have said so far, we have defined a language L ( Poss * ) 
which is isomorphic to L (See -A ) • Hence we have a complete axiom-
atization at hand. So far we have done nothing to ensure that s 
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ls a subsituation of t if + siT t. Hence we do exactly that, and 
add the structural constraint: 
( 2 ) + If siT t, then s is a subsituation of t. 
A new axiomatization l.s then obtained by adding the axiom 
Poss(A)AB => Poss(AAB). 
A counterpart for the negative extension could be 
( 3) If + sEjpJ and tEjpJ - -then siT t and tiT s and the axiom 
It could also be argued that ,Poss(A) is the same as ,A, so 
that 
II Pass (A) II should be defined as IIAII 
and we could dispense with IT . 
Other reasonable additions are the axiom A=>Poss(A) and the 
requirement that be reflexive. 
He note that by the isomorphy of L(Poss *) to L(See *), 
Poss(A) => ,(A=>~(A=>A)) 
i.e. Poss(A) => M(A) is valid. 
Several augmentations of the L(Poss *) structures could be 
studied. An interesting step would be to allow formulae like 
Poss(Poss(A)), and to discuss which additions should be made to 
make valid the right formulae of this extended language. 
It could also be argued that L(CS), rather than L(S), would 
provide the proper framework, since the truth of Pass (A) in a 
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consistent situation should entail the truth of A in a consi-
stent extension. 
The formula 
Po s s (A ) = > ( Po s s ( AA. B ) v Po s s ( AI\ , B ) ) 
could also be of interest, perhaps even L(CS)+ would be the best 
framework for a discussion of this formula. 
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Note. 
This article was based on excerpts from my cand.scient. thesis 
of the same title, which was written at the University of Oslo 
under the supervision of Professor Jens Erik Fenstad. I am 
indebted to him for encouragements and valuable advice during 
·the work on my thesis and in the composition of this article. 
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0. Introduction. 
Some typical examples of mass terms are: v.rater, gold and 
cheese. They are separated from typical count terms like ~~ 
house and book, both on semantic and syntactic grounds e.g. in 
the determiners they take. But the dividing line is notthatsharp. 
Some words are said to belong to both classes e.g. cake, typical 
mas terms like water has occurences as count terms, and it is even 
claimed (Pelletier (1975)) that every count noun can occur as a 
mass term. He shall not consider this claim, but from the mere 
fact that it has been stated, we can conclude that it may be 
better to look upon the distinction between mass terms and count 
terms as a distinction between different types of noun occurences 
in sentences, and not as a lexical distinction, even though many 
nouns nearly always occur in only one of the two categories. 
I shall not try to classify all noun occurences according to 
this dichotomy, nor shall I discuss \vhether such a classification 
is possible. vfuat I shall do, is to separate out two smaller 
classes of noun occurences which are clear cut examples of mass 
terms and count terms, respectively, and whose semantics will 
occupy us in the sequel. The mass terms will be nouns (or nouns 
together with modifying adjectives or restrictive clauses) in 
indefinite singular preceded by one of the determiners all, ~· 
much, most, little, a little or an amount term like two liters of, 
less than one kilo of and so on. The whole noun phrase including 
the determiner or amount term will be called a mass noun phrase. 
In comparison, typical count terms are nouns (or modified nouns) 
in singular preceded by ~· an, or every, or in plural preceded by 
many, most, few, a few, two, three, ... more than two, less than 
three and so on. 
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Definite descriptions will also be of concern to us since 
there are semantic fferences betv,reen expressions like the red 
car and expressions l the water that John drank. Intuitively 
·the first one is generated from a count term, the latter from a 
mass term. Hmvever, since v.'e have abandoned the idea of the 
mass/count dichotomy as a lexical distinction we have also lost 
the possibility ·to distinguish these two definite descriptions on 
purely syntactic grounds. That is maybe not so bad, because it is 
possible to g at least the latter one a second ("countable") 
reading. ~Je shall be careful not to use the technical term mass 
!]?Uf_l phrase to any occurrence of definite descriptions for reasons 
to be given in section l . 
Hany studies of mass terms (e.g. Quine (1960), Parsons 
( 1 970) ) take as the s·tarting point occurences of mass terms with-
out determiners e,g, in the sentence Water is wet. There are 
several reasons for 1,vhy we deviate from this practice. First, of 
course, mass terms with determiners are semantically interesting 
in themselves. Second, it is possible, as we have seen, to sepa-
rate out a class of mass terms with determiners syntactically from 
a class of count terms with determiners. This may not be possible 
for mass terms without determiners, at least not in a language 
like Norwegian where kj¢re bil (drive a car} has the same form as 
drikke vann (drink vJat<-..,.r). Third, if one v1ants to study the seman-
tics of mass terms with no determiners, one runs into problems 
which are independent of the mass/count distinction. Water is wet 
has a form very similar to Horses are kind and one is thus lead into 
problems with so-called generics. On the other hand, in the study 
of mass terms with determiners one can learn from the study of 
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count terms with determiners. He shall particularly profit from 
Barwise and Cooper's (1981) study of generalized quantifiers. 
Fourth, most analyses of the sentence Water is wet (e.g. Parsons 
(1970), l'vlontague (1973 b)) propose to paraphrase it as All water 
is wet or Most water is wet, thus in effect reducing the study to 
the cases we propose to consider. 
Why is the analysis of quantification and mass terms proble-
matic? ~fuy cannot this problem be treated along the same lines as 
"normal" quantification, letting water as a mass term refer to all 
quantifies of the world's water, All water is wet be true if and 
only if every quantity of water is vlet, and Sor:te water is wet be 
true if and only if some quantity of water is wet? I think that 
this approach works if one restricts oneself to the logical deter-
miners all and some, but one gets into problems when more general 
mass noun phrases and definite descriptions are taken into con-
. d . 1 s1 erat1on. 
A definite description like the red car has meaning in a 
context only if there is one and only one red car present. But if 
John drank one quantity of water there were many more quantities 
that he also drank, still the description the water that John 
drank has a clear meaning. There has been two ways to tackle 
this. The first approach, proposed e.g. by Burge (1972), is often 
called r.tereology and stems from Leonard and Goodman's (1940) "cal-
culus of individuals". The idea is to add to the semantic model a 
new primitive relation between the individuals called overlap. 
This in turn gives rise to an inclusion relation betv.Teen the indi-
viduals. Then the description the water that John drank is taken 
to denote the maximal element under this inclusion relation in the 
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set denoted by water that John drank. Hhat is needed to make this 
work, is some restrictions on the semantics that secures this set 
to contain a maximal element, and at the same time does not force 
the set denoted by gold that weighs 2 kilos to contain a maximal 
element. I have not yet seen the necessary details carried out. 
'I'he other approach -to definite descriptions has been to keep 
the model standard and then paraphrase the gold in Smith's ring as 
something like the gold co~tituting Smith's ring (Hontague (1973 
b)) which intuitively works in this example since there is only 
one gold quantity that constitutes Smith's ring. But it is pro-
blematic to paraphrase some definite descriptions and not all if 
one wants a serClantic analysis that match the syntactic analysis as 
in Hontague (1973 a} grammar. It is also a problem to find the 
right way of paraphrasing; e.g. it may seem odd to use constitute 
in connection with the water that John drank. The main objection 
is, ho\\rever, that this is not a sa tis factory formal semantic 
explanation. Even though it is intuitively clear that there is 
only one gold quantity that constitutes Smith's ring vle cannot be 
sure that ~ld consti tutin · Smith's rin \vill denote a unit set in 
every model, at least not if constitute is treated as a normal 
transitive verb and assigned as denotation a (non-specific) set of 
ordered pairs. In that case the cardinality of the set denoted 
by constituting Smith's rina ~__,J. 11 vary from model to model, and 
the same will happen with the intersection of this set and the set 
denoted by gold, i.e. the set denoted by gold constituting Smith's 
rir.!..9:. The result will be models where the definite description is 
undefined" 
Then there is the ques'cion how mass noun phrases with non-
logical determiners like much and most or amount terms can be 
handled when water is interpreted as guantities of water. 
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Huch water does not mean the same as many quantities of water, if 
the latter one has any meaning at all. He can say that one glass 
contains more water than another glass, but we will not say that it 
contains more quanti·ties of wa·ter. One proposal for handling much 
(Montague 0973 b)) is to paraphrase much water F as some large 
quantity of water F. But this does not generalize to little or 
to amount terms, ,John drank less than one liter of milk does not 
mean the same as John drank a quantity of milk with volume less 
than one liter. 
liters of milk. 
'I'he latter sentence is true even if John drank 5 
Furthermore it is hard to see that such rewrit-
ings is compatible with a s·trategy that aims at a semantic analy-
sis which is parallel to the syntactic analysis. 
A related problem has t.o do with negation. If some water 
boiled and some water did not boil, there were quantities of water 
that partly boiled and partly did not boil. More precisely, there 
would have been at least as many such quantities as there were 
quantities that boiled. If now negation is interpreted as set-
theoretic complement in the set of quantities then the set denoted 
by water t.ha"c did not boil cannot have smaller cardinality than 
the set denoted by water that boiled. It follows that the sen-
tence More than half (of the) water boiled only can be true if All 
(the) water boiled is true. The sentence 
( 1 ) Much vlater did not boil 
has according to my intuitions two readings - one with wide scope 
negation a.nd the oJcher IAJi01 narrow scope negation: 
( l a) It is not the case that much water boiled 
(lb) It was much \vater that did not boil, 
respectively. If much water boiled, and some water did not boil, 
(lb) will become true with these interpretations. So it seems 
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that interpreting water as quantity of water is not compatible 
with normal interpretation of negation. 
The goal of this paper is to present a new theory for mass 
term quantification whicl!. takes these problems into consideration. 
At the same time we must be able to give an account for the valid 
inferences of previous theories, in particular, of Bunt's (1979) 
examples 
(2) (a) All water is water 
(b) All blue water is water 
(c) All blue water is blue 
We will also consider it as a goal to show how it is possible to 
get a valid form ·to the 
( 3) Huch 1"1ater 
All that evap,nated, disappeared 
.. Huch water dis 
and at the same time not to get a valid argument if much is 
exchanged <,vith little. 'I'he final goal is to show that the theory 
naturally extends to treat amount terms and to give the connec-
tions betv,reen the sentences 
(4) Less than two kilos of cheese disappeared 
(5) The cheese that disappeared weighed less than two kilos 
Before continuing let me add some general remarks. Our aim 
is to give in a uniform way a semantics of natural languages in 
modeltheoretic terms. T'hus we aim to give the semantics uniformly 
(or mechanically) from the syntactic analysis as in Montague ( l 97 3 
a) grammar. This excludes, in particular, any kind of rewriting 
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which is not uniform, 
Further, our interest lies in the natural language itself, 
not in the world ::'Jescribes. This means that the models we 
build are not necessa ly "true" models of the physical world, but 
means to understand the particular, to give valid 
forms to intuitive true sentences and inferences. 
Finally, natural uages have priority not only over the 
physical world, but also all kinds of formal languages and 
logical systems, lfuat is of primary inocerest is the natural lang-
uage and s model t.heore>tic c1renotations, not any intermediate 
formal language. But: an intermediate formal language may be a 
valuable tool in stud t.he semantics of our natural language 
fragment, in particul r, in gai some insight into the complex-
ity of the structure and the inferences in the fragment we are 
studying. 
section 2. 
It is to t.Li.s end that we introduce the system Ll.\1 in 
The treatment here ll be pure extensional. This is not 
because every mass noun rase can be taken to be extensional. 
But we need first to a correct account of the difference 
between mass noun phrases and count noun phrases. 
independent of intensionality. 
The rest of the paper organized as follows. 
And that is 
In section 
one we discuss the idea of homogeneous references and show how 
this gives a clue to a "Boolean" semantics for mass noun phrases. 
In section ·two we construct a simple formal system LM and show 
in section three how a fragment of English can be interpreted via 
it. In section four we discuss the metamathematics of LM, this 
section can be omittedo In section five we discuss a combined 
system for mass terms and count terms, and in section six we 
extend the fragment to include amount terms. 
~ III" 
1 • Homogeneous re:fe:rencre bo0Jean alaebras. 
Two proposed uni V•3~csals for t.he ~'3emc.ntics of mass terns, 
fsrence have been widely dis-
cussed. On cummulative re!'erence we n:::a.d Quine (i960); "So-
called mass terms like and 'red' have the 
semantical property of r<::?.f·er nsr cumrclt"lE1ti ·'"' any sum of parts 
which are water hc•wever also be 
ful lassifi0:d as mass 
terms such as plurais of one, like Quine, extends 
the category mass ~erms t eome uccurences of adj s - an 
adjective like hea 
A furhter cr.ite proposed, namely dis-
tributive reference 3 ) ., p:±r >:.s c:E something which 
is water are vvater than the first 
criterion for the fol Q ine ( 1 960 ) } g there are 
parts of water, sugar, t l1 to count as water, 
sugar, furniture. small to count as furni-
ture is not too small (p 99) • 
Bunt { 1 979 has poitJt:..:od cn:t -th,~l th can be read in two 
different ways. Either a;.:; a statE:ment about the vvorld around us, 
and in tha-t case it l:S Or as a statement 
about our use of the l3nguage. In tJ1a. e is necessary to 
point out where OlJr ~Jse rna sa the existence of 
minimal parts is reflected. such evidence 
forthcoming. 
Quine's goals in ·'t']ord Object are differen-t from the goals 
of this paper. 
language and the outer wo:r: ld, hmv the used for refer-
ring. This is reflected not on in his onjections to the distri~ 
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butive reference criterion but also in the formulation of the 
cummulative reference criterion. For our purposes it is not cri-
tical if mass terms really refers homogeneously, that is both 
cummulatively and distributively. Rather what is of importance is 
whether they behave as if they did and what it means to behave in 
such a way. 
From this discussion and from the fact that we have defined 
mass terms as certain specific occurrences of nouns in sentences, 
it is natural to take as point of departure some examples of sen-
tences containing mass terms: 
(6) (a) Much water boiled 
(b) John drank much water 
(c) * Much water weighed two grams 
(d) * Much \vater contained ten grams of salt. 
Rather than focusing on the mass terms alone, let us shift 
attention to the rest of the sentences and ask which semantic 
property is shared by the phrases boiled and John drank in opposi-
tion to weighed two grams and contained ten grams of salt? It is, 
of course, the property of homogeneous reference. If John drank 
two parts, he drank the sum of them and any smaller parts con-
tained in them. On the other hand, the sum of two (different) 
parts, each weighing two grams is more than two grams and parts of 
them weigh less than two grams. An analysis of more examples 
gives the same result, so I propose the following as a linguisti-
cal universal3 : 
Homogeneous Constraint: 
Mass noun phrases combine only with homo-
. 4 f geneous express1ons to orm sentences. 
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Intuitively, a homogeneous expression is an expression which 
refers homogeneously. But to avoid undesirable references to the 
outer world and speculation on whether an expression refers homo-
geneously in all possible worlds we will redefine homogeneity 
without mentioning reference: 
Let a be a noun which can occur as a mass term, and let ~ 
be a noun modi which can combine with a to form a mass term. 
The expression 6 is said to be homogeneous if and only if the 
follmving two inferences are valid: 
CUM The ~a 6 
The no·t~,~ a o 
DISTR The a o 
T"here is some ~a: 
-~~--------~---
To give an example on how this definition works, say we want to 
test disappeared Then we can choose gold for a, white for ~ 
and substitute disappeared for 6. The two inferences then become 
(7) The white gold disappeared 
The not-white gold disappeared 
, . The gold disappeared 
(8) The gold disappeared 
There was some ll'lhi te gold 
.. The white gold disappeared 
which are valid. He can test any expression which can combine 
with the white gold to form a sentence, with this test. For a 
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phrase like John drank the word order has to be changed, of 
course, so the first premiss in CUM reads John drank the white 
gold. 
It is our opinion that the phrases disappeared, boiled and 
John drank pass this test, while contained ten grams of salt and 
weighed two kilos fail. 
Is it possible to restate the Homogenous Constraint in purely 
syntactic terms? We think it can be done at least to some extent. 
First, nearly all intransitive verbs seem to be homogeneous and 
can combine with mass noun phrases. But some exceptions exist, 
including meet and 
For transitive verbs the picture is more complex. We have 
seen that John drank can combine with mass noun phrases. That is 
also true for the phrase t'1any men drank, even though this does not 
pass the homogeneity test, It is clearly enough that what each 
man drank was homogeneous, so a slight modification either in the 
Homogeneous Constraint or in the test is necessary to cover this. 
It is more doubtful whether mass noun phrases can be found in 
direct object position with any transitive verb. It is at least 
difficult to get an extensional reading of love much water. 
Sentence (6d) indicates that a mass noun phrase cannot stand 
in subject position to a transitive verb when the direct object is 
quantified, and that seems to be the case for all transitive 
verbs. On the other hand, when the direct object is not quanti-
fied a combination is possible, e.g. much water contained salt. 
Similar observations as for transitive verbs may be done for 
3~place verbs. Finally, sentence (6c) exemplifies that mass noun 
phrases cannot have subject position to measure verbs. 
"-"'- ·~ ~ .,_,..,, ....... ~-« 
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Observe that if much water is exchanged with the water that 
John drank in any of the example sentences in (6), the result is a 
well-formed sentence. Definite descriptions are not subject to 
the Homogeneous Const nt, and that is one reason why they should 
be kept separate from mass noun phrases. 
Let us turn to the formal semantic treatment of mass terms, 
and start with the observation that countability pervades current 
formal semantics. This means that the denotation types of all 
types of terns is determined by the fact that they occur in sen-
tences vlhere the noun terms are count terms. Thus a verb phrase 
like disappeared is taken to denote a set, and we get a natural 
semantics of the sentence a man disappeared, viz. it is true if 
and only if the intersection between the set denoted by man and 
the set denoted by disappeared is non-empty, i.e. contains an 
individual. But if v.re look at the sentence much water disappeared 
it may be unnatural to let disappear denote a set, and we may run 
into problems if disappear is presupposed to denote a set and the 
denotations of water and much water are forced to submit to this. 
He must thus be v.rilling to rethink the semantics and not only ask 
for the right types of denotations for the mass terms, but also 
for the co-occurring terms. And it is here that we shall take our 
cue from the Homogeneous Constraint. And we shall also have to 
account for the semantic difference between the verb phrases in 
(6a) and (6d), which are given the same type of denotation in the 
count case. 
The proposal for a semantic model for mass terms is based on 
the concept of a boolean algebra. A boolean algebra is a set A 
with at least two elements named 0 and 1, where there is de-
fined a binary function +, sum, which to any two elements a and 
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b gives a new element a+b, another binary function x, product, 
which to tvm elements gives the product, axb, and a unary function 
complement, >vhich to the element a gives its complement a. 
(Other names and symbols such as v and joint for + and A • • 
meet and in·tersection for x are frequently used). The last part 
of the definition of a boolean algebra is certain postulates or 
laws the functions and special elements have to consider, such as 
a+b = b+a (commutati ), a+a =a (idempotens), a+a = 1 and 
axa = 0. A typical example of a boolean algebra is the set of all 
subsets of a nonempty set X, \oJhere 0 and are interpreted as 
¢ and X and +, x and are interpreted as U (union), n 
(intersection) and -x (complement \'llith respect to X) respectively. 
Hhat will be of interest to us later is that it can be proved that 
every boolean al is isomorphic to a subset of the set of all 
subsets of a nonempty set X >Ill th these interpretations. 
It is not necessar:y with so many primitives to define the 
boolean algebras. It is, for example sufficient with x, -, and 
the following set of postulates (Hughes and Cresswell ( 1 972)): 
BAl A contains at least two elements 
BA2 If a,bE.A. then aEA and ax bE A 
BA3 If a,bEA then axb = bxa 
BA4 If a, b, eEl', then ax ( bx c) = (ax b) x c 
BAS For all a, bE A, if ·there is some c such that 
-axb :::::: ex c, then axb = a 
BA6 For all a,b,cEA if axb = a, then axb = ex c. 
From this 0 and + can be defined: 
0 = ax a df 
= 0 df 
--s 
a+b = (ax b) df 
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The intended u:3e of a boolean algebra as a model for senten-
ces containing mass noun phrases is then the following: Homogene-
ous expressions like boiled and John drank shall denote elements 
in the algebra. Mass noun phrases like much water shall denote 
subsets of the algebra and the sentence much water boiled will be 
true if the element denoted by boiled is a member of the set 
denoted by much water. Mass terms shall also denote elements of 
"the algebra, and determiners shall denote relations between ele-
ments of the a or, equivalently, functions which to ele-
ments of the algebra ass s subsets of it. This resembles the 
generalized quanti£ approach to count terms, where determiners 
are taken to be functions which to subsets of the individual 
domain assign sets of such subsets (Barwise and Cooper (1981 )). 
The determiners all and some will have a fixed (or logical or 
modelindependent) interpretation. The interprettion of ~ shall 
be the function which to each element a in the algebra assigns 
shall be such that 
II all II (a) = {~I a:(~} where a(~ is defined to be o;x~ = a. 
This model is a formal model for the language - not a model 
of the world. Still it may be of help to think that the elements 
of the algebra a.re the quantities (or portions of matter or bits 
of matter) in the actual ~,vorld. is the quantity which is the 
sum of all the other quantities and 0 is the empty quantity. 
Hater refers to the totality of the worlds water, boiled to the 
totality of what boiled at the time interval involved and some 
water boiled is true if and only if the quantity which is the 
product of these quantities or what is refered to by the water 
that boiled is different fron the empty quantity. But since the 
model works as well for abstract mass terms as for concrete mass 
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terms, it is necessary to think of the elements of the boolean 
algebra as more general than physical quantities. 
Let us see how this model can be used to solve some of the 
problems presented in the introduction, and let us start with the 
question on how adjectives can be treated. Only predicative 
adjectives will be considered. An adjective a is predicative if 
x is an a_§ if and only if x is a and x is a @ for every 
noun ~. For count terms this is the same as saying that ex can 
be considered as a general term and be treated as a predicate in 
an analysis in a first order language. Typical examples are red 
and square. We observe hmvever, like Quine ( 1960) and Bunt 
(1981 ), that only a smaller class of these can stand attributively 
to mass terms 
(9) (a) Much red water boiled 
(b) * . Much square v:ater boJ.led 
It is the same class which can stand predicatively to mass noun 
phrases: 
( 10) (a) Much of the water was red 
* Much of the water was square 
Of course the semantic difference between red and square lies in 
the fact that red refers homogeneously and square does not. We 
can use the previously established criteria CUH and DISTR to 
the expression was @ to decide whether a predicative adjective ~ 
is homogeneous or not. And our observation is that of the predi-
cative adjectives only the homogeneous ones stand attributively to 
6 
mass terms and predicatively to mass noun phrases . 
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Homogeneous predicative adjectives shall denote elements in 
the boolean algebra. A mass term like red water shall denote the 
product of the denotations of red and water. The verb phrase was 
red shall denote the same as red in this simplified model where 
only one time interval is considered. The reader may check that 
the sentences of example (2) become valid with these inter-
pretations. 
Adjectival clauses behave similar to adjectives. Vfe observe 
that only clauses constructed from homogeneous expressions combine 
~vi th mass terms as 1:hese examples show: 
(ll) (a) f'iuch (of the) water that John drank, 
(b) -A Much (of the) l,vater that weighed two grams, 
In the model that John drank can be given the same denotation as 
John drank, an element of the boolean algebra. Hhat the denota-
tions of John and dran~ shall be, will be discussed in part 5. 
In the introduction v.1e discussed the possible readings of the 
negation in the sentence much water did not boil. The wide scope 
reading (la) will be captured in the propositional part of the 
model. To capture the narrow scope negation we let (lb) did not 
boil denote the (boolean) complement of the denotation of boil. 
This will also give a sound denotation to water that did not boil. 
Definite descriptions will be given a very simple analysis in 
this model. The water that John drank shall denote the same ele-
ment of the algebra as water t.hat John drank. This is well-defined 
since water ·that John drank denotes one and only one element. The 
difference bet"~ileen water and the water is intuitively that water 
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refers to the totality of >~Vater in the world while the water 
refers to a definite subquantity. That is also why it is more 
natural to say much of the water that John drank than much water 
that John drank. In a more fine-grained analysis where place-
references and tense, aspect, and time-references are taken into 
consideration, ·this difference has to be made clear. At this 
stage however, we shall not differentiate semantically between 
water and the water nor between much water and much of the water. 
The sentence (12a) can then be paraphrased as (12b). 
(12) (a) The water boiled 
(b) All (the) water boiled 
Definite descriptions can also combine with inhomogeneous expres-
sions as \ve saw in 
(5) The cheese that disappeared weighed less than two kilos 
Here the inhomogeneous verb phrase weighed less than two kilos 
shall denote a subset of 'che boolean algebra. The sentence is 
true if the element denoted by the cheese that disappeared is a 
member of this set. It is easy to see the problems which would 
arise if inhomogeneous verb phrases were to denote elements of the 
algebra. Thus in our proposal verb phrases get denotations on 
different levels depending on whether they are homogeneous or not. 
This will give a natural account for the lack of grarnmaticality of 
the examples (6c) and (6d), It will also bring about that the 
rewriting in (12) is uniform, i.e. whenever the verb phrase is 
homogeneous rewrite the a as all (the) a. 
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2. LM - A logic for mass noun phrases. 
A LM language consists of: 
2. 1 . Logical ~§y_mbols o 
a) propositional connectives: v, , 
b) parantheses: (,) 
c) two operator ls~ - (unary), • (binary) 
d) two logical determiners~ lUl, Some 
2.2. Non-logical symbols. 
a) a nonempty set of constant symbols, e,g, ~~ E' £• 
b) a (possibly 
e.g. D,, D.., 
-1 -L. 
2.3, Formation rules~ 
Fl~Terms 
) set of nonlogical determiners, 
a) constant symbols are terms 
b) if t is a term, then (-!) is a term 
c) if s and t are terms -then (_!:• ~) is a term 
F2-Quantifiers 
if D is a deterrniner and t is a term, then !2_(!J 
quantifier 
F3- Formulas 
a) if Q is a quantifier and t is a term then .Q.{_!J 
formula 
is a 
is a 
b) If E and g are formulas, then (Evg) and ,E are 
formulas 
The well-famed e~~pig~ of the language is defined to be any~ 
thing that can be built up by using the rules Fl-F3 a finite num-
ber of times. 
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Other propos onal cormecti ves can be defined in the usual 
way: 
pAq = ' ( -;q) df 
p+q = q df 
Parantht~ses ;pJ]l be tted ',vhen this does not give rise to 
ambiguities. 
2,4, Semantics 
A model for a L consists of a boolean algebra 
<A,+,x, ,0,1> and an interpretation function H•ll defined on the 
non-logical s L such that 
Sl a) llaiiEA for constant symbol a 
b) For each non- ical determiner symbol !2_, 11]211 shall be 
a function vihich t.o each element aE A gives a subset 
II Dli (a of l'i such that 
bEIIDII{ if ax bE II D II ( a) 
(II Dll a "li :5 a). 
The inte ions of ·the expressions of the language can then be 
given by ext the function ll•ll. 
S2 a) II All II is the function 1.vhich to each aE A gives 
the l:l<.Jolean ring relation which can be defined 
by: a<b if and if axb = a) 
b) IISomell is the func·tion which to each aE A gives 
II Some li ( a) """ { bE A: ax bt- 0} • 
S3 a) II ( ~t) II = iltll for every term t 
b) II (!.• ~)II = II !11 x 11..§.11 for all terms t and s. 
S4 IIQ(!:)II = II.Q.Il (11!11) for every term t and and non-logi-
cal determiner D. 
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S5 a} If Q is a quantifier and t a term, then 
b) 
If ot= 
If 4J 
I 
l 1 IIQ(_~)II = 
and (~) ctre 
( 
II ;¢II =~I ~ 
r 
li ¢ v <jJ II ~J~ 
<<A,+,x, ,,0,1>,ii•ll 
if and only if 
othervlise 
formulas, then 
if II 4> II = 0 
if II¢ II = 1 
if II 4> II - 1 or 
if II 4> II = 0 and 
is a model and 
II til Ell Q!l 
II <jJ II = 1 
II <!1 II = 0 
¢ a formula such 
that 11¢>11 = 1, ¢l is said to be true in ()t; or equivalently Ot 
is a model for ¢ (in symbols ot ~¢). If all the formulas in a 
set of formulas r are true in C't, ()t is said to be a model for 
r (ot, Ff) , A formula \]> is true in every model is valid 
In the rule Sl b) 'was presupposed that every determiner 
D forms a quantifiar 11£11 (a) which "lives on" a. This is an 
empirical fact taken over from Barwise and Cooper's (1981) treat-
ment of the count det:erm:Lners. It seems to be true of mass deter-
miners as \vell and is as easy to formulate in this semantic frame 
as in the set-theoretical one. 
An important subclassification of the determiners in the 
count case can also be formulated in this frame. A quantifier Q 
is said to be monotone (increasing) in a model if for all a,bEA 
the following holds: aE II tJII and acb implies bEHQH. A deter-
miner D is said to be monotone if it always gives rise to mono-
tone quantifiers. Monotone decreasing quantifiers and determiners 
can be defined in a similar way. 
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3. Application of LM to a small fragment of English. 
In this section we present a small fragment of English con-
taining mass noun phrases together with a translation procedure 
into the system LH, thus giving the fragment a modeltheoretic 
semantics. 
3o1. Lexicon. 
N - {water, gold, salt} 
AD - {blue, hot} 
VP - {boiled, evaporated, disappeared} 
Det- {all, some, much, little, one kilo of, less than two 
kilos of} 
3.2. Syntactic rules. 
We define the set of structural descriptions. 
SRO - Lexical insertion: 
If a is a word listed in the lexicon under A then 
[A a] is a SD. 
The phrase structure rules will have the form A + BC which is to 
be read: if a,~ are SD's of forms [By] ,[co] respectively 
is a SD. 
SRJ - s + I,NP VP 
NP negVP - if the VP is not already negated 
s and s 
0! or s 
SR2 - NP + r~et N 
~ Det R 
I net of DD 
Go 
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SR3 - DD -+ the N 
SR4 - N ~ {: N 
R 
SRS - VP -+ was AD 
was N 
negVP - if the VP is not already negated 
SR6 - R -+ that VP 
negVP is the negation of the VP. A VP which is not negated 
has either the form was a or it is a lexical expression of the 
form a-ed. In the first case negVP is was not a, in the 
second case negVP is did not a. 
3.3. Translation into LM 
'i/le define the translations into LM of the expressions in 
the English fragment inductively on the structural descriptions. 
A translation a' of an expression a is uniquely determined by 
the derivation of a, but not necessarily by a due to the 
ambiguity of the negation. 
TO - a) Each word listed in the lexicon under N, AD or VP 
shall be translated to a constant symbol. 
b) The determiners all and some shall be translated to the 
logical determiners All and Some respectively. 
c) Other words listed in the lexicon under Det shall be 
d) 
translated to non-logical determiner symbols. 
If a is a SD of the form [X ~] where ~ 
lexicon, then the translation of a, a' is ~' 
is in the 
given in 
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Tl 
- ( S [ NP a ][ VP ~ J ) translates as a ' ( ~ ' ) 
( S[ NPo; J neg[ VP~ J " " ,a I ( ~ ' ) 
[ s[ st1>] and[ s<V]] " " <I> I 1\cjJ I 
[ s[ s4>] or[ sq.,]] " " <I> I vq., ' 
T2 - [ NP[ Det0 )[ Na)] " " 6'(a:') 
[ NP ( Det 0 J ( Rp J J " " 6 ' ( p ' ) 
(NP[Deto)of[DDyJJ " " 6 ' ( y ' ) 
[ NP[ DD y J) " " All(y I) 
T3 [ DD the[ No:) J " II a:' 
T4 - [N[ADc:J[1:l]J " " (e:'•a') 
[ N[ No: )[ Rp ) J "' II (a'•p') 
TS - [VPwas[ADE:]] " " E: ' 
[ VPwas[ No: J J " " a' 
[ VPneg[ VP~]] " " ( -~ ' ) 
T6 - [Rthat[VP~JJ " II ~ I 
3.4. Examples. 
The sentence 
( 1 ) Much water did not boil 
can be given two different syntactical derivations: 
( 1 a) ' [ 8 [ NP[ DetMuch] [ tlV'ater]] [ negdid not] [ VPboil] J 
( 1 b) ' [ 8 [ NP[ DetMuch] [ Nwater]] [ VP[ neg did not) [ VPboil] J] 
with corresponding LM-·translations. 
( 1 a) '" 
( 1 b) II 
,Huch (water) (boil) 
Huch (water) (-boil) 
which reflects the two possible readings of the sentence. 
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The sentence (2c) gets the derivation (2c)' and the valid LM-
translation (2c)". 
( 2c) 
( 2 c) ' 
( 2c)" 
All blue water was blue 7 
[ 8 [NP[DetAll][N[ADblue][Nwater])J[vp~[ADblueJ]] 
All (blue• v1at.er) (~) 
The inference (3) gets the translation 
( 3) ' Much ( 'lt<!a ter )(evaporate) 
All(evaporate)(~sappear) 
:. Much(water)(disappear) 
This inference is val if Much is demanded to be monotone in-
creasing. Since it is not reasonable that little or less than two 
kilos of are monotone increasing, the inference will cease to be 
valid if ~uch is exchanged with any of these. But if on the other 
hand less than two kilos of is demanded to be monotone decreasing 
then the following inference gets a valid translation 
(13) Less than two kilos of water disappeared 
All that evaporated, disappeared 
:. Less than two kilos of water evaporated 
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4. Formal aspects of the logic LM. 
\tJe now turn to a study of the model theory of the language 
UL A reader who does not 'l'lant to go into the mathematical 
details may W'ithout loss of continuity proceed to section 5. 
He start with the simpler system LA. A LA-language is a 
LM-language with no non-logical determiners. The determiner Some 
can be defined from All by the schema: 
Some(t)(s) <-> ,All(t)(-s) 
LA can then he axiomatized as follows: 
A.xiorn Schemata 8 : 
for all terms t, s and r: 
Al All(t)(t) 
A2 All(t)(s)A~11(s)(r) ~ ~ll(t)(r) 
A3 All(t•s)(s•t 
A4 All(t•s)(t) 
AS All(t) (s)AAll(t) (r) ~ A~_!(t) (s• r) 
A6 All(t•(-s))(r•(~·r)) ~ All(t)(s) 
A7 All(t)(s) ~ All(t• (~s)}(r• (-r)) 
A8 Al~(t)(r• (-r)) 7 ,All(-t)(r• (-r)) 
Rule of inference: 
If <P is a tautological consequence of <V 1 ,</1 2 , ... ,<jln, then 
from <V 1 ,</1 2 , ... ,<Vn to infer ~. 
A proof is defined (in the usual way) as a sequence of formu-
las where each formula is either an axiom or follows from the 
earlier formulas in the sequence by the rule of inference. The 
last formula in such a sequence is said to be provable or to be a 
theorem. As usual we write ~~ to assert that ~ is a theorem. 
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If we allow formulas from some set of formulas 2: in the 
sequence, 4> is said to be provable from L: (2: r~). A set of 
formulas is said to be consistent if there is a formula ~ 
tha"t not L: ~¢ • 
Theorem 1. Every theorem is valid. 
such 
Proof. Remembering that the interpretation of All is nothing but 
the boolean ordering relat <, it is straightforward to check 
that all the axioms are true in every boolean algebra. And the 
rule of inference o£ course preserves valinity since the interpre-
tation of the propositional calculus is "normal". 
q.e.d. 
Theorem 2. 
a) Every consistent set of formulas has a model 
b) is provable from Z if and only if <P is true in every 
model for L: o 
c) is provable if and only if it is valid. 
Proof. Since the tautology rule is the only rule of inference, we 
have that 
if :w{r-<P} 
ru{~}~¢ if and only if 
is inconsistent. Hence 
Zr~~<P and Zr~ if and only 
b) follows from a) and c) is 
just a special case of b). To prove a) suppose E is a consi-
stent set. Then E can be extended to a maximal consistent set 
r, that is a consistent set vvhich is not properly contained in any 
larger consisten"t set, For every formula 4> ,r~¢ if and only if 
Q>Er, and either 
A model for 
<PEr or •¢Er but not both. 
r, and hence for E, can then be constructed as 
follows. Define the relation ~ on the terms by 
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t:::s if and only if r~All(t)(s)AAll(s)(t) 
This relation is clear sywnetric and from the axioms Al and A2 
it follows that it: is reflexive and transitive, so it is an equi-
valence relation. We can write [t] for the equivalence class of 
t, A for the set of equivalence classes and define the unary 
operation and binary operation x on A by 
[t] = [(~t J 
[t]x[s] = [(t•s 
It. is necessary to ch·eck tl1at these are well-defined. We leave 
the first one to thE:: reader and verify the second one. Suppose 
t"'r and S"'P· vJe must sho>N' that (t•s)::::(rop). 
·- from the definition of t::::r by the 
tautology rule 
II r~All(t• s) (t) instance of A4 
III rt-All(t® s) (r) - from I and II with the aid of A2 
IV fi'-All(s)(p - from the definition of S"'P 
v f!-lli(t•s){s) - from the axioms A4, A3 and A2 
VI rt-~ll(t•s)(p) - from IV and v with the aid of A2 
VI I !'t-All ( t s s) r • p) - from I I I, VI and AS 
VIII f!-~11( r• p) ( t• s) - by an argument symmetric to I-VII 
IX - from VII and VIII. 
The next step is to prove that the structure <A,-,x> is a 
boolean algebra. One way to do this is to check that the six 
principles BAl-BA6 listed 1n part 1 are satisfied. He give one 
example, BAS. Suppose a,b,cEA and (axb) = (cx"C;). He shall show 
that axb = a. There must be terms t,s,r in the language of r 
such that [t] =a, [s] = b, [r] =c. It is sufficient to show 
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I rrAll(te(-s))(r• (~r))- from the supposition 
II fj-All(t)(s) - from I and A6 
III fi'-All(t)(t) ~ instance of Al 
IV fi-All ( t) ( te s) - from II, III and AS 
v rf-All(t•s) (t) - instance of A4 
VI (t• s)zt 
- from IV and v. 
The last step is to define the interpretation function 11•11 
on the constant symbols by II all = [a], and to check that 
oc = <<A, • X) •' li II ) a rnodel for r or in other vmrds that 
fl-¢1 if and only if iJL, F¢ for every formula cp. This must be 
checked first for formulas of the form All(t)(s) and then by 
induction for propositional combinations of such formulas. 
q.e.d. 
Theorem 3. LA has a decision procedure. 
Proof. Theoreru 2c gives a characterization of the valid formulas, 
but not a way to decide if a formula is valid or not. To see that 
there is a method for doing this we start with an example. A 
formula with only two constant symbols a and b will have its 
truth-value in a model totally determined if vle know which of the 
- ~ ~ ~ 
elements li all xn bll, II all xll bll, II all xn bll, II all xU bll that equals 0 and 
which does not. There 4 is only 2 different answers to this ques-
tion and since a model has at least two elements it will be suffi-
Ll. 
cient to check 2'-l different models. This line of argumentation 
may be repeated in the more general case to state that for a for-
mula with n different constant symbols it is sufficient to in-
spect (
.,n) 
2 "- ~ 1 differen·t models. 
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Implicit in the proof of theorem 3 is a normal form theorem 
for the system LA. Let 4> be a formula in the constant symbols 
a 1 ,a 2 , ••• ,an. Then it is not difficult to prove that 4> is prov-
ably equivalent in LA to a formula 4>' which is a propositional 
combination of formulas of the form 
where each b. 
1 
is either a. or 
1 
(-ai). The reason for this is that Some(b1 •b2 • ... •bn)(b1 • ••• •bn) 
is true in a model OC = <l'\,11 II > if and only if 
llb 1 11xllb2 11x ••• xllbnii=FO. From the normal form we can derive a proof 
procedure for the system LA. q.e.d. 
Before taking the whole LM into consideration we shall make 
some more comments on the system LA. First observe that Al-AB 
can be taken as axioms for the first order theory of boolean alge-
bras letting t, r and s be variables, and function 
symbols and All a reLation symbol. So this is one possible answer 
to the question (raised by Parsons (1970)) whether mass terms 
shall be translated into names or predicates in a first order 
analysis, For the other possible ansv1er we start with a lemma. 
Lemma. A set of LA formulas r which has a model has an atomic 
model, that is, a model where the boolean algebra is atomic. 
Proof. A boolean algebra <A, x, +,-, 0, 1 > is isomorphic t.o an 
algebra -x <B,n,u, ,¢,x> for a non-empty set X where B cP(X} 
(see e.g. Halmos (1963) for a proof). So if <<A,x,+, ,0,1>,11•11 > 
_.., 
is a model then <<B,n,U, --,¢,X>,foJI•II> is a model where f is 
an isomorphism from A to B. It is easy to see that the com-
pleted model -x <<SJ(x),n,u, ,¢,X>,foJI•II> verifies the same formu-
las and hence is a model too. 
q.e.d. 
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One consequence of this is that is is impossible to formulate 
in LA that a model is non-atomic, even if one uses an infinite 
set of formulas 9 . So the semantic aspects of mass terms that can 
be expressed in LA, and as we shall see later in the whole LM, 
is independent of \vhether mass term references have smallest parts 
or not. 
LA does not only have a direct relationship to the first 
order theory of boolean algebras but also to first order langu-
ages, in particular in the form given in Barwise and Cooper 
( l 981) To make this explicit, given a LA-language L, the L(GQ)-
language L' which has a set of unary predicate symbols correspon-
ding to the set of constant symbols in L as the only non-logical 
symbols, will be called the corresponding L(GQ)-language. A 
translation f from L into L' can be defined inductively as 
follows: 
i) If a is a constant symbol then f(_~) = Pa, the corre-
spending predicate symbol 
ii) If t is a terrn of form (-s) and f(s) is defined, 
then A f ( t) = x[ 1 f ( S) (X) ] 
iii) If t is a term of form (s•r) and f(s) and f(r) 
are defined then f(t) = ~[f(s)(x)Af(r)(x)] 
iv) f(All) = Every 
v} I£ Q = D(t) is a quantifier and f(D) and f(t) are 
defined then f(Q) = f(D}(f(t)) 
vi) If 4J = Q(t_) is a formula and f(Q) and f(t) are 
defined then f(¢) = f(Q)(f(t)) 
vii) If ~ = ~~ and f(~) is defined then f(~} = ,f(~) 
viii) If ~ = ~v~ and £(~) and f(~) are defined then 
f(¢) = f(<)J)Vf(yj} 
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Theorem 4. A set for formulas r in a LA-language has a model if 
and only if the translation f[r] into the corresponding L(GQ)-
language has a model. 
Proof. It is straightforward to check (by induction on the defi-
nition of f) that <~(X),n,u,-x,O,l>,ll®ll> is an LA-model for 
r if and only if <X, II ~11 > is an L(GQ)-model for f[r]. Then use 
the lemma. 
q.e.d. 
So this is the other possible answer to the question whether 
mass terms shall be translated into names or predicates in a first 
order analysis. It says also that LA is a reformulation of 
d . f' d . . f . d' 'd 1 10 mona 1c 1rst or er log1c w1th no re erence to 1n lVl ua s. So 
first order language is an extension of LA where more structure 
is imposed on the models and the language is equipped with tools 
to profit from these extensions, i.e. terms which make it possible 
to talk about individuals. One word of caution is appropriate. 
The translation of All into Every does not mean that the LA (and 
LH)-analysis of mass terms is equivalent to a L{GQ)-analysis which 
reads all water as every quantity of water, since the translation 
does not give rise to quantification over the set of quantities 
but rather over the set of atoms. 
Let us now turn to the general LM-language. It can be axio-
matized if we add ·the following schemata to Al -A8 of LA: 
for all terms t, s, r and non-logical determiners D: 
MQ All(t)(s)A~(s)(t) ~ (D(r)(s) ~ D(r)(t)) 
MDl All(t) (s)AAll( s) (t) ~ (D(s) (r) ~ D(t) (r)) 
MD2 D(t)(s) <-> D(t)(t•s) 
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The first two schemata give the extensionality of the non-logical 
determiners. The third one states that IID(t)ll lives on II til 
and should of course not have been added if we had not imposed 
this restriction on the semantics. Proof, provable (from I), 
theorem and consistent are defined as for the system LA (of 
course with this larger set of axioms). 
Theorem 5. 
a) Every consistent set of formulas has a model. 
b) ~ is provable from r if and only if ~ is true in every 
model for 
c) ~ is provable if and only if it is valid. 
Proof. One part of b) and c) is proved in the same way as 
theore~ 1. ~fuat is new is to check that the new axioms are valid. 
a) and thereby the second part of b) and c) are proved in the same 
way as theorem 2a) . What is new here is that we must define the 
interpretation function U$U on the non-logical determiners, and 
that in a way which secures that r~¢ if and only if 
<<A, , x >,II • II >f:¢ for every formula <!>. So if D is a non-logical 
determiner, let II Dll be the function which to each aE A gives 
IIDII(a) = {bEAithere exists terms t and s such that [t) =a, 
[s] = axb and r~D(t)(s)}. This definition is clearly in accor-
dance with the semantic rule for determiners. Horeover, with this 
definition it is possible to show that r~D(t)(s) if and only if 
<<A, , x>,II•II>~D(t)(s) for all terms t and s. Notice that all 
the three new schemata are used in this proof. Then the conclu-
sion follov1s as in theorem 2. 
q.e.d. 
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We shall not try to copy theorem 3 and show how to construct 
a decision- and proof procedure for LH. But this can easily be 
done along the folowing lines: We saw that for checking LA-vali-
dity it was only necessary to check a finite number of models 
where each such model could be assumed to be finite. Now, in such 
a finite model, it is only a finite number of ways to introduce an 
interpretation of a non-logical determiner. And this means that 
there will only be a finite number of non~isomorphic LM-models 
which must be considered to check the validity of a Lr-1-formula cj>. 
Hov1 many depends on the number of non-logical symbols in cj>, i.e. 
constant symbols and non-logical determiners. This number will, 
however, be very large if more than very few symbols are involved. 
So other procedures mus·t be developed to practical purposes. 
If LA is considered as the first order theory of boolean 
algebras, LM is this theory extended with more relation symbols, 
all restricted by HD2. The lemma is valid for LM as well as for 
LA. And if a corresponding L(GQ)-language is defined as above 
with the addition that the L(GQ)-language shall have the same set 
of non~logical determiners as the LM-language and that the defini-
tion of f is extended with 
o) f(D) = D for each non-logical determiner symbol, 
then theorem 4 can be extended to LM-languages too. 
He conclude this section with showing that the semantic 
important notion of monotonicity is axiomatizable. A determiner 
D is consistent with the schema 
MM All(t)(s)-* (D(r)(t)-* D(r)(s)) 
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if all instances of this, (i~e. for all t, r and s), can be 
added without causing inconsistencies. 
Theorem 6. A determiner D is monotone (increasing) if and only 
if it is consistent with the schema MM. 
Proof. It is immediate to see that every monotone determiner has 
to be consistent with MH. The other part is parallel to theorem 
Sa). The only difference is that H H will have to be defined in 
a slightly modified way on the non-logical determiners consisent 
with MM. If D is such a determiner then IIDII shall be the 
function which to each aEA gives IIDII(a) = {bEA: there exist 
terms s and t such that [t] =a, [sJ(axb and r~D(t)(s)}. 
This is clearly monotone and HM will secure that rt-D ( t) ( s) if 
and only if <<A,-, x >,II ~II >I=D ( t) ( s), with this interpretation. 
q.e.d. 
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5. Hass terms and count terms. 
In our proposal for a semantics for mass terms, verb phrases, 
adjectives etc. have got denotations different from the usual 
ones. Hence it is not at all clear that count noun phrases can be 
treated in this frame. Moreover 8 examples like 
( 14) Much gold and many coins disappeared 
shmv that mass noun phrases and count noun phrases occur together 
and that an analysis is needed of a verb phrase such as disappear 
which can work both in combination with mass noun phrases and 
count noun phrases. Transitive verbs also often occur with both 
count noun phrases and mass noun phrases, like 
(6b) John drank much water 
and this must also be accounted for in our proposal. 
In this section we present in outline how a combined system 
of mass terms and count terms can be constructed. The starting 
point is that we have two models at hand: One based on a boolean 
algebra <A, x, +, , 0, 1 > and one based ·on a non-empty set I 11 . 
The first can be used for the pure mass term part, the second for 
the pure count term part. Our first idea is to take the union of 
the two models in some direct way - either the union of A and I 
(where A and I do not have to be disjoint, A c I is one 
possible proposal), or the union of A and P(I). This is pro-
blematic for two reasons. 
In connection with mass terms homogeneous verb phrases and 
inhomogeneous verb phrases got denotations at different levels, in 
combination with count noun phrases they get denotations at the 
same level. So if we take the union in either of the two ways the 
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result is that one of the two classes of verb phrases will get 
denotations at bvo levels at the same time. 
The second reason is that taking e.g. A as a subset of I 
may be interpreted as identifying quantities with individuals 
vihich is questionc<ble, as already Parsons ( 1 970) pointed out, 
because the identity tions seem to differ for the tvvo 
classes. \!Je tolerate many changes in the material basis of an 
idual and st 1 c :hat it is the same individual, but we 
are not so ll to tolerate changes in quantities. Of course 
·this objection turns on the relationship bet\veen the language and 
the outer world and it is t"herefore not crucial according to the 
principles stated in the introduction. But it may be important if 
we want to exted our analysis to more complex sentences which take 
time references into consideration. 
Ide therefore propose to take as basis for a model both a 
boolean algebra < +, ,0,1> and a set I. A homogeneous verb 
phrase, like shall then denote an ordered pair <d ,d > 1 2 
where d 1 EP. (an element in A) (a subset of I). A 
mass noun phrase like ~ shall, as before, denote a subset 
of A and a count noun phrase like many coins shall denote a 
subset of 9 (I as usual" The conjunction much gold and many 
coins shall have t.he denotation {<x,y>EAxY(I):xEIImuch goldn 12 and 
yEI!many coinsll}. The sentence 
( 1 5 ) Much gold disappeared 
is then true just in the case d 1 Eli much goldll , while the sentence 
(14) is true if d 1 ,d 2 >EIImuch gold and many coinsll which is the 
same as a1 E :1 much goldil e:u1d d~.E II many coinsll . L. 
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Inhomogeneous verb phrases, such as weighed less than three 
kilos, shall denote an ordered pair where the first element is a 
subset of A and the other element is a subset of I. 
element is needed for sentences like: 
The first 
(5) The cheese that d appeared weighed less than two kilos 
·where v;re still want the cheese that disappeared to denote the 
element ct1xc 
denotes), 
A (vvhere c is the element that cheese 
In the introduction we proposed to regard the distinction 
between mass terms and count terms as a distinction between diffe-
rent kinds of noun occurences. For a noun having both types of 
can be captured as follows: The noun 
wate~ is given a denot"ation of the same type as disappear, L e. an 
ordered pair <w1 , > Much is a mass 
determiner, i.e. ~~ is a mass noun phrase, so much shall 
denote a funct which assigns a subset of A to w1 , ignoring 
'""2 . Many, on the other hand, makes count noun phrases like many 
waters, so the denotation of many will take w2 as argument and 
produce a set of subsets of I. 
Homogeneous predicative adjectives like red shall have deno-
tations of the same type as disappear and water, ordered pairs 
where the first element is an element_ in A, the second element a 
subset of I. \iihile inhomogeneous predicative adjectives shall 
denote subsets of I only. 
John drank has already been proposed to denote an element in 
A. Since John naturally denotes a member of I it seems appro-
priate to let drink denote a function which to elements in I 
yields members of A. A sentence like John drank many beers shows 
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that ,John drank must also 1'ienote a subset of I. So it seems most 
natural to let drink denote a function which to elements in I 
yields ordered pairs where the first element is a member of A, 
the second element a subset of I. Notice that restricted to the 
countable domain this gives the normal interpretation since (2I)I 
is isomorphic to Ix I 2 . If drink denotes II drinkll and 
II drinkll ( i) = <x,y> we can call x for (II drinkll ( i)) 1 
for (II drink II ( i)) 2 • Then the sentence 
( 16) Hany men drank much water 
and y 
is true if and only if {iEI:(IIdrinkll (i)) 1EIImuch waterll )} is a 
member of the set llmany menll. (Recall that we have restricted 
attention to the distributive reading of count noun phrases.) 
The question remains whether all transitive verbs shall be 
given this type of denotation. For a given transitive verb ~ we 
can check whether the expression John ~ passes the homogeneity 
test. If the answer is yes, this treatment should be appropriate. 
If the ans\'ler is no, the sentence John @ much water will not be 
wellformed according to the Homogeneous Constraint, and ~ is 
better taken to denote a function which to elements in I yields 
subsets of I, or maybe subsets of I and subsets of A. The 
example: 
(17) The water that John drank contained 10 grams of salt 
opens for transitive verb denotations which are functions defined 
on A and I, but we do not yet see how to come from this to the 
homogeneous contained salt in 
(18) Huch water contained salt. 
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Definite descriptions are harder to capture than other noun 
phrases, because it is not possible on syntactic grounds to 
classify the noun as a mass term or as a count term. He are thus 
forced to treat the water and even the water that John drank as 
ambiguous between two readings. Recall that water has a denota-
tion <w1 ,w2 > where w1EA and w2 c I. Then in the first read-
ing, the "mass" reading, the water shall denote w1 • In the 
second reading, the "coun·t" reading, the water will be defined 
only if w2 is a singleton set, and in that case it shall denote 
the unique member of w2 . So with this reading the water that 
John drank shall have a denotation if and only if there was a 
water that John dranJ: and only one such water. 
~lhen this model is applied to a fragment of a natural lan-
guage it is necessary to refine the syntactic rules to take care 
of the differences behveen mass noun phrases and count noun 
phrases, which expressions they can occur together with and so on. 
1 3 The details are lengthy and will not be given here , we only give 
some examples. The simple rule 
N + AD N 
needs at least the following refinements. N must be separated in 
three subcategories N[M]-mass nouns, N[c)~count nouns, and N[u]-
the nouns that can have both types of occurences (U for undeter-
0 d) 14 m1ne , The predicative adjectives must be separated in two sub-
categories AD[H]-homogeneous adjectives, and AD[I]-inhomogeneous 
adjectives. The reformulated rule is then 
N [ U J + AD [ H J N [ U J 
N[M) + AD[H]N[M) 
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The reader may like to formulate the corresponding semantic rules 
from what is said earlier about the denotation types of the diffe-
rent categories. 
Determiners must also be separated in two subcategories: 
Det[M]-mass determiners, and Det[c]-count determiners. 
NP + Det N 
is then refined to 
Det[M]N[u] 
Det[ M) N[ M] 
NP[c] + Det[c]N[u] lDet[ c] N[ c] 
The rule 
Further refinements taking number into consideration to get 
the right analysis of the two noun phrases some water and some 
waters may also be necessary. 
Rules like 
S + NP VP 
where the category NP occur to the right must be refined to take 
care of the Homogeneous Constraint. Notice that this is extended 
to cover noun phrases which are a conjunction of a mass noun 
phrase and a count noun phrase as this example illustrate: 
( l 9) * Much gold and many coins weighed two grams. 
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There are some connections between mass terms and count terms 
which we have not commented on yet. Parsons (1970) starts his 
treatment of mass. terms \vi th the example sentence 
(20) My ring is gold 
I have problems with ascribing meaning to this sentence because 
the direct translation into Norwegian, my native tongue, ringen 
min er gull is not well-formed. One would have to say: ringen 
min er av gull (is of gold) or ringen min er laget av gull (is 
made of gold). That (20) may be odd in english too is indicated 
by a remark in Quine (1960): " ... things are red, stuff alone is 
water" (p 92). But since ( 20) is proposed it must be well-formed 
for some speakers of English and hence demand an explanation. He 
offer two. The first is simply to give gold the same type of 
denotation as water, both an element in A and a subset of I 
and say that the sentence is true if the element in I denoted by 
my ring is a member of this set. 
The other approach is an attempt to explain the relationship 
between the things that are gold and the quantities that are gold, 
and it resembles a proposal by Link (1982). We introduce a func-
tion ft 15 mapping each element in I to a member of A, 
intuitively mapping each object to the quantity that constitutes 
it. If nmv II goldll is a member of A, II is goldll can be given the 
denotation <II goldll, { iE I: ft ( iH: II goldll} >. The awkwardness of this 
approach is that my ring has to be wholly made of gold, it cannot 
e.g. possess a pearl, if the sentence (20) shall be true. How-
ever, with some ingenuity it should be possible to get around this 
particular problem. 
- III.42 -
He conclude this section with one further semantic observa-
tion, Count noun phrases can occur together with homogeneous 
expressions and in nation with inhomogeneous expressions. 
But there is a semantic difference between the two types of occur-
rences, at least concerning occurences exemplified by John and 
Harry, the men, and three men. 
(21) John and Harry weighed 100 kilo 
can either mean that each of them weighed 100 kilo or that their 
combined \veight was 100 kilo. Now this ambiguity is only possible 
if the verb phrase is inhomogeneous. If the verb phrase is homo-
geneous, the two read s are equivalent. Thus, if John disap-
peared and Harry dxs-appeared then John and Harry disappeared, and 
the other way round. The possible ambiguity between the two boys 
disappearing at the same time or at different times is irrelevent 
for the simple sentence John and Harry disappeared. 
does not carry that much information. 
It simply 
In connection -vii th mass terms vve established a test for 
checking homogeneity (CUM and DISTR). With minor changes this 
can be used with count terms to. vfuat is needed is to exchange 
~ with count everywhere in the introduction to the test and 
allow plural forms in the inferences, e.g. 
CUM' The ~ a/a-s 6 
~he not~~ a/a-s o 
..• The a-s 6 
If v!e want to test disappeared for CUM' 
with this inference, e.g. 
then this can be done 
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The red car/cars disappeared 
The not-red car/cars disappeared 
.·. The cars disappeared 
This test does not explain why some expressions give rise to 
ar~bigui ties \vhile others do not. It only gives us a tool to check 
if an expression give rise to ambiguities. Moreover we can use 
this tool if we want to try to give a syntactic classification of 
the homogeneous expressions like we indicated for mass terms. The 
general scheme seems very similar in connection with count terms. 
Nearly all intransitive verbs seem to be homogeneous. And transi-
·tive verbs seem to be homogeneous in relationship to the direct 
object, but inhomogeneous in relationship to the subject when the 
object is quantified. note that the verb love which was problema-
tic in connection with mass noun phrases seem to be homogeneous 
with respect to the direct object now, e.g. John loved two girls. 
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6. Amount terms. 
A.n amount term is composed of a numeral plus a unit of mea-
sure (or denomination) (e.g. two kilos) or is an expression of the 
form less than, more than, at least etc. plus a numeral and a unit 
of measure (e.g, less than two kilos). 
In connection with a mass term it can occur as a part of a 
determiner (sentence (4)) or as a part of ari (inhomogeneous) verb 
phrase (sentence (5)). 
(4) Less than two kilos of cheese disappeared. 
( 5) The cheese tha·t disappeared weighed less than two kilos. 
In this section we extend our semantic model to cover these 
occurences of amoun·t terms and, in particular, we will show that 
the sentences (4) and (5) are equivalent. That will be attained 
if the subset of the boolean algebra denoted by weighed less than 
two kilos is related to the denotation of the determiner less than 
two kilos of according to the following formula 
(22) bEIILess than two kilos ofll (a) if and only if 
(ax b) E II weighed less than two kilos II 
Before we go into the details we add the following co~aent: 
Parsons (1970) starts his study of amount terms with this example: 
( 23) Three teaspoons of gold weigh thirty ounces. 
This sentence diverges from sentence (4) in at least two respects. 
vfuile sentence (4) is about one specific quantity of cheese, sen-
tence (23) is about (nearly) all or a typical quantity of gold of 
a certain size. And the verb phrase in (23) is not homogeneous. 
This means that the Homogeneous Constraint universal will have to 
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be changed to allow sentence (23). Either this can be done by 
giving up the idea that mass noun phrases can be given a purely 
syntactic definition saying that the noun phrase in ( 23) is not a 
mass noun phrase, or by changing the constraint so that it says 
that mass noun phrases do only combine with homogeneous expres-
sions to form sentences with existensial readings. Be that as it 
may, it would, however, be worthwhile further study to classify 
which of the earlier classified mass noun phrases \vhich can occur 
in sentences like sentence (23). 
Note that the contrast between the sentences (23) and (4) can 
also be observed in connection with some types of count noun 
phrases 
(24) 
(25) 
Two men disappeared 
Two apples \veigh thirty ounces. 
The verb phrase in (25) is inhomogeneous, and the sentence is not 
about two definite apples but about (nearly) every pair or one 
typical pair of apples. So this shows that the distinction is 
independent of the mass/count distinction. We feel therefore 
justified here to concentrate on sentence (4) and reserve for 
later treatment the problems raised by sentence (25). 
Let us return to the sentences (4) and (5}. Then some ques-
tions arise. First what is the meaning of each of the words in 
the amount term and the measure verb and what kind of denotations 
shall we give them. The second question arise because there are 
numerals involved in the amount terms and concerns how much of 
nathematics shall be regarded as a part of the semantics. I think 
these questions have in corrmon that they do not have a right or 
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even a best answer. So let us consider some possible answers 
starting with ·the second question. 
In the boolean framework the concept of measure (or measure 
function) comes immediately to mind when thinking about amount 
terms and measure verbs. A (finitely) additive measure 1-L on the 
boolean algebra <A, .•. > is a function from A into the 
nonnegative real numbers such that for any two elements a,bEA 
.ADD: if axb = 0 then !J.(a+b) = !J.(a)+!J.(b) 
(+ to the left here boolean sum, the + to the right is the 
standard arithmetic operation of addition.) The application of 
this to our semantic model should then give 
(26) llweighed less than two kilosll = {aEA:iJ.(a)<k} 
for some measure 11 and constant k which are related to the 
words of the phrase in some well-determined way. It would then 
follow from this, formula (22) and ADD that IILess than two kilos 
o£11 is monotone decreasing. 
This reflects fairly well what is going on when we measure 
something. But it is somewhat questionable if all mathematical 
truths which can be derived from an act of simple measurement 
shall be regarded as semantic truths. To take one example, shall 
it be regarded as a semantic truth that 2 10 kilos of salt is more 
than 1000 kilos of salt? If our goal is a semantics for a natural 
language, ·then I think the answer is no. So let a measure instead 
be a function from A to a primitive set R. 16 We can then study 
which constraints erie should impose on R and the measure func-
tions to validitate some typical inferences involving amount 
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terms. First observe that the relationship in (22) and thereby 
the equivalence of the sentences (4) and (5) may be formulated 
independently of the structure of R and the measures. 
The inference 
(2 -,\, Th " d 3 . e water we1ghe k1los 
:. The water v1eighed more than 2 kilos 
becomes valid if R is taken to be (at least) a (pre-)ordered set 
where II 311 >II 211 (in this ordering). No restrictions on the 
measures are necessary. But as mentioned earlier we are not sure 
that (27) shall be taken as valid if 3 and 2 are exchanged 
with more complex number terms. One way out of this is still to 
demand that R is ordered but not to assume that 112 10 11~11100011 
or even II 3D II 211. Then 3 is greater than 2 or 3 kilos are 
more than 2 kilos can be taken as an additional premiss in (27) to 
get a valid inference. 
There is probably agreement on the following inference 
(28) Two liters of water disappeared 
:. Some v1ater disappeared 
It follows from ADD if we demand II Twoll:fO. But the only fact 
from ADD which is needed here is that there is a special element 
0 in R such that ll (0) = 0 (where 0 to the left is the null-
element of A). ~ne validity of (28) with two exchanged with.~ 
than two will also follow from this if we in addition demand 
lltwoii>O. 
One of the most striking properties of determiners con-
structed from amount terms is the monotonicity: 
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(29) More than five liters of water evaporated 
All that evaporated disappeared 
.. Hare than five liters of v1ater disappeared 
As mentioned, this follows from ADD, but it is sufficient that R 
is ordered and that the measure is monotone: 
MON if a<b then ~(a)c~(b) 
\-Jhich of course is a consequence of ADD. MON also implies that 
quantifiers constructed from art10unt terms starting with less than 
(see example (13)) are monotone decreasing. And MON in conjunc-
tion vJi th (22) yields ·the left monotonicity which validitates 
inferences of the following form: 
( 30) 1'1ore than two liters of red water disappeared 
:. More than two li~cers of water disappeared 
The inferences stud:Led until now depend only on the ordering 
structure of R and ·the monotonicity (MON) of the measures. 
Inferences that also need the arithmetic structure of R and 
(larger parts of) ADD may be constructed, but they seem a bit 
more "mathematical" in structure 
(31) John drank 2 glasses of white wine and one glass of red 
wine 
No vvhi·te wine 1s red wine 
... John drank (at least) 3 glasses of wine 
This presupposes that an operation of addition is defined on R, 
ADD or at least one half .of it where = is exchanged with ) , and a 
"normal" interpretation of the numerals such that II one II +II 211 = II 311 . 
Similar examples can be constructed which needs the other half of 
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ADD, and it is also possible to construct examples which need 
formulation of multiplication on R. 
We have touched upon some issues concerning natural language 
inferences involving amount terms and our discussion is far from 
complete. Another topic beyond the scope of this paper is to 
relate our treatment. of amount terms to Kamp' s (1975) approach to 
comparatives of adjectives, 
Then to the question of what the different words shall 
denote. If we think about what we are doing when "vve measure or 
weigh something, or if vle start with the sentence ( 5), the most 
natural thing seems to be to let weighed denote a measure, that is 
a function from A to R, and let two kilos denote a measuring 
result, i.e. an element in R. Then if a multiplication operation 
o on R is a.vailable, t\\ro and kilo can both be taken to denote 
elements in R, and ~ can denote II twoll • II kiloll , less than 
two kilos denote the subset of R of elements r such that 
r< II two kilos !I (where .;; is a relation on R) and weighed less 
than two kilos denote the set of elements in A mapped into this 
set by llweighedll. 
But this approach leads to problems with sentence (4) because 
there is no measure verb available. The most natural analysis if 
one starts with sentence (4) is to let kilo denote the measure, 
less than two denote the set of elements r in R such that 
r<lltwoll, and less than two kilos denote the set of elements in A 
mapped into this set by the rr1easure function II kiloll . This can 
also take care of sentence (5). All one has to do is to give 
weighed less than two kilos the same denotation as less than two 
kilos. 
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'rhe weakness of the second approach is that vleighed is given 
no meaning in sentence ( 5) . This is a bit counterintuitive and it 
does not give any semant explanation of what is wrong with an 
expression like weiql1ed more than two liters. Another problem 
which the first approach manages better is to explain the closer 
connect:. ions that exis'c bet~,reen e, g. kilo and ounce than between 
kilo and liter. 
One could think of various compromises between the two ap-
preaches. One would be to hide the word weigh somewhere in the 
syntactic deep struc-ture of sentence (4) and claim that it has 
been deleted in the der on of ·the surface structure. Another 
way out is to push the problem to the semantics and give kilo a 
denotation consisting of an ordered pair of an element in R and 
a measure, and then call upon the right part of the pair in build-
ing more complex denotations. In particular, in giving a denota-
tion to (5), vle shall na>.rer call upon the measure part of kilo 
since that will be provided by the measure verb weigh. 
But this is not the end of our problems. Nothing that we 
have said so far blocks a sentence such as 
(32) ?The v.rater weighed two liters. 
One can argue whether it should be blocked on syntactic or seman-
tic grounds. 
Our proposal to get around these problems is as follows: 
Instead of letting measure verbs denote function into one set R, 
1 7 
one can let them denote functions into different sets R1 ,R2 , ... , 
one for each measure verb. If then weigh denotes a function into 
R1 , kilo shall denote an element in R1 while the denotation of 
liter is not in R1 , but in some other To secure that the 
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denotation of kilo is in the right R. the syntactic category 
l 
denomination is equipped with a feature: weight, volume, ... or 
another measure verb. It is then possible to reject sentence (32) 
syntactically if also amount terms get features - the same feature 
as the denomination it contains - and if it is required that the 
feature of an amount term has to correspond to the measure verb 
for the combination of them to be well-formed. Where the amount 
term is a part of a determiner the feature can be regarded as a 
syntactic counterpart to the stored measure in the semantics. 
This means that it is not necessary to let a denomination denote 
both an element in an R. l and a measure since the measure can be 
derived from the feature in a uniform way. 
It d f '" f 1 f f f 1' h 19 ns ea o g1v2ng a set o ru es or a ragment o Eng 1s , 
let us see how the example sentences (4) and (5) may be treated in 
a way consistent with vihat is said above. Observe that of is not 
given a denotation but is introduced syncategorematically when 
determiners are formed out of amount terms. That is partly be-
cause there are languages (e.g. Norwegian) where of is not real-
ised. It is also assumed that there are only finitely many words 
except numerals which can be the head of an amount term, and that 
they can be given a special (logical) treatment. 
The syntactic categories used are: 
Den[w] - denomination; feature: weight 
Num 
AT[ w] 
MV[w] 
HVP 
IVP 
- numeral 
- amount term~ feature: weight 
- measure verb; feature: weight 
- homogeneous verb phrase 
- inhomogeneous verb phrase 
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Det - determiner 
N - (mass) noun 
NP - (mass) noun phrase 
DD - definite (nass noun) description 
TI1e syntax trees are then: 
I 
Det 
\ 
----------~ 
'., 
Num Den[ J H 
s 
I 
NP 
N ffiTP 
(4) Less than two kilos of che se disappeared 
~s 
DD 
~~ 
N IVP 
\ ~ 
R AT[v,T] 
I 
N ffiTP Num Den[w] 
(5) The cheese that disappeared weighed less than two kilos. 
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One model for this is based on a boolean algebra <A, .•. >. 
Since only one feature weight is involved, it is sufficient with 
one additional set R, with at least one binary relation < and 
one binary function • , and one function w from A to R. The 
denotations of cheese, disappeared, and the cheese th~t 
disappeared are exactly as in part 3. In addition 
II[D kilos]ll 
en[ w] 
is an element in R 
11 [ Num t'tlO] II is an element in R 
II [ less thanf two] [ kilos] II = 
AT[ w] - Num Den[ w] 
{rER: r<II[N two]II•II[D kilos]ll} 
urn en[wJ 
Let us call this last set LTTK. Then 
II [ Det[ AT[ w] less than[ Num two] [Den[ w] kilos]] of] II 
is the function f from A to the set of subsets of A such 
that 
bEf(a) if and only if w(axb)ELTTK. 
Notice here that the measure w stems from the feature weight of 
the amount term (in a uniform way). The rest of the semantics of 
sentence (4) is now standard. For sentence (5) we require that 
II [ IVP[ MV[ w] weighedl [AT[ w J less than[ Num two] 
[D kilos]] )11 = {aEA:w(a)ELTTK}. 
en[w] 
Since the denotation of the definite description which introduce 
this sentence is II [ n cheese] II x II [ IWP disappeared] II , it is easy to 
see that the two sentences become semantically equivalent. 
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One special problem related to amount terms concerns noun 
phrases like two cups of coffee. Our proposal for an analysis is 
that this phrase is ambiguous between two readings. In the first 
reading two cups functions as an amount term along the same lines 
as two liters. So cup can be put in the syntactic category deno-
mination with feature volume. This reading is the most natural 
in 
(33) John drank two cups of coffee 
where it is not necessary that there were two cups present, not 
even one if John drank from a glass. The second reading is domi-
nant in situations where the presence of two cups are necessary. 
One such example is 
(34) Two cups of coffee are on the table. 
In this case the noun phrase is a count noun phrase with cups as 
its head noun, of coffee functions as a noun modifier, and two is 
the (count) determiner. 
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7. Further directions. 
Throughout the paper we have listed some problems that need 
further study. To begin with we gave some reasons for taking mass 
terms with determiners as basic. But it is an open question if 
this approach can be extended to (some) occurrences with no deter-
miners. v~e have not proposed to rewrite drank water as drank some 
water, because it is not clear how this rewriting can be done 
uniformly, e.g. it does not extend to water is wet. Another 
reason is that the two verb phrases drank v1ater and drank some 
water react differently to time references. They combine with 
different members of the pair for an hour/in an hour. 
This last point shows the importance of extending the analy-
sis to cover tense and time references. Another reason to such an 
extension is that we want a better analysis of the differences 
between definite and indefinite mass terms, e.g. ice and the ice. 
In the sentence Huch ice a, we evaluate ice at the time interval 
indicated by the verb phrase a. vJhile in the sentence Much of 
the ice that John found a, ice is evaluated at the time indicated 
by found, and that does not have to be the same time as the action 
time of a. So what we are talking about in the last sentence 
need not be ice when it a. 
Verb phrases, like disappear, which express a change of state 
may also get a more realistic analysis, i.e. an analysis which 
covers more of their semantics, if a more dynamical model is 
established. 
The remarks at the end of part 5 suggest a further study of 
collective and distributive readings of count noun phrases. We 
need here an analysis which does not overgenerate i.e. which does 
only produce a conflict between a collective and distributive 
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reading in the cases where the verb phrase is inhomogeneous. 
Closely connected tc this is the problem of existensial and (near-
ly) universal collective readings mentioned in part 6, both when 
mass terms and count terms are considered. 
Footnotes. 
* This paper an extract of my (unpublished) cand.real.thesis 
{L¢nning ( 1982)). I ;,vish to thank my advisor Professor Jens Erik 
Fenstad for valuable help and encouragements, both in the work of 
the thesis and this paper, I wish also to thank Helle Frisak Sem 
and the participants in the Groningen workshop on generalized 
quantifiers in July 1983 for comments on earlier versions of this 
paper. 
1. \-That follmvs is not a satisfactory criticism of all contempo-
rary theories of mass term quantification, but some problems 
which face everyone who want to study this phenomenon. 
2. This is reformulated from Cheng to match better with the other 
criterion. 
3. That this is a proposal for a universal means that is open for 
amplification and changes (in the sequel). 
4. Expression Means here the rest of the sentence. That is, it 
includes e.g. John drank vvhich is not normally regarded as a 
unit. 
5. For nore information on boolean algebras see Halmos (1963). 
6. Bunt (1981) finds it necessary to single out some exceptions 
to this. But none of this examples are predicative. 
- III. 57 -
7. is is exchanged with 1.vas to get a sentence generated in the 
fragment. 
8. This is not an independent set of axioms since e.g. Al can be 
proved from the other ones. 
9. Here one can see how the LA~language is weaker than the first 
order theory of boolean algebras. The latter one needs only 
to be extended with one sentence: Vx(x:f0-+3y(y<xAy:f0Ay:fx)), to 
get the theory of non~at.omic boolean algebras. 
10. This follows because it can be proved that every formula in 
the corresponding L(GQ)-language with no determiners except 
Every and Some is equivalent to a translation of a L-formula. 
If one extend LA ;,.-lith modal operators 0 , 0 and the seman-
tics which is the natural combination of LA's semantics and 
85's semantics, then the result is a decidable system. Modal 
monadic first order logic is not decidable on the other hand. 
One reason for this discrepancy is that there are modal mona-
dic first order formulae which do not correspond to LA+S5 
formulae, e.g. formulas of the form 3x8¢. 
1 l • This is not a complete analysis of count noun phrases and 
their semantics. In particular so-called collective readings 
of count noun phrases will not be considered. Hy cand.real.-
thesis (L¢nning (1982)) includes a logic for treating collec-
tive readings of numerals (e.g. two men), which is formulated 
in a way which allows a complete axiomatization with respect 
to the semantics. 
l 2. Here and for the rest of the paper II • II will be a function 
which to natural language expressions gives their formal 
denotations. 
13. In L¢nning (1982) this lS carried out. 
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14. If it is true tJ1at every noun can have both types of occuren-
ces then the lexical entries of and will be 
empty and the following rule accordingly shorter. 
l 5. The t in ft indicates the dependence of time. 
l 6. Parsons ( 1 970) lets m.c:;asures be relations. That is uneccesary 
since nothing can have more than one \-Teight. 
17. An eresting question is if it is sufficient with finetly 
many such 
1 8. A numeral like two must have deno'cations in each R .• 
l 
1 9, In L¢nning ( l 982) I gave such rules and formulated a formal 
language ~tJhich had semantics in ·terms of <A,+, • , ... > and R. 
I also showed there thai: if R is supposed to be an ordered 
field and the meastJres satisfies the ADD requirement, a com-
plete axiomatization with respect to the semantics can be 
given. 
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0. Preface. 
In this article we discuss questions of quantifier scope and 
anaphoric relations between noun phrases. vJe approach the topic 
through a study of two different systems for representing language 
meaning, one the system using the "storage mechanism" developed in 
R. Cooper: "Quantification and Syntactic Theory" (Cooper 1983), 
the second the theory of Discourse Representation Systems as 
introduced in H. Kamp: "A Theory of Truth and Semantic Represen-
tation" ( Kamp l 981 ) . 
v~e start out by giving a modified treatment of the Cooper 
systems, in particular, we eliminate the use of multivalued func-
tions in the semantic interpretation. The storage mechanism is 
successful in treating many questions of quantifier scope in 
natural languages, but there are examples which the system does 
not seem able to handle. He conclude this part of our study with 
a systematic discussion of limitations of the storage method. 
Many of these limitations can be overcome by using the theory 
of Discourse Representation Systems. We extend the analysis of 
Kamp's (Kamp 1981) to cover the syntactic fragment of Cooper 
(1983) and are thus able to obtain a satisfactory treatment of 
some of the examples that could not be handled by the storage 
method. 
The way the Discourse Representations describe submodels of a 
model for Discourse Representation Systems bear clear resemblances 
to the way event-types describe partial mode~s in the Situation 
Semantics presented by J. Barwise and J. Perry in "Situations and 
Attitudes" (Barwise and Perry 1983) . ~'le end the paper with an 
illustration of how the theory of Discourse Representation Systems 
can be applied in the construction of meaning relations for 
linguistic expressions in Situation Semantics. 
vJe assume familiarity with (Cooper 1 983) and (Kamp 1 981 ) even 
if, in principle, this article is self-contained as the systems 
are presented in full details. For reasons of space few examples 
are discussed. A more comprehensive treatment is found in my 
cand.scient thesis "Kvantifikasjon, syntaks og semantikk" (Sem 
1983) (in Norwegian) which was written under the supervision of 
Professor Jens Erik Fenstad, and I am indebted to him for encour-
agement and valuable advice during the work on my thesis. 
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1. The Cooper stores, 
1 • 1 • 
The aim of this section is to study "the Cooper stores", 
their possibilities and limitations. As a starting point for our 
investigations \ve take Fragment 6 from Cooper (1 983). This is the 
simplest non~transformational fragment rich enough to contain the 
full use of the storing mechanisms with relative clause formation 
and embedded questions. 
For reasons of clarity and ease of readability some simplifi-
cations both of the phrase structure rules in the syntax and of 
the technical apparatus of the semantics will be made. Thus, a 
better basis for further extensions, especially with regards to 
interaction between the different storage applications, is 
obtained. Though the notation and to some extent the technical 
apparatus undergoes several changes, the main virtues of the stor-
age technique remain unchanged. The limitations discovered for 
the present version will also apply to the original one, as far as 
the original contains the possibilities of the present version. 
That a fragment with the syntax of Fragment 6 and semantics sim~ 
plified similarly as the present fragment is syntactically and 
semantically (weakly) equivalent to the present fragment, is 
proved in Sem (1983, I.4), 
The syntactic simplifications are all motivated by the desire 
to avoid the following kind of syntactic ambiguity. I want to 
avoid any two SD's of the form 
tactic categories, A*B, and ~ 
[ J!'J ,[!!'] where A,B 
"' A "' B 
are syn-
is a string of SD's. The indue-
tion base of the syntax then defines the basic elements of the set 
SD, while the phrase structure rules defines a function from 
SDxSD into SD (provided we regard 'that' and ¢ as basic SD's 
in the case of S + that S and NP + R) . 
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The use of multivalued functions in Cooper (1983) is motiva-
ted partly by free pronouns, partly by semantic ambiguity of syn-
tactically unambiguous phrases (Cooper 1983, Ch. II, 2.5). The 
full interpretation of a phrase is the set of all the different 
readings of the phrase. The point is to make one phrase corre-
spond to exa one interpretation. During the interpretation 
process, only one of the readings for each constituent phrase can 
be used to calculate one of the readings for a compound phrase. 
Thus, the process itself is obscured by a notation designed only 
for denoting the entire set of meanings for a fully interpreted 
phrase. The multi-valued notation can therefore be dispensed with 
altogether without any loss of compositionality. The set of 
obtainable readings will remain the same for every phrase. To 
further increase readability, the K and p functions will not 
be used, 
In addition to giving a simpler and more uniform treatment of 
the WH-clauses, the present syntax definition provides a fragment 
that follows a somewhat stricter principle of compositionality 
than the original fragment. A further discussion of the fragments 
with respect to the principle of compositionality and a definition 
of an equivalent fragment following a strict formulation of the 
principle is found in Sem (1983). 
Som restrictions will then be removed from the semantics to 
get a fragment that allows more complicated use of the storage 
mechanisms. Although the storage technique turns out to meet most 
of the needs of this more extended fragment, one major class of 
problematic constructions emerges - a class comprising the con-
structions knovvn in the literature as "the donkey sentences". 
The storage technique is used to obatin the correct relation-
ship between the referents of the various NP-phrases (including 
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gaps and VJH-terms), Different quantifier scopes 6 de re/de dicto 
readings, coreferentiality between antecedent and anaphoric 
pronouns and finally reference for gaps in relative clauses and 
questions are obtained by means of storage. The main idea behind 
the storage technique is to put the intension of a NP-term on ice 
for a while, in order to give it wider scope. When appropriate, 
the stored NP-intension is lifted out of the store to get scope 
over the phrase now composed, We will return to the actual defi-
nitions of these mechanisms later on. 
There axe essentially b1o kinds of storage: ordinary NP-
storage and vJH-storage. The two should not interfere. As a tech-
nical means to carry out the storage and retrieving processes, we 
let the intensions depend on certain terms of countable sequences 
of elements from the domain E, and distinguish between the two 
storage types by means of a standard trick: the one storage type 
use the odd terms of the sequence, the other the even terms. This 
approach differs from the approach in Cooper (1983) where the se-
quence is used exclusively for NP-storage and -retrieval while WH-
storage makes use of a special element as a flag in the store 
(Cooper, Ch. IV, 3). 
l .2. Introduction to Fragment 6 11 • 
The simplified version of Fragment 6, Fragment 6 11 , consists of: 
Syntax: - Lexicon 
- Induction base 
- Recursion clauses (Phrase structure rules) 
- (Exclusion clause) 
- Horphology. 
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Semantics: - Denotations for each word in the lexicon 
- Denotations and interpretations for the base 
- Recursive rules for interpreting compound phrases 
- Rules for the storage mechanisms: opening, storage, 
retrieval. 
The basic building blocks of the semantics are as usual a set E 
(of entities), a set W (of possible worlds) and the set of truth 
values, {0,1}, from which we build a possible world semantics for 
the fragment. 
Notation 1. 
For each Structural Description (SD) a 1 ) defined by the syntax , 
we want to define interpretations of the form 
<llcxll (NP 1 ). , ••• ,(NP ). > cr,w, 1.1 n l.n 
where 
Q:;;; n, nEft..i 
i .EIN for j = 1 , ••• , n 
J 
w 
crEE , an infinite (countable) sequence of elements of E 
wt::.W 
II all = lied (cr) (w) is a denotation for a with respect to the 
cr,w 
sequence cr and world w 
llall = lla;ll (cr) is an intension (function with domain W) 
cr 
for a; 
(NP. ) . 
J l. . 
J 
wrt. the sequence cr. The intension II a; II may depend on 
cr 
crk either because the storing of a NP-intension in a 
binding operator has left an opening, or because there is 
an opening created from a pronoun or a gap on the k-th 
term. 
is a stored binding operator for the NP NP .. 
J 
He follow 
the convention of letting the category name denote a SD 
of the category in question, the j is just a convenient 
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way to enumerate the stored NP's in a general case, the 
index i. indicates which term in a the binding 
J 
operator is to operate on. 
(NP 1 ). , ... , (NP ) . is called the store. If n = 0, the store is 
1 1 n 1 n 
said to be empty. 
For convenience, we will in the following use the terms storage, 
binding, binding operator, retrieval for the general NP-storage 
terms, and use the prefixes NP and WH for the ordinary NP-case 
and WH-case respectively. 
Jr will be used to denote a variable over NP-intensions, 
J.f~w + {XIX c:::.:P (E)} NP- int = {X I X '=. ~ (E) } W 
p will be used to denote a variable over propositions, 
p:v~ + {0,1} Prop = { 0, 1 } vJ 
The following definitions will be useful: 
Definition 1: An intension llall for a SD a is said to depend 
(J 
on the k-th term in the sequence a if lied (J varies with the 
value assigned to ok. Similarly for denotations. 
Definition 2: a called a HH-tenn if a: is a SD of category 
NP not on the form [R]NP' and the leftmost word in a: is a 1-'JH-
word (who, what or which in Fragment 6). 
Definition 3: a is called a VJH-phrase if a is a SD on the 
form [NP s]X' where NP is a WH-term and X is some syntactic 
category. 
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The rules for interpreting a compund phrase on the basis of its 
constituents will all be on the following form: 
If o: is a SD on the form [ AB] , \vhere 
c 
<II All , ( NP l ) . , ••• , ( NP ) . > 
cr 1 w 1 1 n 1n 
< II B II , ( NP + l ) . , • • • , ( NP + ) . > 
cr,w n J] n rn Jm Ot;:; n,m 
are interpretations of A and B respectively, and 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
number) . 
jl, ... ,j 
m 
are even numbers (possibly 
{i 1 , ••• ,i }n{j 1 , ... ,j} = p n m 
If II All 
cr , 'iiv 
depends on then 
iv) If kl , •. ' I k and kb , ... , ~ are odd terms in cr 
v) 
then 
1 ah 1 2 
II All , II Bll are dependent on, respectively, then 
cr,w cr,w 
{k. , ... ,k }n{kb , ... ,kb} = ¢ a, ah 1 2 
If is an odd number for a 1, Ot;:;1 .. n, then 
depends on cr. 
11 
II Bll 
cr, w 
an odd 
that 
<II [ A.B J II I ( NP 1 ) . ' ••• I ( NP ) . , ( NP +1 ) . I ••• , { NP + ) . > 
c cr,w 1 1 n 1 n Jl n m J n m 
is an interpretation of o:, where ..... 
( ( NP 2 ) . must be retrieved and removed frorn the store if 11 
i 2 is odd). 
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As mentioned above, HH-binding operators and NP-binding operators 
are distinguished by means of the difference between the odd and 
even numbers. 
where: 
The conditions i) ... v) are safety mechanisms, 
i) prevents further storage of WH-binding operators 
ii) prevents more than one binding operator for each term in cr 
iii) prevents backwards binding of pronouns 
i v) prevents more than one gap to be bound by the same vm-
binding operator 
v) ensures that if the first constituent, A, is a vVH-phrase, 
then there is a gap in the second constituent, B, that will 
be bound in the composing process. 
All the safety mechanisms will not l>e required in every rule, and 
redundant mechanisms v1i 11 be omit ted. 
1 .2.1. !,he storin9_Eiechanisms~ some preliminary reflections. 
Before giving the exact definition of the simplified frag-
ment, some questions concerning the storage mechanisms and their 
interaction must be considered. lfuat restrictions should be made? 
How general should the mechanisms be - what restrictions should be 
inherited from the definition of the mechanisms and what restric-
tions should be imposed on the rules? The answers given here are 
by no means exhaustive, The guiding principle is to make the 
basic definitions and rules as general and independent as possible 
to get a base that allows for flexibility. Specific restrictions 
may then be imposed on the combination rules as demonstrated 
above, or given as constraints. These imposed restrictions and 
constraints can easily be changed to accommodate particularities 
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proper to the different languages. 
In addition to the restrictions concerning the manipulation 
of binding operators and openings mentioned in the general scheme 
for phrase-structure rules, a choice regarding the possibility of 
the following options must be made before defining the basic stor-
age mechanisms: 
I) Should more than one gap be accepted in one phrase? 
II) In the case of NP-storage, should the NP-interpretations be 
allowed to 
1) be an open pronoun exclusively? 
2) be an open gap exclusively? 
3) contain open pronouns (as proper parts)? 
4) contain open gaps (as proper parts)? 
5) have 1iJH-binding opera tors in the store? 
6) have NP-bind.ing operators in the store? 
Point II.4 is only relevant if the answer to I) is affirmative. 
In that case, a decision concerning phenomena like crossover 
dependencies must also be made. In the definition of Fragment 6, 
Cooper gives an affirmative answer to I) 2 ). Concerning NP-storage, 
Cooper requires the NP-interpretations to be stored to have empty 
store and no openings, Thus, storage of NP-terms with one of the 
features 1), ... 6) is prevented. 
The aim of tW-storage is to change NP-scope by storing an NP-
intension and thereby postponing the combination of the NP-inten-
sion3) vli th the intension of the rest of the phrase of which it is 
a constituent until suitable. Consequently there should be a 
proper NP-intension to store. The openings serve to mark off 
where a possible stored intension is to have effect. vJhen stored, 
a NP-intension will leave behind an opening exactly similar to a 
pronoun opening. At retrieval, these two kinds of openings will 
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not be distinguished. The openings themselves are in a sense 
intensionless. At retrieval of a corresponding binding operator 
from the store, they are to be filled with the stored intension. 
Nor have the HH-terms ordinary NP-intension, they are to be 
functions on propositions (S-intension) as well as indicating the 
possible NP-intensions for the gap. 
The position taken here is therefore not to allow the NP-
s·torage of pure openings and HH-terms, that is, a negative answer 
is given to point 1 ), 2) and 5). For the moment, nested storage, 
point 6), liJill also be prevented. 
1 .2.2. Storage, opening and retrieval. 
Definition 4: An intension depending exclusively on the value 
assigned to a certain term of the sequence a is called an 
opening at that t.erm, 
As opposed to Cooper (1983), pronouns and gaps will here be 
treated in a uniform manner. The two opening types will be dis-
tinguished by letting openings at odd terms of a be gap openings 
while openings at even terms v1ill be pronoun openings. In addi-
tion to giving a basis for uniform formulation of the two storage 
types, this approach enables us to avoid the special NP-intension 
reserved for marking off the gaps in the store (Cooper l~ti:;, Ch. 
IV, 3) • 
The definitions of the storage machinery will also differ 
from the definitions in Cooper (1983), especially in the case of 
\vH-storage (Cooper 1983, Ch. IV, 3.2). The NP-storage definition 
from Cooper (1983) will be used as a pattern, and we make the 
following general definitions: 
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Definition 5: A binding operator is a function constructed from a 
w 
NP-intension, with the domain ({o}Vl)E , replacing a certain term, 
say ai, of each element from Ew by a NP-denotation obtained 
from the NP-intension. The binding operator is said to be at the 
i-th term of a. He denote such a binding operator by 
where NP denotes the stored NP-intension. 
(NP),, 
]_ 
Definition 6: Storage is the process of taking the intension from 
the denotation part of an NP-interpretation and use it to form a 
binding operator in the store at some term of a, say a, • ]_ After 
storage, the denotation part of the NP-interpretation may be empty 
or an opening at i. 
Definition 7: Retrieval is the process of applying a stored 
binding operator to the intension taken from the denotation part 
of the interpretation to give a new denotation part and remove the 
binding operator from the store. 
With the formulation of the storage mechanisms to be presented 
below, the two storage types can be regarded as a weaker and a 
stronger kind, respectively. ~~-storage, the weaker kind, leaves 
behind an opening, and allows freedom with respect to the moment 
of retrieval, while the stronger kind, WH-storage, leaves the 
denotation part empty, and retrieval is obligatory at fusion. In 
addition, the weaker one yields a sentence intension from a sen-
tence intension while the stronger one yields a function from E 
to the set of sentence intensions. 
To fulfil the conditions of the definitions and be in accor-
dance with the principle of compositionality, the denotations for 
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WH-words must be chosen carefully. Intuition does not give any 
clear support to the choice of meanings for \'lH-.-mrds. To choose 
E or some subset of E as denotations does not seem too far 
fetched. In this context, no distinction between amimate/inami-
mate etc. is made, so all the WH-words will have E as denota-
tion. In a more sophisticated fragment such a distinction could 
be implemented by choosing the appropriate subset of E as deno-
tation for each \18-word, No·te that the HH-word which will have 
only one denotation though it is listed under two categories in 
t.he lexicon. The ·two SD's [which]NP and [which]Det will get 
different interpretations by lexical insertion, corresponding to 
their different syntactical function. 
I put forward bvo alternative proposals for building inter-
pretations for NP-terrns resulting from lexical insertion of WH-
words: 
a) Guiding principle: Every NP-denotation is a set of subsets of E. 
This is the usual claim rising from the principle of compositiona-
lity. SD's of the same category should have set-theoretically the 
same kind of denotation in order to make the semantical machinery 
work in a uniform way. HH-terms stand in a class by themselves as 
NP-terms. During the interpretation process, they are always 
distinguished and treated differently from other NP-terms. A 
minor reduction in the guiding principle of alternative a) allows 
a somewhat simpler solution: 
b) Guiding principle: An ordinary NP-denotation is a set of 
subsets of E, a IJH-term denotation is a subset of E. 
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A final decision concerning the two alternatives will not be taken 
here. I will give rules for both alternatives. The semantics 
will not be affected by the choice other than in the rule for 
lexical insertion of vVH-words and in the rule for WH-storage. 
1 .3. Fragment 6rr. 
1 • 3. 1 • Syntax 
Lexicon: NP: John, Mary, Bill, Sam, Leslie, Kim, Chris, ... , 
he, who, what, vvhich 
N: woman, man, fish, unicorn, centaur, 
VP: runs, 
V: loves, admires, seeks, needs, believes, knows, 
says, thinks, ·wonders, 
Det: !3:..1 every, no, which 
Induction base 
0. Lexical insertion: If a is listed under X in the 
lexicon, then [a]XESD 
[ ] NPE SD 
Phrase structure rules. 
1 • s ~ NP VP 
2. VP ~ 
v {t} 
-3 . s ~ that S 
4. NP ~ , UP R r l l ~et N J 
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6. R + NP S 
In rules 1 and 2, NP may be headless relative, in rule 2, R 
functions as an embedded question, in rule 4, first alternative, R 
functions as a non~restrictive relative, and in rule 5, R and S 
function as restrictive relatives. Rule 3 creates both sentence 
objects and relative clauses starting with that, rule 4, third 
alternative creates a headless relative from a relative (WH-) 
clause, rule 6 creates all relative clauses starting with a WH-
word. 
Exclusion clause: Nothing is a member of SD unless resulting 
from applications of the rules 0-6. 
Morhology: If a is a SD, then the result of applying rule 7 to 
a represents a syntactically well-formed expression of the frag-
ment. 
7. Pronoun case-marking: Change every occurrence of [he]NP, 
[she]NP not immedately below S in a tree representation 
of a to [him]NP' [her]NP' respectively. 
l .3.2. Semantics. 
The semantics is based on a model consisting of: 
A non-empty set E - the universe 
A non-empty set W - the set of possible worlds 
{ 0, 1 } - the set of truth values 
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Denotations for the words in the lexicon: 
NP: i) If a is John, ~~ ••• ,Chris there is an eE::E for 
each a such that lied = e cr,w 
ii) For any eE E, II hell = e is a denotation for he 
(f 'w 
iii) If a is who, which, what, lied = E (f, w 
N,VP: If a is listed under N or VP, then 
V: 
II all = f(w), where f is a given function for each a 
(f. w 
such that f:W + {xjx ~ E} 
i) 
ii) 
If a is a) loves, admires 
b) seeks, needs 
c) believes 
d) says, thinks 
e) wonders 
then II all = f(v!) where f is a given function for 
(f 1 W 
each a such that 
a) f:W + { X I X '=._ Ex E} 
b) f:W + {X I X c::_ Ex NP- int} 
c) f: lv + { X I X ::_ Ex ( P ropJ E >} 
d) f:W + {XIX c::_ ExProp} 
e) f:W + {xjx '=- Exj)({qjq:W +Prop} )} 4 ) 
llknowll = f(w). g(w) or h(w), where f,g,h are given 
-- (f ,w 
functions such that 
f:W + {xjx '=- ExE} 
gdv + {XI X'=.. Ex Prop} 
h: W + {X l X '=. Ex:P ( { q I q: W + Prop} ) } 
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Det: For given A c E, then 
"~"a,w(A) = {x ~ EIXnA*¢} 
lleveryll (A)= {xc EiAc X} 
- a,w - -
llnoll (A)= {xc_EIXnA= ¢} 
- a,w 
llwhichll = E 
a ,w 
Induction base: 
0. If a is listed under X in the lexicon 
II [a] XII = II o:: II 
cr,w a,w 
unless 
i) a is listed under NP, a*who, what, which, then 
II [ a J.TP II = { X c E 111 a II E X} 
u a,w - a,w 
For alternative a) : If a = who, what or which, then 
II [ a J NP II cr ' w = {llo:ll } 5 ) cr, w 
ii) a is love or admire, then 
n[a]vn = {<xJ(>I{yl<x,y>EIIo:ll }EJf(w)} 
cr,w a,w 
iii) a is believe, then 
II [a] VII = { <x.J(> I {yl <x,y>EIIall }EJ{('Itl)} 
cr,w a,w 
U { < x, p> I < x, p> E II a II } 
cr, w 
i v) a is know, then 
II [a] VII = { < x ,J'(> I { y I < x, y> E f ( w)} EJ{( w)} 
cr, vl 
or 
ll[a] II = {<x,p>l<x,p>Eg(w)} 
v (j '"'' 
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or 
II [a:] II = { <x, Q> I <x, Q>E: h(w)} where Q varies V rJ,W 
over subsets of {qlq:W ~ Prop} 
v) a is which and X is Det 6 then for given subset 
A c E, then 
For alternative a): 
n[~...rhich] II (A)={X=EiX=Aflllwhichll J Det a w - a, 
For alternative b): 
11[which] 0 til (A)=Anllwhichll e a,w a,w 
When a is listed under X in the lexicon, and [a:]X is a 
SD with denotation ll[a:]XII , then 
a, w 
<II [a] II > is an interpretation of [a:JX. X a,w 
Phrase structure rules. 
1. If a is a SD on the form [NP VP] 8 where NP is not a 
WH-term, and 
< II NPII , ( NP ] ) . , ••• , ( NP ) . > 
a,w 1 1 n 1n 
<II VPII ,, ( NP +l ) . , ••• , ( NP + ) . > 
a ,w n ] 1 n m Jm 
are interpretations of NP and VP respectively, where 
i) il, ... ,in, jl ' • ' ' ' jm are even numbers 
ii) { i 1 , . . . ' in} n { j 1 , • . . , j m} = ¢ 
iii) If II NPII 
a ,w 
depends on then 
{ k 1 , ••• , k;. } n { j 1 , ••• , j m} = ¢ 
iv) If k , ... ,k and k_ , ••• ,k. 
a 1 ah ·o1 --b;. 
are the odd terms in 
a that IINPII ,IIVPII are dependent on respective-a,w a,w 
ly, then {k , ... ,k }n{k , ... ,k } = ¢ 
a 1 ah ·o1 ·o1 
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then 
<II [ NP VP] S II , ( NP1 ) . , ••• , ( NP ) . , ( NP +l ) . , , •• , ( NP + ) . > a,w 1 1 n 1n n ] 1 n m Jm 
is an interpretation of a where 
II [ NP VP) 8 11 = (J 'w iff II VPII E II NPII cr,w cr,w 
2. If a is a SD on the form [v A}VP where A is a SD of 
-
category NP, S or R, A not a WH-term, and 
<II VII > 
Ci , \'J 
< II A.ii , ( NP l ) . , ••• , ( NP ) . > Q.;; n 
cr, w 1 1 n 1n 
are interpretations of V and A respectively, where 
i) i 1 , ••• ,i are even numbers n 
then let 
II Ail' 
a ,w 
= [IAIIcr,w if A is of category NP or 
{pI p( \.V) =11\3 a\iw' ~ W ( p ( w' ) =1 +-I- aE II All )} 
(J 'w 
-s 
otherwise 
then 
< II [ V A} VPII , ( NP l ) . , ••• , ( NP ) . > 
cr,w 1 1 n 1n 
is an interpretation of a where II [ V A] VPII cr, w <::. E such that 
bEIIV A]VPII iff <b,IIAII '>EIIVII 
cr,w cr a,w 
3. If a is a SD on the form [that s} 8 and 
< II S II , ( NP l ) . , • • • , ( NP ) . ) Q( n 
cr,w 1 1 n 1n 
is an interpretation of S where 
i) i 1 , ••• ,in are even numbers 
then 
<II [that s] 811 , ( NP l ) . , ... , ( NP ) . > cr,w 1 1 n ln 
is an interpretation of a where n[that s}-8 11 =nsn 
---- cr,w a,w 
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4. a) If 0: is a SD on the form [ NP R) NP' NP is not a 
WH-term, R is on the form [ [who] NPs] R or 
[ [which) NPS] R' and 
<IINPII ,(NP 1 ). , ••• ,(NP ). > a,w 1 1 n 1n 
<IIRII ,(NP +l). , ••• ,(NP +). > 
a, w n ] 1 n m Jn 
0~ n,m 
are interpretations of NP and R respectively, where 
i) i 1 , ••• , in, j 1 , ••• , jm are even numbers 
iii) If II NPII depends on 
a''" 
iv} If k , •.. ,k 
al ~ 
are the odd terms in 
a that IINPII ,IIRII are dependent or respectively, 
a,w a,w 
then { k 1 • • • 1 k } n { kb 1 I 1 'kb } = ¢ 
al ah 1 1 
then 
< II ( NP R] NP II I ( NP 1 ) . I • • • , ( NP ) . I ( NP + 1 ) . , • • • I ( NP + ) . > 
a ,w 1 1 n 1n n . ] 1 n rn Jm 
is an interpretation of a where 
II [NP R)NPII = {XiXnll Rll Ell NPII } a,w a,w a,w 
b) If a is a SD on the form [Det N]NP' and 
<II Detll > 
a, w 
< II N II , ( NP 1 ) . , ••• , ( NP ) . > Q.;; n a,w 1 1 n 1n 
are interpretations of Det and N respectively, 
where 
i) i 1 , ... ,in are even numbers 
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then 
<II [ Det N J NPII , ( NP 1 ) . , .•. , ( NP ) . > cr,w 1 1 n 1n 
is an interpretation of a where 
II [ Det N] NPII ,.., , ,.. = II De til (II Nil ) 
.., .,. cr,w cr,w 
c) If a is a SD on the form [ R] NP' R is on the form 
[ [what] NPS] R' and 
<IIRII ,(NP 1 ). , ••• ,(NP ). > cr, w 1 1 n 1.n 
is an interpretation of R where 
i) i 1 , ••• ,in are even numbers 
then 
<ii[R]NPII ,(NP 1 ). , ••• ,(NP ). > cr,w 1 1 n l.n 
is an interpretation of a where 
II [ R} NPII = {X '::_ E jll Rll eX} cr,w cr,w-
5. If a is a SD on the form [N A]N, A is a SD of cate-
gory R or S, if A is of type R then A is on the form 
[ [ whoJ NPs] R or [ [which] NPs] R' and 
< II Nil , ( NP l ) . , • • • , ( NP ) . > 
cr,w 1 1 n 1n 
<II All , ( NP +l ) . , • , • , ( NP + ) . > 
cr, w n J 1 n m Jm 
Q<; n, m 
are interpretations of N and A respectively, where 
i) i 1 , ••• , in, j 1 , • • , jn are even numbers 
ii) {i 1 , ... ,i }n{j 1 , ... ,j} = ¢ n n 
iii) If 
(J 'w 
depends on then II Nil 
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iv) If k , ... ,k are the odd terms in 
al ~ 
a that IN" ·"R" are dependent on respectively cr,v., a,w 
then {k , ... ,k }n{~ , ... ,kb} = ¢ 
al ah 1 1 
v) ~ If A is of type S, then II All depends on (J • I for 
(J 'w J 
an odd number j 
let II All ' = ~I All if A is of type R 
a,w } 1 a, 
·-l{ a Ill A.ll 0j = 1} if A is of type s 
a, iii 
then 
< II [ N A) Nil , ( NP l ) . , .. , , ( NP ) , , ( NP + l ) . , ... , ( NP + ) . > 
cr,w 1 1 n 1 n ] 1 n m J n m 
is an interpretat.ion of a where 
By 
II Nil nil All' 
cr,w· cr,w 
crj we mean the sequence exactly like 
a 
(J except possi-
bly for the j-th term where aj has the value 
a 
a. 
6. If a is a so on the form [NP s]R, NP is a vvH-term, and 
<¢,(NPO)j> 
< II S II , ( NP l ) . , ••• , ( NP ) , > Q,.; n 
cr,w 1. n1 
J n 
are interpretat of NP and S respectively where 
i) j is an odd number, i 1 are even numbers 
ii) II Sll depends on cr . 
cr,w J 
then 
<(NP 0 ).(11SII ),(NP 1 ). , ... ,(NP ), > J a,w 1 1 n ln 
is an interpretation of a. (See the definition of HH-stor-
age for the definition of (NP0 )j.) 
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Note that the f does not include a special category 
for quest If 't!e wanted to single out the questions in 
the syntax, v-Ye could have chosen the approach used for head-
less relat es ,. That is, v.;e could have added a syntactical 
rule -~ R and R '"ri th Q in syntax rule 2. In 
the sernantics we '.Nould t.hen need a rule expressing 
IIQII 
CJ, 
r 
"" 1P 3a'1w'EVJ(p(vi') = 1+-+aEIIAII ) }, CJ, w 
eliminating r:·he on fo:r embedd.ed questions in rule 2. 
Such a v.rould be equ lent ·to the present one. 
Similar 1.ve could h.a ve chosen the approach used in the 
present t for ,e.mb(o:dded quest also in the case of 
headless relatives 
Rul 
For iEN we d.efin•": 
Pronoun~et]i_!"J.9 ~ 
11 r .· J 1• H j_ ! 
L NP IJ .. = {x c Eio.EX} ~ 
If a: is [he] NP i:hen for any even 1., iEIN 
<llri] II > 
- NP a is an i on of a: 
Gap opening: 
If a is [] NP t.hen for odd i. iEfl\1 
<ll[i] .11 NP cr ,, an interpretation of a 
NP-storage: 
If a is a SD of category NP not a \··H-I-term and 
< II t<fP II > 
a~ "~-'1'1 
is an interpretation of a 
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where II NPii on any term in cr , 
then for any even :l, 
<II [ i J P ls 21n 
l 
etation of a 
where 
i 
W ,w W Ew NP ) , ({ 0 , l } ) t, ~ ( { 0 , 1 } ) 
l 
such t 
I cP i 
a,w 
- 1} E: II NPII 
(J 'w 
<II NPII of a 
a ' 
Vlhere II NPII on any term in a, then for any odd 
i, i 
t~Je ·~, on of Ct 
}, 
where 
i 
' J 
'!I'J) then 
,_ .. 
I ~l:n 1 =·I ::JA(AE: II NPII 1\ aE A} '!. d.. ~ \l· 0 a cW a 
for alternative a) 
""l aEIINPII } 
a ,w 
for alternative b) 
- IV.24 -
NP-retrieval: 
If a is a SD of category S and 
<IISII ,(NP 1 ). , ••• ,(NP ). > l~n cr,w . 2 1 n 1n 
is an interpretation of a where i 1 , ••• , in are even numbers and 
] .;; k<; n, then 
< ( NPl ) . (II Sll ) ' ( NP] ) . I ••• 8 ( NPk J ) . 
-.;: 1k a ,w 1 1 .- lk-l 
{ NPk+l ) . , ... , ( NP ) . > ~+1 n ln 
is also an interpretation of a. 
1 .4. Nested storage. 
In this paragrapllu one of the most important restrictions on 
contained in the other, is removed to see whether the storage 
technique can accomplish the interpretations then required. 
1 .4.1. What is nested storage? 
Definition 8: Let a be a so of category NP where 
< II ctll , ( NP 1 ) . , . . . , ( NP ) . > 0~ n a w 1 n 1 
' l n 
is an interpretation of a such that llall depends on a., jE~. 
a, w J 
To apply storage on this interpretation is called nested storage. 
In other words, nested storage is to store a NP-intension contain-
ing an opening. This is prevented in the earlier fragments. Note 
that an interpretation without openings must have empty store or 
empty denotation part. ~fuether the opening results from previous 
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storage or pronoun/gap opening will not be distinguished. From a 
retrieval point of view, openings are recognized only by their 
correspondence to a term in cr, and will be treated in the same 
way no matter whether they result from the creation of a binding 
operator or from a pronoun/gap opening. 
To have an interpretation satisfying the conditions of defi-
nition 8, a NP II in Fragment 6 must be on one of the following 
forms: 
[NP[NP[NP VP] 8]RJNP non-restrictive relative 
[ Det[ N[ [ t~~t] [ NP VP] 8 ) [if N] NP restrictive relative 
[ NP [ NP VP J SJ RJ NP headless relative 
In other fragments of English, simpler NP-constructions containing 
NP-terms would be generated, i.e. by a syntax rule like 
NP ~ NP' and NP". The present fragment is not particularly fit 
for the study of nested storage as the examples all will be 
unnecessarily complicated. 
Nested storage is like simple storage motivated by wide scope 
readings of one of the following types: 
1 . Reversed quantifier scope readings 
2. De re readings 
3. Binding of pronouns. 
This gives 6 types of nested storage. For each of the three kinds 
mentioned above the interpretation of the NP-term in question may 
contain 
i) an even opening (with or without stored binding 
operator) 
ii) a gap opening 
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In the present fragment, case ii) will only occur if the NP-term 
is a part of a larger relative clause (containing two gaps). This 
does not occur in English, but is grammatically acceptable in 
Scandinavian languages (see Engdahl 1980). The storage mechanisms 
should consequently give an appropriate account even for such 
constructions. 
III 
·1 • 4, 2. Fragment 6 • 
The fragmen~t is presented as a series of alterations to 
Fragment 6 11 . 
Openings may nov.1 occur in the store, and consequently the 
safety mechanisms to prevent backwards binding and more than one 
gap opened on one term in o must be changed accordingly. The 
phrase structure interpretation rules must all be modified corre-
sponding to the following rewriting of the safety mechanisms iii} 
and iv) on page 7. 
iii)' If ( ) ( ) II All , NP 1 . , , •• , NP 0 depends on ok , ••• , ok 
o,w 1 1 n 1.n 1 J. 
then {k 1 , ••• ,k1 }n{j 1 , .•. ,jm} = ¢ 
iv)' If k , ... ,k and~ , ... ,kb are the odd terms in o that 
al ah 1 1 
IIAII ,(NP1 ). , ••• , (NP ). and a,w 1. 1 n ln 
IIBII , (NP +l) 0 , ••• , (NP , ) . depends on respectively, 
o , w n J 1 n-rm Jm 
then { k ' ... 'k } n { kb ' ' .. 'kb } = ¢ . 
a 1 ah -1 J. 
To allow nested storage, the storage rules and the rule for NP-
retrieval must be replaced by the following rules: 
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NP-storage: 
If a is a SD of category NP not a HH-term, 
< II NP 0 II , ( NP 1 ) . , ••• , ( NP ) . > 0<: n cr,w 11 n 1n 
is an interpretation of a, there is no iE~ such that 
II NP0 II = II [ i J..:rp II for all (j 1 W L (J g 'i;/ 
w 
crE E , wE tv and are 
even numbers, then for any even iEN such that i*i 1 , ••• ,in and 
II NP 0 11 does not depend on a 1., (J 'w 
where 
viR-storage: 
<II [ i] NP II , ( NP0 ) . , ( NP l ) . , ••• , ( NP ) . > cr,w 1 1 1 n 1n 
is an interpretation of a 
W Ew (tw 0 )i is the function (NP 0 )i:({O,l} ) ~ 
such that if <PE ( { 0,1} H) Ew then 
(NP 0 )i($)(cr)(w) = 1 iff {ai<P i =1 }Ell NP0 11 a ,w cr,w 
a 
If a is a HH-tern and 
< lltW 0 n , ( NP 1 ) . , ••• , ( NP ) . > 0< n cr,w 1 1 n 1n 
is an interpretation of a where i 1 , ••• ,in are even numbers, 
then for any odd iEN such that II NP 0 11 does not depend on a . (J, w 1 
<(Zl,(NP 0 ).,(NP 1 ). , ••• ,(l'W ). > 1 11 n 1n 
is an interpretation of a 
where 
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such that if 
function (NP 0 ) i: ( { 0,1} W) If'-+ 
cp E ( { 0 , 1 } H ) EfU then 
(NP0 ). (<j>)(cr)(v-r)=ja'<jl i =1 "3A(AEIINP0 11 A l. C5 CJ,W 
a,w 
· for alternative a) 
.
. l{ a I <P i =1 A aE II NP 0 11 } <J ,W CJ,W 
a 
for alternative b) 
NP-retrieval: 
If a is a SD of category S and 
<IISII ,(NP 1 ). , ••• ,(NP ). H;n cr,w 1.1 n l.n 
aEA} 
is an interpretation of a where i 1 , ••• ,in are even numbers, 
and kEft:J is a number such that 1 ( k( n and neither of 
(NP1 ). , ••• ,(NP }. depends on l.l n l.n CJ. , then l.k 
<(NPk). (IISII ),(NP,). , ... ,(NPk ,). I 
l.k CJ,W 1 1 - 1 k-1 
(NPk+l ). , ... ,(NP ). > 
l.k+l n l.n 
is also an interpretation of a. 
The modifications are all only in the semantic machinery, and 
would apply equally well to a fragment with the syntax of Fragment 
6 in Cooper (1983) with semantics modified similarly to the seman-
II tics of Fragment 6 . 
1.4.3. Examples. 
The examples are phrases generated by the syntax of Fragment 
6 II d an , hence, of Fraginent 6 in Cooper ( l 983) since the two frag-
ments have the same generative pm.rer. The interpretations that 
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require nested storage are not obtained in these fragments. To 
get examples that are more natural, we also use words that are not 
explicitely listed in the lexicon, and write the sentences morpho-
logically correct. The binding relations are indicated with 
arrows. The example with two gaps in one relative clause is for 
obvious reasons in Norwegian. The interpretation processes are 
loosely described, exact calculations can be found in Sem (1983, 
6) 
I. 5.3) • 
(l) Mary believes that a man who 
L.T 
loves her 
J 
admires a woman who hates him. 
To get the NP a man who loves her to corefer with him at the same 
time as Mary corefers with her in a man who loves her, a man who 
loves her must be stored with her open, and retrieved to have 
scope over the embedded sentence or over the whole sentence before 
~ is retrieved to bind her. The intended interpretation is 
obtainable in fragment 6 111 , and by choosing a man who loves her 
to have scope over the embedded sentence, we get 7 ) : 
«II Maryll , II Sll 2 >E II believell 2 > 
a ,w crll Maryll ,w crll Haryll ,w 
cr,w cr,w 
where 
-II Sll 2 is cr , vl II Maryll 
cr, w 
:Jb.::!y(<b,IIMary\1 >EIIlovesll 2 3 1\ bEIImanll 2 
(J I w (J II rvtaryll c 'w a II Maryll , w 
1\<b,y>EIIadmires\1 2 4 
criiMaryll b'w 
cr,w 
A<y, b>t II hates \I 2 4 5 1\ yE II womanll 2 4 
0 11Maryll b a'w criiMaryll b,w> 
cr,w cr,w 
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( 2) Every man who loves, Mary, 
t l -!/' 
E1 
I 
+-
says that he needs her 
In this example every man v,rho loves Hary is to corefer with he at 
the same time as Mary is to corefer with her. To obtain this, 
both Mary and every man who loves Ivlary must be stored or, to be 
exact, Mary must be stored first, and then every man who loves i, 
with a binding operator on i for Mary in the store, must be 
stored. Both the stored NP's must have scope over the full 
sentence, and for -technical reasons every man viho loves i must be 
retrieved before Mary in order to have i bound by Hary. Just 
before retrieval, the situation can informaly be described like 
this: 
<IIi says that i needs jll , (Every man who loves j)., (Mary) . > 
a,w ~ J 
Since the first binding operator depends on the term bound by the 
second, the second binding operator cannot be retrieved before the 
first. Mary therefore gets scope over Every man who loves j. In 
this case however, this has no serious side effects. Formally, 
the obtained interpretation will be 
<'lia( (<a, IIMaryll >EIIlovesll A aEIImanll )--+ 
a,w a,w a,w 
<a,IISII It 2 >EIIsaysll )> 
a a w 
a IIMaryll ' 
a ,w 
where 'liwEH, 
IISII It 2 (i-v)=(<a,IIHaryll >EIIneedsll It 2 a a a 
a IIMaryll a IIMaryll 
a,w a,w 
that can be paraphrased as 
1:;/a[(a loves !1ary A a is a man)~{a says that a needs Hary)]. 
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( 3 ) Every man who loves 1i woman, 
L ~ 
.I 
t 
says that he needs her 
This example is just like (2), exept that Mary is replaced by~ 
woman. In this case, the fact that a woman must have scope over 
every man who loves i does have serious side effects. As in (2), 
we obtain the intended coreferentiality, but there is no way to 
obtain the main reading of this sentence, namely the reading with 
the indicated coreferentiality and with Every man who loves i 
having scope over a woman. 
( 4) B) Enhver hest 
Every horse 
en mann som 
(som) 
that 
r~lari kj enner 
Hary knows 
.,·r 
,____e_i_e_r_..._..,~ , kas t er ham a v 
a man th,_,a_t _ _,~ ovms throws him off t ~1-------------------~ 
To have en mann som eier bind ham, en mann som eier 
must have scope over the full sentence. This means we have to 
store en mann som eier j with an open gap until the full sen-
------------===-------
tence is constructed. Technically, this will not work, since WH-
retrieval is obligatory at relative clause formation and retrieval 
cannot take place while a corresponding opening is in the store. 
To get an interpretation at all, en mann som eier j must be 
--------------~==~-------
retrieved before relative clause formation if stored at all, and 
we thereby lose the possibility of coreference with anything out-
side the relative clause. The interpretation we do obtain, may be 
paraphrased as 
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'dbEIIhesterll (3aEIImannll (Mari kjenner a A a eier b) 
cr,w cr,w 
~ (b kaster a 2 av)), 
a solution varying with a 2 • This is not the intended interpreta-
tion since is not bound to a. 
1 ,5. Storage limitations. 
~Je have that 
Quantifier scope depends on the order of retrieval. The earlier 
the retrieval, the narrower the scope. 
De re/de dicta De re readings are obtained by storage 
Binding Coreferentiality is obtained by interpreting different 
openings in an S denotation by the same individual. This is 
implemented by storing and retrieval. 
III In fragement 6 we also have that 
At nested storage, an outer NP-term must be retrieved before inner 
Obviously this may lead to difficulties, i.e. if we want an outer 
UP-terra to have \Jider scope than an inner. To retrieve an outer 
NP-term before an inner is in any case a precarious principle. 
The least natural quantifier order is enforced, that is the order 
opposite to the order given from left to right in the phrase. The 
question is ''vhether another strategy for reformulation of the 
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storage and retrieval mechanisms would give a better result, or 
whether this is a problem implicit to the storage technique 
itself. 
To obtain coreferentiality between openings (at the same term 
in cr), it is necessary to retrieve on a semantic unit, either on 
the denotation part or on one of the binding operators. Retrieval 
on the entire interpretation or parts of it not forming a semantic 
unit will not give coreferentiality. In addition to the retrieval 
III definition given in Fragment 6 , we have the following possibi-
lities: 
J ) To retrieve on the denotation part of an interpretation 
of a SD of a category different from S. 
2) To retrieve on a binding operator. 
Alternative 1 gives the possibility of NP-scopes over phrases of 
other categories than s. This could eliminate some of the cases 
of conflict between de re/de dicto readings and narrow/wide scope, 
but cannot remove the problem entirely. A better solution with 
respect to quantifier order would not be obtained. For alterna-
tive 2), we could define the composition of two binding operators 
like this: 
Definition 9: If (NP). and (NP'). are two binding operators 
l. J 
such that i' j are even numbers and (NP I) . J 
(NP) . ( (NP') . ) is the function 
l. J 
w w 
(NP.((NP'.)):({O,l}W)E + ({O,l}W)E such that if 
l J 
then 
depends on cr . , then 
l. 
( NP ) 0 ( ( NP ' ) 0 ) ( <!> ) ( cr ) ( w ) 
l J = 1 iff {al{blc!> j i =l}EIINP'II i }E:IINPII crb ,w cr cr,w a a,w 
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However, this is even less satisfactory, forcing both ~W-terms to 
have scope over the same phrase while maintaining to give the 
reversed quantifier order. 
Our conclusion is therefore that extension of the storage 
mechanisms to UP-terms containing NP-terms is possible, but forces 
the reversed quantifier order at nested storage. This does not 
III 
matter as long as we keep ·to binding of pronouns. Fragment 6 
works satisfact.orily for (1) and (2). The problem appears in 
(3) and (4) where binding and scope relations interfere. The 
problem is essentially the same in these examples (though it mani-
fests itself slightly differently): conflict between binding and 
scope. In example (3) the binding enforces the reversed quantifier 
order, and the left--to- right order would have blocked the intended 
binding relation. In (4), the intended binding relation is 
blocked by the obligatory scope order. The HH-word can be regarded 
as a scope marker for the vJH-binding, and vVH-retrieval is obliga-
tory at formation of the relative clause. A stored opening must 
be retrieved before it can be bound. Thus if the NP A contains 
a NP B but not the NP C, that is, we have a SD on the form 
• • • [ ' ' ' [ B ) NP ' • ' J NP • ' • [ C ) NP • ' • 
( or ' . ' [ C J NP " • ' [ . • • [ B J NP •• ' ) NP ' •• ) ) 
B cannot corefer vdth or have "vider scope than C without also 
having wider scope than A. 
The problem rises from the co~bination of manipulation of 
quantifier scope (or de re/de dicta reading) and binding through 
the same ~echanism, the one enforcing a retrieval order conflict-
ing \vi th the retrieval order required by the other. This is not a 
- IV. 35 -
consequence of the nested storage. The same problem occurs in the 
sentence 
( 5) Every man who loves 1a woman 1 needs her, 
L_J I t 
a variety of the so-called "donkey sentence" (after Geach, 1962). 
In the following sentence we have an example of conflict between 
quantifier scope and de re reading: 
( 6) The detective thinks a psychopath killed three 
freemasons. 
on the reading that the detective is not yet aware of the fact 
that the three victims were freemasons, so that a psychopath is to 
be read de dicto while three freernasons is to be read de re with-
out having wider scope han a psychopath. An example of conflict 
between binding relation and de dicto reading is 
(7) John seeks 1a unicorn 1 because he wants to ride on it 
~------------------------------~ 
where a unicorn is to be read de dicto. To use the same 
mechanisms to obtain coreferentiality and de re/de dicto readings, 
and to manipulate quantifier scopes invariably leads to this kind 
of problems. 
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2. The Discourse Representation Systems 
2.1. Introduction. 
In this section ·>ve 1N'ill study the approach to quantifier 
scope and anaphoric relation between noun phrases developed by 
Hans Kamp in "A Theory· of Truth and Semantic Representation" Kamp 
(1981) as opposed to the Cooper approach as presented in the first 
section. The Discourse Representation Systems (DRS) of Kamp (1981) 
are designed to 9ive an account of meaning both as "that which 
determines condit of truth" and as "that which a language user 
grasps when he understands the words he hears or reads" (Kamp 
1981, sect. i). Kamp has two central concerns in his choice of 
fragment in (Karop 1981) namely "(a) to study the anaphoric 
behaviour of personal pronouns; and (b) to formulate a plausible 
account of the truth conditions of the so-called 'donkey--senten-
ces'" (Kamp 1981, sect. 1 
Cooper and Kamp both keep the syntax and semantics of their 
systems s·trictly apart and avoid using semantic motivation for the 
syntax defin This allows us in the following to interpret 
a slightly modified version of Fragment 6 11 by a DRS-semantics. 
The semantics presented below will be a modified and extended 
version of the system presented in Kamp (1981 }. The modifications 
are mainly cosmetic and the main features of the system are 
preserved. 
2,2. !:, II - Fragment 6 -syntax and DRS~sem~ntic~. 
We will follow Ka~p in allowing relative clauses to combine 
only with basic terms or common nouns and not with derived phrases 
Q' 
of category T or CN"'J. That is, the following constructions 
corresponding to a T or CN already specified or restricted by a 
- IV, 37 -
relative clause being further specified or restricted, will be 
prevented: 
T CN 
/""' / ""' T RC CN RC 
~ / '""' T RC CN RC 
On the other hand the fol construction for terms containing 
more than one relative clause will be permitted~ 
CN 
/ ""-, 
CN 
TV 
T RC 
That is, the fragment will generate relative clauses on the basis 
of tenus with relative clause constituents, In paragraph 2.4 we 
will discuss some approaches allowing more than one non-restric-
tive relative to the same CN. Nevertheless, the fragment below 
v-.rill be sufficiently rich to illustrate the quantifier scope pro-
blems and anaphoric relations which we have focused on above 
(1.4.3, LS), 
For the present, we will ignore the problem of intensionality 
and keep to a purely extensional fragment, The DRS-system is not 
fit for the intensionali~cy treatement of possible world semantics. 
I believe that with the choice of another base structure, for 
instance the situation semantics of Barwise and Perry (1983), a 
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fruitful account also for the phenomena we usually cathegorize as 
intensional can be given. 
From these simplifications, it follows automatically that TV-
expressions taking S obj(:::cts and intensional TV's like seek 
ll be tted from L 1 ,. 
To avoid the overgenerating capacity resulting from the non-
trans forma·tional cons of relative clauses on the basis of 
WH-words and gaps as v1ords of category NP (Det), the relative 
clause construction ll be as in L0 in Kamp (1981 ). As far as 
only acceptable ses are concerned, the DRS-construction is not 
affected by this choice. The determiners a and every are 
syncategorematical in·troduced, and the fragment contains condi-
tionals. is to be an extension of L0 ; the lexicon and names 
for the syntax categories are as in L0 • To emphasize the analogy 
between Fragment and I . h , t. e 
II the same order as in Fragment 6 , 
2.3. Fragment L 1 , 
2.3.L Syntax. 
syntactic rules are given in 
L1 contains expressions of the following categories with the 
following basic members~ 
l ) T: 
2) CN: farmer, donkey, window, man, woman, 
3) IV: 
4) TV: 
5) s 
6) RC 
~ 
7 s 
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The terms he, she and it are called pronouns. 
Formation rules 
FR 1 ) : 
FR2): 
FR3,k: 
FR4): a) 
b) 
c) 
FRS): 
If aEIV, ~ET then ~aES 
If aETV, ~ET then a~'EIV where 
him 6 if ~ = he 6 
~ ' = her 6 if ~ = she 6 
~ otherwise 
where 6 is possibly the empty string. 
If <VES and the k-th v1ord in q., is a pronoun, then 
that <V'ES where q.,' is the result of eliminating the 
k-th word from q.,. 
If aERC and ~ is a basic T or formed by FR4 b) 
then ~aE T. 
i) a ( n)a 
.] If aECN then ET ii) every 
If aERC and a starts with what or whoever then aET 
If a is a basic CN, 
{RC and ~ starts with who/whom/which ~E -
s 
then a~ECN 
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FR6, k) : If ~cS and the k-th word of ¢ is a pronoun, then 
FR7): 
~~'ERC 6 where ~' comes from ~ as in FR3k), and 
\who/~/which according as the pronoun is 
[he, she/him, her/it respectively 
~ is l or 
If 
Lwhat if the prounon is it, whoever otherwise. 
then 
and 
if 
if 
<P.~ 
<P then 
Note: FR3,k) would not be sufficient for the construction of 
that S-phrases in a fragment containing that S-phrases 
other than relative clauses. L1 is a purely extensional 
fragment without_ sentence embedding verbs. The problem with 
the two kinds of that S-phrases is thus avoided. 
~tax terminologx 
Definition 10: ~1 -discourse is an ordered n-tupple of 
expressions of category S in L1 
synatic analyses for D. The nodes in -.,, ... ,-.n can be uniquely 
numbered, e.g. by the leftmost branch principle. 
Definition 11: An occurrence of an expression a in D (rela-
tive to a syntactic analysis) is an ordered couple <a,n> where 
n is the index of the connection node for a in the syntactic 
analysis of D. 
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Let y be a L 1-expression 
Definition 12: If the rule applied last in the construction of 
y is FRl or FR2, then y is formed by combining a term a 
with a IV or TV ~-
Then 
- a is the main term in y 
a ' is the term vii th maximal scope in y, 
where a:' =f If the rule applied last in the construction of 
~ is FR4 a} then a is formed by combining a term 
! tvi th a RC p • Let a' be this term 
t a: otherwise. 
The term lfli th maximal scope is the main term without non-restric-
tive relatives. The reason to single out non-restrictive relatives 
this way is the special position non-restrictive relatives hold in 
the semantics. They are intended to give supplementary information 
about the object(s) determined by the rest of the term, and do not 
give substantial contribution to the determination of the 
object( s). 
He will follow Cooper (1983 Ch IV 2.3) in interpreting head-
less relatives as if they contained a hidden universal: 
Definition 13: If the rule applied last in the construction of y 
is FRl or FR2 and the term with maximal scope starts with every, 
whoever or ~~ then y is called a universal sentence or a uni-
versal IV respectively. If the rule applied last in the construe-
tion of y is FR7, y is called a conditional. The term with 
maximal scope in a universal sentence or IV is called a ~niversal 
term 
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( 8) y = A man Wl!O loves Mary runs 
Syntatic analysis 1 ~ l ~ JA man viho loves Mary runs 
~0-, / ~ ~· '"" 
2: A man who loves Hary 11 :runs 
I 
IFR!Jb) i) 
3 : nan vJho lo•les Hary 
4 5: 'tJ:""tlO loves Hary 
i 
I FR6, l 
I 
6: he loves Hary 
R· u • A 9~ loves 10: Mary 
is the 'cerm with maximal scope in y 
as well a.s the main term. 
Syntac·tic 
FR4b) i) FR6, l 
4. man 6: he loves Mary 
/' /FR~ 
// "" 
7' he a, lo~ 
9: loves 10: Mary 
With s a man who loves still the main terM 
a man. 
for how to desc~ 
subrnc;~:!e:l.s ctf 
tion of t rL'.th in ~th<? ::"UCh c 
lf'le use 1. 1 s and some 
variables cal deac be submodels. Given 
a L 1-discourse we consc system", 
c:u1 ordered sys r_E:rl of '''dis at: ions"" describing simple 
submodel:s on a small refr:::rents, The dis-
course l.l represented by 
the scourse rspresenta ~e is a mapping from 
the discours.s :nodel, sa·tis fying the 
cor1di t.i ons i 
Definition l ture on the form 
H = <U F> 
. ) l. u is a n_on set 
ii) F ari ion each 
n::JJne in to an element of U 
basic C::N or IV in to a subset of U 
basic in L to a set of ordered rs of members of 
U, 
The pronouns do not get any i F. This corresponds 
to the ope ~:o·tatio:n of pronc,_ms in ·the fragements in 
part 1 (and to the of gaps, as L1 uses pronouns 
instead of gaps in the construct of relative clauses.) 
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Definition 15: Let V be a countable set of entities none of 
which is a basic expression in L1 or a string of such express-
ions. V is called the set of discourse referents. 
Definition 16: For any subset X c V of V, let L1 (X) be the 
result of adding the members of X as basic terms (expressions of 
category T) to L1 • Let ~l~ be L1 (X) extended with the 
symbols =, ( , ) r and the syn'tactical rules: 
i) If uEX, a a proper name, then u=a ES 
ii) If uEX, aECN then a ( u) E S 
In Ll (X) the following is a derived rule: 
iii) If uEX, o1ao 2ES, aE'l', then o1 uo 2ES 
Definition 17: Let y be an expression in Ll(X), yES. y may 
then be of one of the following three kinds: 
i) y is on the form If 0 1 ,o 2 or If o1 then o2 , 
o1 ,o 2Es in L1 (X), and y is called a conditional. 
ii) y is on the form a~, aET, ~EIV in L1 (X), and y is 
called a simple sentence 
iii) y is an expression of Ll (X)~L 1 (X), and is called a 
'f' ( ' . )10) qual~ y~ng sentence qual1f1er . 
Definition 18: If y is a Li(X)-expression, yES, and all the 
well-formed subexpressions of y (including y itself) that are 
also expressions in L1 
category in L 1 , then y 
are basic expressions of some syntactic 
is called an atomic sentence in Li (X). 
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The following table gives examples of the kind of sentences we 
have defined in definition 17 and 18. 
Table: Examples of atomary and non-atomic sentences. 
non-atomic atomic 
conditional If Pedro owns a donkey, he beats it 
qualifying sentence who loves Hary(u) man ( u) man 
u;=Pedro 
-
sentence Pedro u runs owns a simple donkey loves u v~ 
I 
u,v are discourse referents. 
If y is a non-atomic simple sentence in 
the longest well-formed subexpresson of y 
L 1 (X), let 
in L 1 (X) 
y' denote 
not on the 
form u6 or o u, where o is of any syntax category, and u is 
a discourse referent. 
Proposition: If y is a non-atomic simple sentence in L 1 (X), y' 
is on the form a~ where aET, ~EIV, or y' is on the form ~a 
where a:ET, ~ETV. 
Proof: Suppose this is not the case. Since y is a simple sen-
tence, y must be on the form a~, o:ET, ~EIV. y' is not on this 
form, so y'*Y• and a must be a discourse referent. y is non-
atomic, so ~ can not be a basic IV and is thus on the form 
~'a', ~'ETV, a'ET. Again, y' is not on this form, so y'*~ and 
a' must be a discourse referent. But all the expressions of cate-
gory TV are basic, so in this case y is atomary, contradicting 
the premises. 
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Definition 19: If y is a non-atomic simple sentence in L 1 (x), 
the main term and the term with maximal scope in y is then as in 
y', and y is said to be universal if y' is a universal sen-
tence or IV. 
Definition 20: If y 1 and y2 are Li(x)-expressions, and y2 
comes from yl exclusively by the use of the rules i)-iii) under 
definition 1 6' then y2 is a descendant of y 1 • 
Definition 21: If D is a L1-discourse, <o,k> an occurrence in 
L 1 of an expression in D, then <o' ,k> is an occurrence in 
L1(x) of 6 in D if o'=o or 6' is a descendant of o . If 
o' is a descendant of 6, we say that <6 ', k> is a descendant of 
<o,k>. 
Discourse Representation 
Notation 2: Indexed or primed V's are used for denoting sets of 
discourse referents (subsets of V), while subsets of the universe 
U are denoted by indexed or primed U's. 
Definition 22: A possible DR (Discourse Representation) of the 
L 1 -discourse D is an ordered pair <V ,Con > where: m m 
i) 
ii) 
v c v 
m-
Conm consists of occurrences in L1 of expressions in D 
or descendants in Ll (X) of such occurrences. 
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Definition 23: If m and m' are possible DR's for D, 
m' extends m if V c V , and Con c Con , . Moreover, m";::m+m' 
m- n m- m 
(or m' added to m) is also a possible DR for D where 
m+m' = <V U V , , Con U Con , > 
m m m m 
( 9) D = <Mary loves a man who owns a donkey> 
Syntactic analysis: 
1 : Mary loves a man who owns a donkey 
~-----2: Mary 3: loves a man who owns a donkey 
~4: loves s~ a man who owns a donkey 
6: man \vho I owns a donkey 
7: ma~i1s- a donkey 
I 9: he owns a donkey 
~10: he 11: owns a donkey 
/~ 
12: owns 13: aldonkey 
14: donkey 
m: u,v,w 
1 : <Hary loves a man who owns a donkey, 1 > 
2: <u=~1ary, 2> 
3: <u loves a man \vho awns a donkey, 1 > 
4~ <man who owns a donkey ( v), 6> 
5: <u loves v, l > 
6: <man ( v) , 7> 
7: <v owns a donkey, 9> 
8: <donkey (wL 14> 
9: <v owns w, 9> 
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m is a possible DR for D. The occurrences in lines 1, 3, 5, 7 
and 9 are occurrences of simple sentences, while the occurrences 
in lines 2, 4, 6 and 8 are occurrences of qualifiers, the occurr-
ence in line 4 being non-atomic. 1 is an occurrence in L1 , while 
2 is a decendant in L~-(x) of the occurrence <Mary,2> in L 1 . 
Definition 24: Let m be a possible DR for D. An occurrence 
in Con is called unreduced if Con contains no descen-
m m 
dant of subexpressions of <o ,n>. 
m is called maximal if every unreduced element in 
occurrence of either of the following kinds: 
i) atomic sentence 
ii) conditional 
iii) universal sentence 
Con 
m 
is an 
Definition 25: A partial DRS (Discourse Representation Structure) 
is an ordered triple <K,A,E> where: 
I K is a set of possible DR's such that 
Vm_1 ,m2EK(Con neon = ¢) m1 m2 
II A, E c KxK such that ArlE=¢ and AU E is a partial function 
from K to K that can be extended to a partial ordering 
< on K with the same domain as AU E. 
III Unique origin of the occurrences of a DR: 
VmEK[3m1 EK (m<m1 )~ 3m2EK(m<m2 A J8 2EConm2veEConm 
( e a descendant of a subexpression of e 2 )) ] . 
- IV.49 -
IV The ordering preserves descendance for occurrences: 
( 1 0) 
If u 
mEK 
Con 
m 
contains two occurrences and 
e1 EConm I e2 Econ2 for m1 I ~EK such that e2 is a 
1 
decendant of a subexpression of e1 , then m1)m2 . 
D = <Every man loves a woman> 
m0 : l <Every man loves a woman, 1 > 
v u 
<man(v),3< <v loves a woman, 1 > 
<woman (u), 7> 
<v loves u, 1 > 
When a DR raEDom(A), ~11 possible mappings from the discourse 
referents in m compatible v.ri th mappings for the DRS that make m 
true in the model will be necessary in the evaluation of truth for 
the discourse. On the other hand, when a DR mEDom(E), the exi-
stence of such a mapping is sufficient. So in (10) we want 
the discourse to be true in a model if whenever v is mapped to a 
man in the model, there is a mapping for u such that u is a 
woman and v loves u. 
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Definition 26: Let be possible DRs in the DRS <K,A,E> 
or m < m 
-1-JIU E-2 
if 
If <m 1 ,m2 >EA we write m1 < l\m2 and 
if <ml ,m2 >EE we write ml < r,m.;. 
.t:; ,t; 
nate to m2 , or r:'!_l <m2 
if 
there is a chain of iab~ s nate DRs from m1 to m2 • 
If K contains a element mo such that 
mEK, then m0 is the pr~ncipal element. of K. 
) 
Notation 3: K (m) = {m EK I rn';;;m} 
Vr=U ,..-V K rncK m 
Vk;;; (m) = U { V , I m' E K> (m)} 
m· 
ConK= U E KCon m _ m 
for every 
Definition 27: Let 8EConK be an occurrence in the DRS D = <K,A,E> 
e unreduced in D 
if 
ConK contains no descendant of a subexpression of e and e is 
not atomic, 
Definition 28: He say that a partial DRS <K,A,E> 
i) Every element in K is maximal 
ii) No occurrence in Con K is unreduced. 
is complete if 
Note that as a C011S of de ition 25 and 28 i), any partial 
DRS cannot, l::Je e.?d::ended ng occurrences and possibly some 
new DR's to a_ DRS. If a subexpression of an occur-
renee e ha,s a (iescen~da_._n·t that is not also a descendant of a 
s s of a ccndit or universal subexpression of e, 
or o£ a on t.he form a~ , o:E 'I', BE: RC, in some DR 
other than the DR ng 8, the DRs in the partial DRS 
cannot be made 1 thou.t violating condition I in definition 
25. 
DRS construction ules. 
Notation 4: r 
the resul i: of f~rting v to the k-th position in l;, 
-if y E RC US an..:J y cmnes f:com I; FR3,k or FR6,k. 
~ the resul of ac the main term in y with v if y 
is a s rn.ol~~_=""a_t()rnic- sentence"' 
Let DRS, mE:K, m0 the principal 
element st subset of K containing m having a 
principal element, 8E ' 8 unreduced in J), e = <y ,k>. 
~.r ,<x,s> are the occurrences 
of the antecedent and conses respectively. 
Add to K: m1 = 0,{<~.r>}> 
m2 ~- r.zL r < v s > l > ' " l /\.,. J 
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C2. y is a simple sentence. 
Let a denote t,he term with maximal scope in y, and r the index 
of the occurrence of a: as the term with maximal scope in y • 
r~ 
1 v~ (m) such that v is suitable if 
1 1 ) 
a: is a pronoun 
Choose a vE: 
v v 
K 
-
othervdse 
a must be either of the following: 
a) a pronoun 
b) a proper name 
c) an indefinite term 
d) a universal term. 
Let I; denote a ::::: 2 in case b. In case 
form a 
-
~ ' ~ery ~ or what 0 ' whoever 6, 
or vo respectively. 
According to whether a is of type a) ' b) ' 
a) 
b) add <{v},{<l;,r>}> to rna, 
c) add < { v} , { <I; , r> } > to rn, 
d) add ml = <{ v}, <1;,r>}> to K, 
If a: is not the main term of y , then the 
form a: p , p E: RC. Let s denote the index of 
of y' and 
add m' = <¢,,{ <p[ vj ,s>} to K, 
c)-d), a is on the 
let 1;: denote ~ ( v) 
c) or d): 
let rnl denote rn 
let ml denote m 
let ml denote m 
add <m 1 ,rn> to A 
main term is on the 
p in the main term 
and <m' ,m1 > to E 
In case: 
a)-c): 
d) 
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add <¢, { <y [ v J , k>} > to m1 
add m2 = <yj,{<y[vJ ,k>}> to K 
C3. L-i_s a qualifier, y is on the form ~p(u), ~ECN, pERC. 
Let r,s denote the indices of the occurrences of ~.p in y 
respectively. 
add <¢,{<~(u),r>,<p[uj,s>}> tom 
C4. y is a sequence of sentences, y :::: y1, ... ,yn and kl, ... ,kn 
is the indices of the occurrences of r,, ... ,yn in y respec-
tively. 
add <<!J ' { <yl ,kl >, • '.,<yn,kn>} > to m. 
Definition 29: Any complete DRS obtained from a partial DRS 
<K,A,E> by a sequence of applications of the rules Cl-C4 is 
called a completion of <K,A,E> 
Definition 30: A DRS ~ =<K,A,E> is a DRS for the L 1-discourse 
D=y (relative to a syntax analyses for D> 
if 
D is obtained from <{ <¢,{ <y,k>}>} ,¢,¢>, where k is the index 
of y in the syntax analysis for D, by a sequence of 
applications of the rules C1-C4. 
Well-definedness of the DRS-construction in L 1 
We want to shov1 that starting with the partial DRS 
.D=<{ <¢, { <y ,k>} >} ,¢,¢> for the L1-discourse D==y, a completion of 
.1J v1i 11 give us a complete DRS for D. Horeover, we want this DRS 
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to reflect the universal sentences/IVs, the conditionals and the 
non-restrictive relatives. 
The proof goes by induction on the construction of DRSs as is 
sketched belmv: 
Let D=y be a L 1-discourse. 
Induction hypothesis: D = <K,A,E> satisfies the definitions 25 
and 30, and if 6ECon , mEK and 9 is unreduced in m, then 
m 
a) 
or b) 
e is unreduced in ConK 
e is reduced in ConK' and 9 is a [uni versa! J d conditional an 
there is a pair of DRs m1 ,m2EK such that m1 <Am, m2<Eml 
and m1 contains an occurrence of a descendant of the 
runi versal termJ~ ~ contains an occurance of a descendant antecedent ' ~ 
of [the ~onsequent} 
1. :D = <{ <¢, { <y ,k>} >} ,¢,¢> is a parial DRS for D as D 
trivially satisfies the induction hypothesis. 
2. If D = <K,A,E> satisfies the induction hypothesis, the 
application of one of the rules Cl-C4 for DRS-construction 
preserves the conditions of the induction hypothesis. 
3. Each of the rules Cl-C4 for DRS-construction leads to the 
reduction of one occurrence in ConK together with the 
addition of some new occurence(s) to ConK. The occurrences 
added to ConK will have smaller parts of the longest 
subexpression also an expression in L1 of the reduced 
occurence, as their longest subexpression also an expression 
in L1 . l.s y is finite, having a finite number of 
subexpressions, this process must stop because no occurrence 
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in ConK is unreduced in D. Hhen no occurrence in ConK 
is unreduced in D, every DR in K must be maximal since 
V satisfies the induction hypothesis, and D satisfies 
definition 28, and is thus a complete DRS for the L -1 
discourse D. 
We have no¥! shown that a completion of D = < { <¢, { <y, k>} >} , ¢, ¢> 
will give a complete DRS for the discourse D = <y>. Note that 
the construction rules Cl-C4 preserves the property that no 
conditional or universal occurrence e is reduced in the DR 
that contains it. In a complete DRS for D, there will thus be a 
Moreover, if 
in the terminology of Kamp (1981 ). 
8ECon , 8 = <a~y,j>, ~ 
m 
a non-restrictive relative 
to the term a, then in a complete DRS for D, there is a m'EK, 
m'< m such that Con' contains 8', 8'=<~[vJ ,k> and Con E m m 
contains <y[vJ,j>, v a discourse referent. 
Note also that L 1 
sense that if y 
is an extension of L0 in Kamp (1981) in the 
is a L 0 -expression then y is also a L -1 
expression, and if i) = <K 1 ,A,E> is a complete DRS in Ll for 
the L 0 -discourse D, then Ko will be a L 0 -DRS for D, where Ko 
is exactly like K 1 except for the deletion of all occurrences of 
non-atomic qualifiers and sequences of sentences. 
2.3.3 Truth 
Let M = <U ,F> 
M be a L 1-model and let D = <K,A,E> be a complete 
DRS for the L 1-discourse D. A denotes as usual the empty 
function 
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Dl ~ D is true in H on the reading .D 
D2: 
D3: 
(rela·tive to the function c:X + UM, X c V) if 
If 
f verAm 
f verEm 
A(Uc) verE m0 in M 
l 2) 
and ~ VK (m) c X c V, 
f verifies m in M, f ver m 
iff 
iff 
i) 
ii) 
f verAm 
f verEm 
v 
m VgEUM (fUg 
v 
3 gEV Mm( fUg 
if 
if mE dom(A) 
if mEdom(E) 
lim' (m' < m + ver m + 
e AIJE 
ver m A \im ' ( m ' < AU Em + e 
fUg ver m' ) ) 
fUg ver m' ) ) 
This is well-defined since AUE is a total function on K'{m0 }, 
AnE = ¢ and all chains of subordiniate DRs end in an atomic DR 
(in the domain of E). 
D4: If m is a DR, X~ V such that every atomic expression in 
Conm is a Ll (X)-expression, and f is a function 
05: 
f:X + UM, 
If 
in 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
rn is elementa_EY verfied in H by f, f ver m 
e-
if 
every atomic occurrence in Con is true in 
m 
M by 
Xc V, e = <<!; 'k> is an occurrence of an atomic sentence 
-
L1 (X) I then q; is on one of the following forms: 
u=a vlhere uEV, a a proper name 
a ( u) \!here uEV, a a basic CN 
ua where uEV, a a basic IV 
uav where u,vEV, a a basic TV 
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If f is a function, f:X ~ UM, 
e is true in M by f 
if 
a) f(u) = F (ex ) 
b,c) f(u) E F (a) 
d) <f(u), f ( v) > E F (ex ) 
(11) D = <Enhver hest som Hari kjenner en mann som eier, kaster 
ham av> 
DRS: = <K,A,E> where 
mo: u 
<Enhver hest sorn Hari kjenner en mann som eier, kaster ham 
av, 1 > C2d) 
<u=Mari, 7> 
--------------------------------~· ----~,·-·-,- .. 
w,v 
m1 : <hest sam Mari kjenner en mann sorn eier(w), 3> C3 
<hest (w), 4> 
<Mari kjenner en mann som eier w, 5> C2b) 
<u kjenner en mann som eier w, 5> C2c) 
<mann som eier w(v), ll> C3 
<u kjenner v, 5> 
<mann (v), 12> 
<v eier w, 13> 
m2 : <·wkasterhamav, l>C2a) 
<w kaster v av, 1 > 
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which gives D the truth conditions: 
3 x(x=MARI A Vy,z[ (HEST(z) A MARl KJENNER y A ~ffiNN(y) A y EIER z)-+ 
z KASTER y AVj) 
with the coreferentiality as indicated in the first section. 
At first sight it may be a surprise that an existential term like 
en mann is represented by a V-quantifier. We recoginze, however, 
the following equivalence from first order logic: 
'Hhen x is not free in <);: 
An existential term in the antecedent being bound by a V-quanti-
fier outside the implication is thus in complete accordance with 
first order logic. At coreferentiality betw·een the antecedent and 
the consequent, the variable is free in the consequent, and the 
quantifier movement is therefore not allowed. 
2. 4 Some remarks on the Fragment L1 
Relatively to a syntactic analysis for a discourse in L 1 , 
each occurrence in the discourse can be reduced in only one way, 
except possibly for the choice of discourse referent. Thus any two 
complete DRSs for a discourse D based on the same syntactic 
analysis of D will be alphabetic variants of each other except 
possibly for the choice of discourse referents for pronomina. So 
far, we have ignored the consequences of the reduction order to 
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the coreferentiality. To prevent backwards binding we might want 
the reduction order to be from left to right. This can be imple-
mented by requiring the nodes in the syntactic analyses to be 
numbered according to the reading direction, and the occurrences 
to be reduced in increasing order. 
Kamp does not give any definition for deictic use of prono-
mina. One possibility is to split off a subset of the set of dis-
course referents V, say V' c V (or to choose some other set 
V'). Then given an assignement c:V' ~ UM, we could choose dis-
course referents for the deictic pronomina from V', for other 
terms from v,v·. This strategy is indicated in the truth defini-
tions. 
For a fragment permitting more than one non-restrictive rela-
tive to the same term, the following modifications can be made to 
the syntax definition of L 1 : 
Replace FR6,k by 
FR6 ' n, k 1 , ••• , k n: If <jJl, ... ,<jJnES and the k .-th word ]_ 
a. where a. is either he/him she/her or 
]_ l. 
i=l u ® G ~ n, then ~ 1 <V l ' . . . , ~ n <V ~ E RC (the last 
replaced by 'and'), where comes from 
FR3,k, and ~ . l. is 
who/whom/which according to~ 
whether the k. -th word in 
l. 
or 
what (only if n=l ) 
in <jJ. is ]_ 
it for 
corruna may be 
tV· l. as in 
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The rules making other use of RCs than as non-restrictive rela-
tives needs a restriction against the RC being made up from more 
than one S. In addition, the first part of notation 4 must be 
replaced by: 
Let y[vj, vEV denote 
- the result of inserting v to the 
k.-th 
1 
position in c: . 
1 
for each i=l, ... ,n, where 
y E RC U S and y comes from C: 1 , ••• , C: n by FR3, k 
and n=l or FR6'n,k 1 , ... ,kn 
The alterations given above express a non-recursive analysis of 
terms with more than one non-restrictive relative. The non-res-
trictive relatives are understood as a sequence of co-ordinate 
clauses rather than as a hierarchy of terms with one non-restric-
tive relative to each ·term. Some alternative strategies for the 
analysis of non-restrictive relatives can be illustrated as 
follows: 
1 ) co-ordinate non-restrictive 2) A hierarchy of terms with 
relatives subordinate to one non-restrictive to 
only one term each term. 
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{ <mi,m1>! i=2, ... ,}EE 
{ <m. , m. 1 > I i=2, . . . , 4} E E J. ].-
which will give truth conditions according to the following 
patterns, where x,y,z are variables corresponding to discourse 
referents for terms that have their first occurrence in s 1 , s 2 , 
s 3 respectively: 
for DRs 1 : 
DRS 2a): 
DRS 2b): 
3 xyz ( tjJ 1 A tjJ 2 1\ tjJ 3 ) (if 
3x(<V 1 ) A 3y(<V 2 ) A 3x(<V 3 ) 
3 X ( tjJ l 1\ 3 y ( tjJ 2 A 3 Ztjl 3 ) ) 
S. is 
J. 
tjJ • for i=l , 2, 3) 
1 
If x is not free in <V 2 , tjl 3 , y not free in <V 1 ,<V 3 and z not 
free in <V 1 ,tjl 2 , the three are equivalent. If y is not free in 
<V 1 , and z is not free in <V 1 ,<V 2 , 1) and 2b) are equivalent. 
I have chosen alternative 1) for the following reasons: 
i) Intuitively I understand non-restrictive relatives as a 
string of additional informations to one and the same term, 
and not as isolated additional information to a hierarchy of 
terms. 
ii) Alternative 1) (and 2b)) gives the possibility of coreferen-
tiality between coordinate clauses, as we would need for 
instance in: 
(12) You know Bill, the one ".rho metti:3irl 1 at this party last 
year, who took hir to Hawaii spending all his savings, who 
was then le:H by his v1ife and \vho has been a heavy drinker 
ever since, , ... 
iii) If the reduction order of t.he clauses are from left to 
right, 1) and 2b) always give equivalent truth conditions. 
1) is then preferable as it gives a simpler DRS. 
No restrictions has so far been made with respect to the kind 
of sentences relative clauses can h:! made from. It seems quite 
clear that only simple sentences can be used, but there might also 
be other restrictions regarding the complexity of the sentence. 
Other restrictions, 1 island constraints, restrictions against 
crossing depencies etc. may also be imposed on the relative clause 
formation. 
One of the main virtues of the "Cooper stores" is the great 
flexibility ~vith respect to quantifier scope (and order) and core-
ferentiality. TI1e only limitation to this flexibility is that 
"donkey-structures" (including the structures in (3) and (4)) are 
not feasible. 
The Cooper interpretation process builds interpretations for 
compound phrases from the interpretations already calcu)...ated for 
the constituents. The interpretation process is difficult to 
follow, and even my intuition regarding the construction of sen-
tences being vague, I do not think it looks much like what goes on 
at human sentence construction. As an illustration of what a 
language user grasps at hearing/reading a text, I think the DRS-
system gets far better off. 
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The DRS-system as it stands puts obvious constraints on the 
quantifier scope and order, and with that on the coreferentiality. 
The quantitier scope and order is determined by the left to right 
direction, and the possibility of choice for discourse referents 
for pronouns is determined by reduction order and the subordinate 
relation. It is, however, possible to modify the rules for DRS-
construction to obtain flexibility in quantifier scope and order: 
Replace the first period in rule C2 (the one beginning with "Let" 
and ending with "y ") with: 
If yES and a' 
let a denote 
is a te1~ in y, then 
[:. if a' is on the form otherwise ~ p , ~ E T, p E RC 
and let r denote the index of the occurrence in question 
of a. 
With this modificat.ion, ','ife can alter the quantifier scope in L 1 • 
Note that tvJO complete DRSs for the same discourse D need at 
this not be alphabetic variants of each other except possibly for 
the choice of coreferentiality for pronouns. Even with a restric-
tion on the reduction order, a term can now corefer with any suit-
able pronoun in its scope, also pronouns occuring to the left of 
it in the sentence. This is far too much flexibility and one can 
easily imagine constraints that one would want to impose on this 
modification: constraints against quantifying out of sentences 
(including relative clauses), island constraints etc. 
Some unanswered questions 
The preferable reading of a sentence is normally the reading 
with the quantifier scope and order as given from left to right in 
a written representation of the sentence. Several examples are put 
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forward to support the need of reordering the scope and order, 
among which are the following: 
(13) Every Englishman admires a woman 
a) namely his mother 
b) namely the Queen 
(Engdahl 1980) 
(14) Guinevere has a bone in every corner of the house 
(Rodman 1976. I got it from Cooper 1983, Ch V, 2.5) 
A reversed quantifier order is not necessary for the readings 
we want for (l3)b, as we can obtain the correct interpretation 
also with the left-to~right order. (14) however gives evidence for 
the need of wide-scope mechanisms, unless there is some other way 
of interpreting indefinite descriptions (i.e. something like 
value-free and value-loaded interpretations of Barwise and Perry 
(1980) or the approach taken in situation semantics(Barwise and 
Perry 1983)). Such techniques may also be adequate in the inter-
pretation of sentences like 
(15) As you go north through the valley, the towns get smaller 
( Hellan 1 980) 
A strong candidate against the DRS-·treatment of "donkey-sentences" 
is the following example~ 
(16) Every man who has a daughter thinks she is the most beauti-
ful girl in the world. (Cooper 1979) 
Cooper asserts that the DRS~treatment would "commit any father of 
more than one daughter to the contradictory belief that each of his 
daughters is the most beautiful girl in the world" (Cooper 1979). 
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3. Application of the DRS-analysis to Situation Semantics. 
3.1. Introduction. 
In part 1 and 2 we discussed questions of quantifier scope 
and anaphoric relations between noun phrases through a study of 
the storage mechanisms developed by R. Cooper (Cooper 1983) and 
the theory of Discourse Representation Systems (Kamp 1981). 
The storage systems turned out to be successful in treating 
many problems of quantifier scope in natural languages, but seem 
unable to handle sentences where there is a conflict with respect 
to the need of wide-scope mechanisms. Extension of the analysis 
of Kamp (1981) to cover the syntactic fragment of Cooper (1983) 
enabled us to obtain a satisfactory treatment of some of the 
examples that could not be handled by the storage method. 
The way the DRS describe simple parts of the world by each 
DR, and systematic relations between these simple parts also gives 
a picture of what a language user 'grasps' at hearing/reading a 
text. This feature is strongly reinforced by the correspondence 
between the theory of DRS and situation semantics (Barwise and 
Perry 1983), a promising alternative to the traditional possible 
world semantics. 
Situation semantics is based on a set of individuals A, a 
set of n-ary relations over A for each nE~ and a set L of 
space-time locations. The system also provides a rich number of 
concepts to describe parts of the model (reality), events and 
courses of events, together with a theory of meaning for the 
model. 
How does language get into this machinery so powerful with 
respect to describing reality? To have the means to describe 
reality is one thing, to know what an expression in a (human) 
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language means is anothero Barwise and Perry write: 
"'The linguistic meanings of expressions in a language are 
conventional constraints on utterances. To study semantics 
is to attempt to spell out these constraints, to spell out 
what it is the native speaker knows in knowing ivhat utteran-
ces of his language mean. 
Given an indicative sentence t• we think of the meaning of 
1 as a relation u[~]e between situations u in which ~ 
is uttered and situations e described by such utterances. 
The relation constrains both u and e." 
{Barwise and Perry 1983, a1. 6) 
The theory of DRS gives the means for finding the relations 
that have to hold bet'll.reen the individuals assigned to the dis-
course referents to satisfy the truth conditions of the sentence. 
Can this be used as a means for evaluating the same aspect of the 
meaning relation in situation semantics? My answer to the question 
is yes, and I will in the following indicate how this can be done. 
The event-type in situation semantics describe elements in a situ-
ation structure in very much the same way as the DR describes 
(sub) models of a model for DRS-theory. I will not give any com-
plete system or exact specification of the correspondence rules in 
this paper, but merely illustrate the use of DRS-theory in con-
struction of the meaning relation [~] by means of two examples. 
Familiarity with situation semantics is assumed, and concepts and 
rules from "Situations and Attitudes" will therefore be used with-
out further comments. The definition of the most central concepts 
will, however, be included. 
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3.2. The meaning relation u[.]e. 
Recall the folloV~ring concepts from "Situations and Attitudes": 
Definition 31: Let DU be the event-type 
DU: = at 1: speaking, ~: yes 
addressing, ~~~; yes 
saying, ~.~; yes 
If there is one and only one anchor f for DU such that a 
c.o.e. or state of affairs (situation) d is of type DU, then we 
call d a discourse situation. 
Definition 32: An utterance situation u consists of a discourse 
situation d and possibly of a situation c called the speakers 
connections consisting of situations of the type 
cu~_= = at ~~: saying, ~·.§.J yes 
referring to, ~.fi_.~i yesl3) 
where 
_!I!_ ~ ~. for one or more of the subexpressions .§._ in a:. 
Notation 5: If U is an utterance situation-type for $, and ~ 
is a subexpression of • such that CU~ ~ U, we let 
CU(~) = <~',CU~>, that is, the role of the referent of ~ in 
CU~. If u = de is an utterance situation of •, \ve write c(~) 
for the referent of i!_ in c, and let id, ade bd' a:d denote the 
values of ~~~~~~~ in d respectively. 
Definition 33: A statement ~ of an expression $ is an ordered 
triple ~ = <d,c,.> where u = d,c is an utterance situation of •· 
An expression • expresses a meaning relation, a conventional 
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constraint between utterance situations and described situations. 
~ve adopt the notation from Barwise and Perry (1983) of writing 
for for will be on 
the following form~ 
Notation 6: [~]: = at i : involves, U,E~ yes 
u 
where 
- u ~ DU'[ <a,$>]ucu, cu posibly empty, 
-- <P 4> 
DU' is DU with the addition of uniqueness 
reguirements for the linguistic roles. 
- E is specified by the analysis of 4> as is to be 
illustrated below. 
[$] may contain more than a simple constraint. 
Note that this means that 
( 1 7) uE MF [ .] 
-<P 
iff u is of type 
and ~ e • e • 
U = DU' U CU 
1 
and a = 4>_ 
-d 
iff u is an utterance situation of type 
The simple constraint 
and a = 4> 
-d and e e ., 0 • 
C: = at 1 : involves U,E; yes 
u 
in i[q>] holds a unique position for [4>] as a meaning relation 
ull¢Jl.e. That is, if [_<P.ff contains other requirements, additions 14 ) 
or constraints, these are subordinate to c. No definition of how 
non-simple constraints work is given in "Situations and Attitu-
des", and we will propose the following defective definitions to 
comply with meaning constraints UJl : 
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Definition 34: If [~] is a constraint on the form as in nota-
tion 6, then 
i) uEMF[~l if u is of type U 
ii) If EMF then u["'] e 1' f u [4>], 'I' 
\ff(U[ f]c_::u => 3g(E[ fUg]c_::e 1\ •••• ) 
where f,g are anchors with domains c the set of indeterminates 
for U,E respectively, and the additional conditions denoted by 
in [cj>]. in notation 6 vvill specify ..... 
This definition is equivalent to the corresponding definitions for 
simple constraints in "Situations and Attitudes". 
We also define 
Definition 35: The interpretation of a statement ~ = <d,c,cj>> is 
[~l = {eld,c[cj>]e} 
If uE MF [~], we have 
( 1 8) [~] = {eld,cnle} = {eluMOUJ!e} 
= {e!U[f] is part of u and e is of type E[f] 
for a total anchor f for u} 
Note that Barwise and Perry seems to give a different definition 
in Ch. 6 and in the definition of ALIASS (Barwise and 
Perry 1983). The form given here is more general, and in accor-
dance with the outlines and explanations of "Situations and Atti-
tudes". 
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In part 2, we defined the conditions for a discourse D = <~> 
to be true in a total model M on a reading ~ = <K,A,E> (rela-
tive to a function c). The conditions require that the total 
model M contains a specified submodel, or that it systematically 
contains several specified submodels, depending on the type of the 
sentence. In situation semantics, the underlying structure is 
more sophisticated: 
Definition 36: A structure ~ of situations consist of a collec-
tion M of c.o.e's (the factual c.o.e's) \>lith a non-empty sub-
collection (the actual c.o.e's) satisfying: 
i) Every eEM0 is coherent 
ii) eEM A eo=e => e 0EM 
iii) X is a subset of M => 3eEM0 (ve'EX(e''=.e)) 
iv) If C is any constraint in M, then M respects c. 
Our program is now to characterize those situations in a 
situation structure rn that are described by the expression ~ 
on the basis of the utterance situation of ~. More precisely: we 
want to specify the meaning relation [4>} expressed by ~ on the 
reading D = <K,A,E> of D = <~>, depending systematically on the 
utterance situation of ~· [~] is to be specified so that given 
a statement of ~. ~ = <d,c,~>, if a c.o.e eE[~], that is, if e 
is a model for ~ in the sense of situation semantics, and ~ is 
a simple indicative sentence without non-restrictive relatives, 
then e will be a model verifying ~ with respect to n in the 
DRS-theory. If ~ is true in m then a model verifying ~ with 
respect to V in the DRS-theory can be constructed by union of 
situations in ·T)\ ignoring locations, if the difference of loca-
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tions does not contribute substantially to the truth conditions of 
¢ in m. 
Given an utterance situation u such that uE MF [(p], 
eE [<I? ] iff u[<p] e. ¢1 will be absolutely true in ffi if 11\J 
u 
respects [~], and for simple indicative sentences, ¢ is true 
uttered in u if [q,} nM0 =t: ¢. For sentences that require systema-
tic patterns of simple situations, like universals or conditions, 
this may be a too strong requirement. We may want a universal 
statement to be true for a structure if the structure respects the 
conditions set by the statement without the conditions themselves 
being part of the structure. In this paper, however, we will not 
go further into problems concerning universals and conditions, but 
concentrate on simple indicative sentences without universal 
terms. 
3.3. Specification of u[¢]e by means of DRS-theory. Two examples. 
The meaning relations in these examples are not complete, and 
important aspects of the meaning of expressions, like tense, will 
be ignored or treated in an ad hoc manner. The focus is on the 
relations between the individuals referred to by the noun phrases, 
and we make use of the following notation: 
Notation 7: For every discourse referent vEV in the theory of 
DRS, we let v denote a special individual indeterminant in the 
situation semantics. 
L1 has unique syntax representations (up to the numbering of the 
nodes in the syntax tree) for the two examples we present, and 
syntax analyses will therefore be omitted. The numbering of 
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occurrences corresponds to a leftmost branch numbering of the 
syntax trees. He also make use of the following notation: 
Notation 8: Syntactic expressions are underlined. Capital let-
ters are used in denoting real individuals or relations over A, 
apart from the special system relations. 
~xample 1: ~ 1 = Jackie bites Molly 
mo: v,w 
<Jackie bites Molly, 1 > 
<v = Jackie, 2> 
<v bites Molly, 1 > 
<w = Holly, 5> 
<v bites \v' 1 > 
D1 gives the meaning relation: 
E0 : at ~ 0 : same,~~ cu 1 (Jackie): yes 
same, ~· cu1 (Molly): yes 
BITES, ~~~~ yes 
E0 corresponds closely to the DR m0 , \vi th one line in E0 
corresponding to each atomary occurrence in m0 . Note that E0 
depends on the utterance situation for the referents for Jackie 
and Molly. A specification of U in [~ 1 ] (which we omit here, 
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as we are mainly interested in the right part of the relations 
[~] rising from expressions $) should therefore include 
CUJackie and CUMolly-situation types as part of the speakers 
connections description (see Definition 32). E0 should also 
depend on the utterance situation in the choice of referent for 
~0 , according to some rule for present tense. 
Notation 9: If r is a n-ary relation, e a c.o.e, we write 
re,J.'x1 , ••• ,xn for in e: =at ~:r,x 1 , ••• ,xn; yes 
If n = or n = 2, we may also write 
for and for 
respectively. We may denote same o e,"" by - e, 1 · 
Now, given a statement of Ql 1 I <Ill = <dleCl,$1>' where 
c 1 (Jackie) = JACKIE and c 1 (Holly) = MOLLY, (and such that 
uEMF[tPlJ!) we get 
eE (<I>] iff uEMFU 1] and u[<!> 11 e 
iff u is of type u[c] => e is of type E0[c] 
for every total anchor c for U. 
iff (c 1 (Jackie) = JACKIE A c 1 (Molly) = ~10LLY) 
t 
3fEA{~,~} (f(~) = c (Jackie) A f(~) = c (Molly) e, 1 0 1 e, 1 0 l 
A f(~) BITES n f(~)) 
e,""o 
iff 3fEA{~~~} (f(~) = JACKIE A f(~) = MOLLY 
e,1 0 e,1 0 
A f(~) BITES o f(w)) 
e'"" o 
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This is exactly the condition for e to verify 4> 1 on the 
reading .1)1 in the theory of DRS. 
Example 2: ~ 2 = Pedro, who owns a donkey, beats it. 
In 4> 2 , who owns a donkey is a non-restrictive relative. A donkey 
is therefore not to core fer with it (unless by accident) , and the 
use of it is deictic. 
V' = { u} 
c( v) = CHIQUITA 
mo: w m,; y 
<Pedro, who owns a donkey, beats it, 1 > <w ov;ns a donkey, 4> 
<w = Pedro, 3> <donkey (y), 1 0> 
<w beats it, 1> <w owns y,4> 
<\v beats v, 1 > 
] 2 gives the meaning relation: 
This 
Each 
same 
at J. : 
u 
yes 
E0 : at ~0 : same,~~ CU~(Pedro); yes 
BEATS, ~' CU~ (it)~ yes 
E1 at ~l: DONKEY, y; yes 
ovms, ~~ y~ yes 
specification of u;n corresponds closely 
DR, Eo and El corresponds to the DRs 
to 
mo 
way as Eo to mo in example 1 • The relation 
the DRS :D2. 
and ml in the 
< between E 
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and is implemented by use of a new concept called addi-
tion. The addition is based on a primitive relation 'besides' in 
very much the same way as the constraint is based on 'involves': 
Definition 37: An addition B is a state of affairs on the form 
B: =at~= besides, s 0 ,s 1 ~ yes 
where s 0 ,s1 are uniform schemata. 
Definition 38: e 0 is meaningful with respect to B, e 0EMFB 
if is of type 
Definition 39: If e 0~MFB, e 1 is a meaningful addition to e 0 
with respect to B, e 0MABe 1, if 
and is of type 
for a total anchor f for s 0 . 
Definition 40: A structure of situations "frv respects B if 
We also imagine a 5th requirement added to the definition of a 
situation structure to respect every factual addition. 
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Now, assuming that ~ 2 has to be anchored in some systematic way 
according to ~ and some rule for the present tense, we get the 
following result given a statement of ~ 2, g)2 = <d2,c2<P2>, \>lhere 
c 2 (Pedro) = PEDRO and c 2 (it) = CHIQUITA (and uE MF [~ ZD ) : 
eE[tii~ iff uMF[cfJ ] and u[<l> 2] e 
2 
for every c with domain c the set of indeterminates 
used in U. 
iff c 2 (Pedro) = PEDRO'' c 2 (it) = CHIQUITA 
A 3gEAb!J(E0 [gUc) ~ e A 3e'3g'EA{y}(E1[dJ9Jg'] c e')) 
iff c 2 (Pedro) = PEDRO A c 2 (it) = CHIQUITA 
A 3gEAh::} (g(w) = c 2 (Pedro) A g(~) BEATS a c 2 (it) 
- e,~o e,""o 
A 3e'3g'EA{y} (DONKEY , (g' (y)) 
e , ~ 1 
A g ( ~) OWNS I ~ g ' ( y) ) ) 
e ' 1 
iff 3gEA{w} (g(w) = PEDRO A g(w) BEATS o CHIQUITA 
- e,~o - e,""o 
A 3e'3g'EA{y} (DONKEY , (g' (y)) 
e , ~ 1 
A g(w)m-JNS, n g'(y))) 
- e , ""1 
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In the DRS-theory we have: 
D :::: «jl2 > is true in M on .D relative to c 2 
iff 
3 fEU{ w} ( f(w) = PEDRO 1\ f(w} BEATS c(v) 
1\ 3f'U{y} (DONKEY(f'(y)) 1\ f(w} OWNS f' ( y) ) ) . 
In this example, [~ 2] is not a simple constraint. It constrains 
the situation structure in such a way that it requires a certain 
pattern of situations. The interpretation, however, is not a set 
of such patterns, but of situations e satisfying the conditions 
of the main clause without the non-restrictive relative - if the 
required pattern of situations can be found in the situation 
structure for e, that is. 
The truth condition [~ 2lnM0t¢ will not be affected by this 
choice of what situations are described, as eE [~ iD only provided 
the existence of e'. Hodels for JJ 2 in the sense of DRS-theory 
will constitute the "best approximations" to situation structures 
ht such that e,e'EM, if locations are ignored. 
There may be reasons for preferring other ways to implement 
<E when not preceeded by <A, like using schemata in the main 
constraint in [$1 or choosing to let the addition be the 
situation-type of the described situation. The reason for the 
choice made here is that [~l remains a set of situations that 
can be regarded as described by the utterance of ~. and does not 
become a set of sets of situations nor a set of situations that 
are additions. ¢ 2 talks about the beating that Pedro does, and 
not about the relation between the non-restrictive relative an the 
main clause. 
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3.4. Conclusion. 
We have now given some ilustrations of the connection between 
the theory of Discourse Representation Structures (Kamp 1981) as 
set out in part 2, and situations semantics (Barwise and Perry 
1983). By this we have tried to show that a complete DRS for an 
expression ~ generates substantial parts of the meaning relation 
[~} in situation semantics. Focus is on the meaning relation 
[~], and not on the interpretation [~! of statements of ~. 
though we have also carried out calculations for the elements e 
of [~! in order to study the truth conditions of the statements 
obtained by using [$] . 
Many other interesting aspects of the meaning of expressions 
may"be worked into this frame, not only regarding the technical 
specification of the relation [$!, but also regarding the diffe-
rence between what a statement means for the sender and what it 
means for the receiver, the latter having other (usually far less) 
information about the utterance situation than the former. 
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Notes. 
*This paper is extracts and refinements of my (unpublished) 
cand.scient. thesis (Sem 1983). I wish to thank my advisor, 
Professor Jens Erik Fenstad for valuable advice and encouragement 
both in the work of my thesis and in the work of this paper. I 
wish also to thank both him and Jan Tore L¢nning for comments on 
earlier versions of this paper. 
1 ) Apart from the ones we want to rule out by various semantic 
filters. 
2) That is, he opens for the possibility of more than one gap, 
while giving a single gap constraint in Ch. V, 2.3. 
3) Remember that the intension is a function that yields a deno-
tation for each world, and that the intension can be con-
structed from the denotations for each vlorld. To put the 
denotation rather than the intension as the first term in the 
interpretations is just a matter of notational choice. The 
calculation of the denotation of some types of compound 
expressions, like e.g. in semantic rule 2, may require the 
intension and not only the denotation of one or both of the 
constituents. 
4) See notation 1 for a description of NP-int and Prop. 
5) For alternative b), [who] NP' [what] NP' [which} NP will get 
their correct denotations by the standard rule 
II [a J XII = II a II An exception rule is therefore not 
a,w a,'<'~ 
required in this case. 
6) The examples are there calculated in a fragment with the 
syntax of Fragment 6 in Cooper (1983), but with semantics 
d 'f'd. 'l l 6II d6III S f h mo 1 1e s1m1 ar y to Fragment an . orne o t e 
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words in example 4 are exchanged to get a more natural 
sentence. The structure and the calculation process remain 
the same except for the substitution of words. 
7) The numbers used in the storage mechanisms are arbitrarily 
chosen between the odd or even numbers, and will not be 
further commented. 
8) This sentence is quite heavy even in Norwegian. It may there-
fore be useful to give a contex·t for it: 
"Mari vet lite om hester, men tror at enhver hest kaster sin 
eier av, iallfall hvis eieren er en mann. Hittil har hun 
bare fAtt bekreftet sin tro, idet enhver hest Mari kjenner en 
mann sam eier, kaster ham av." 
The first ~ may or may not be omitted. 
9) Names of the syntax categories will in the following be as in 
Kamp ( l 981 ) and not as in Cooper ( 1 983) . 
10) Only one restrictive relative is permitted for each CN in L 1 • 
The use of non-atomic qualifiers is therefore not necessary. 
We could have followed the Kamp-technique of splitting the 
basic common noun from the relative clause when reducing the 
expression in which the common noun with the relative clause 
is a constituent of the main t.erm. However, the use of non-
atomic qualifiers also serves other purposes: 
i} The rules for construction of DRSs can be made simp-
ler and more systematic, with smaller and more general 
reduction steps. 
ii) Every DR will have a main occurrence which is the 
ancestor to all the other occurrences in the DR. 
iii) It opens for a uniform treatment of more complicated 
CN phrases in a larger fragment. 
iv) t.h one occurrence 
t:erms on the form 
v) The DR:S s l repr-es;:::nt meaning as 
list 'l'he 
entire in our 
(See de:f of DR and 
DRS.) 
1 1 ) At de i Xi G , 
12) The l deictic 
means) between some 
particular s ln A 
verify '1- scourse, relative to 
ible with c. 
13} An extxa ifferent 
occurrences of the it here for 
readabil occur once 
in one es. 
l 4) See under of addi-
tions. 
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